

April 2, 2001

To: Secretary Rumsfeld
From: Rudy de Leon **R**
cc: Andy Marshall
Subject: Comments on the Draft Defense Strategy Review

38

I have examined Andy Marshall's Draft 03/08/01 and have had the opportunity to have two discussions with him on the document. It is thoughtful and should provide for a needed discussion of the kind of military capabilities needed by the United States in the 21st Century.

In terms of actual edits, I will provide some further suggested edits directly to Andy Marshall. I want to use this brief memo to discuss larger trends.

A new century begins as the old one ended. America is the world's military and economic super-power. This brings both challenge and responsibility. Our area of responsibility (AOR) will not be one region but continue to be the entire world. The dynamics of the global economy will force us to spend more time and energy looking across the Pacific. But, Europe and the Middle East will continue to be areas of major interest. So, too, will be Mexico and Latin America.

In terms of the needed military capabilities for this period, the paper continues to build on the unique technological advantages of our country:

- Our ability to strike an adversary at a distance greater than the adversary may strike us back, and to thus deter that adversary from using force;
- Logistics and Mobility that sustain our forces and that give us global reach;
- Skilled military leadership that is professional in the planning and execution of military operations; and
- Communications and Intelligence systems that provide both strategic and situational awareness in almost any circumstance.

2 Apr 01

The Marshall paper provides a framework for looking at how we can maintain these advantages in the future. In my discussions with Andy, I raised these points:

- We should address the tension that exists between tools designed to win long range wars and how they differ from those best suited to deter conflict:



U07104 / 01

- The loss of rationality since the Cold War, portrayed by Saddam Hussein's occasionally irrational use of his military, complicates our efforts to dissuade him when we are relying on weapons built to provide striking power for our forces. Forces dedicated to presence/deterrence make an unambiguous statement of commitment to both friends and enemies. But these may not necessarily be the best forces for combat if deterrence fails.
- The merits of experimentation and innovation are well addressed. The importance/ of experimentation should cause us to build on service experimentation and training, and incorporate joint and combined experimentation.
 - A model that merits potential application of this is the Combined Air-Intelligence-Ops Center employed in Southern NATO Operations.
 - US CINC JOINT FORCES COMMAND should be tasked to develop a joint and combined experimentation proposal that builds upon his existing work on interoperability.
 - The US efforts in joint experimentation, once initiated, should be expanded to include joint experimentation with our major allies and coalition partners. For the foreseeable future we are likely to deploy with our allies and be shoulder-to-shoulder partners during deployments. We should invite them to be part of our experimentation. This will help prevent interoperability problems and force our allies to get serious about investing in their required future capabilities.
- We must incorporate a method to identify "breakout technologies", those that change the way we think about the battlefield.
 - Just as GPS and cruise missiles broke us out from past ways to operate/strike, what technologies may cause future shifts? Global Hawk and Unmanned Combat Air Vehicle (a UCAV with a weapon) are two that might fit the bill. However, for these technologies to be fielded in a timely way the requirements process must become much more disciplined and focus on the "capable" technology rather than the "perfect" technology.
- We should address Information Operations as an operation challenge and not simply a technology. This means we must change the focus from beyond hardware and networks to the content of our information operations. Both offense and defense need new thinking.
 - We have serious vulnerabilities (nothing can sink shipboard morale faster than spurious e-mails) and have put little effort into the content of both offensive and defensive uses of the information.
 - For example, we knew Milosevic had secret, out-of-country bank accounts but could not influence his countrymen with that information.
- The United States must also continue its efforts with the asymmetric threats and the development of capabilities to deal with:



- Counter-terrorism and Consequence Management. Can we stop the terrorist attack from occurring, and if that fails, can we provide civil support to law enforcement to restore order and confidence.
 - Counter-intelligence. The greatest threat to our advances in technology may come from within. Can we protect our secrets?
 - Ballistic and Cruise Missile Defense.
 - Information Network Security. Can we protect and defend the information systems that have become essential to our economic success and national security?
 - Medical Readiness: Can we take care of our troops by safeguarding their health on the battlefield of the future?
- Efforts to reduce uncertainty must be balanced. Throughout history, nations' militaries have been largely unsuccessful in achieving a satisfactory level of certainty about adversaries' capabilities and intentions.
- In ambiguous times, we must consider investment in resources that thrive on uncertainty vice chasing the ideal of complete knowledge.

The Marshall paper is an excellent tool for identifying the military capabilities needed for the United States to . . . Deter . . . Dissuade . . . Win

In addition there needs to be a piece that outlines the national security strategy that will fully utilize these military capabilities. For example the National Security Commission (Rudman-Hart-Gingrich) discusses the following:

American national security strategy must find its anchor in US national security interests, interests that must be both protected and advanced for the fundamental well being of American society. We define these interests at three levels: survival interests, without which America would cease to exist as we know it; critical interests, which are causally one step removed from survival interests; and significant interests, which importantly affect the global environment in which the United States must act.

Interesting enough, while the Commission proposes the elimination of the two major regional conflict policy, it does not offer substitute thinking on the alternative.


That is the remaining work. Specifically, in a dangerous world, how should the force structure be sized.



snowflake

TO: Rudy Deleon
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
cc: Andy Marshall
DATE: March 26, 2001
SUBJECT: **Defense Strategy**

By **this** memo I am requesting that you read Our latest version of the defense strategy. Then please dictate your comments and thoughts, and send both Andy and me a copy.



DHR/azn
0325601.03



U06214 /01

381

AMARU