

DoD 13

MEMORANDUM OF PHONE CALL WITH BRENT SCOWCROFT
January 22, 1976
Milden Hall Airport
London

Scowcroft called me on the plane. Said he wanted to talk to me on a secure phone. Said he wanted to give me a slight idea of the NSC meeting yesterday after the President read Kissinger's cable. He asked Holloway how many launches the navy programed on surface ships. Holloway said that there was no Navy program. The best is by 82, we'd have six ships--strike cruisers -- would have 8 launches per ship and no idea of reload capability. He left the impression, doubted that the whole surface launch cruise missile concept. The meeting turned into shambles. The President was upset as he's ever seen him. This development left the impression that there as a discontinuity between Rumsfeld, Brent and the Chiefs. I said I was not terribly surprised at what Holloway had said. Clement, Brown and I had always said that about the surface ship program. That it was new technology, we didn't have a program, we had a concept. We were well ahead in the technology and for that reason, we should go slow limiting it. And that the last place you would ever get a creative thought is probably out of the people who are running the weapons systems we now have. That that's for people who are looking for 5, 10, 20 years. And as we have all said, it is practically impossible to really know with any precision to really know what our needs would be and of course that depends also on third country acquisition of such weapons systems and it depends also on whether it is nuclear or conventional. He said --he talked about my cable and he said that wasn't a problem. I said Holloway may just have been being very conservative. He may have been being answering a question that the President hadn't asked.

Scowcroft said the President was not upset with Holloway but on the discontinuity between Brown and Holloway. He said he guessed that Henry would come back with nothing. He said the President didn't want to have another meeting today. He wanted to wait until I got back. Scowcroft said he was going to go ahead and meet with Clements and Holloway that day. He said that Brezhev delayed the meeting that morning for an ___ bureau meeting. No indication to the kind of breakthrough it would require for a decision.

I gave Brent a report on the NPG



NOT
Accelerate
D/R

MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION

Phone conversation between Rumsfeld and Scowcroft
1030 EDT, 22 January 76

1. Over secure voice telephone, Secretary Rumsfeld (in Mildenhall, England) talked with Brent Scowcroft (in Washington).
Main points summarized below in sequence:

Scowcroft -- I want to give you a slight idea of what happened at NSC meeting yesterday (21 Jan. 1730 EDT). After the President had read SECSTATE's cable (SITREP of 21 January discussions with Brezhnev), he asked Adm. Holloway (Acting CJCS) how many SLCM launchers the Navy projects for surface combatants. Holloway replied that there is no Navy program yet, but that by 1982 there could be six strike cruisers with eight launchers each (48 launchers total . . . no at-sea reload capability).

That reply left an impression of doubt about the whole surface combatant SLCM concept. The meeting turned into a shambles, with the President as upset as I've ever seen him.

This was a development which appears very different from what has been the understanding.

Rumsfeld -- That's no surprise. It is what Gen. Brown, SECSTATE, Clements and I have said previously in VP/NSC meetings . . . the Navy has only a concept for SLCM, not a doctrine. New technology always tends to come faster than the uniformed Services can come along. There's no contradiction to what was said at last NSC meeting. The number "eight" was used as the Navy's present plan (i.e. eight strike cruisers).

Scowcroft -- The Navy had great reluctance to even consider a response . . . that's what was different from the SECSTATE and RUMSFELD cables. (Latter refers to SECDEF 220350Z Jan 76.) SECSTATE seemed to want to go back to submarine-launched CM as a better option.

Rumsfeld -- Interesting. . . the only thing I can think of is our (SECDEF/CJCS/Scowcroft) obligation to put these things to the President in a balanced way. Pro and con arguments. People like Holloway, who are not present for these meetings regularly, don't realize that President may only recall details of latest position. (Holloway must have spoken in a very careful, cautious, conservative way.) Had I been there, I would have cited numerous discontinuities in the SLCM program,



- It's a new technology
- We're well ahead
- Uniformed Services not likely to come forward with a good idea of employment.

So we don't want to close off any options for ourselves.

Scowcroft -- The President is not upset with Holloway, but with discontinuity between Brown and Holloway representations.

I guess SECSTATE will come back with nothing . . . the President does not want a meeting today, he'd rather wait until you get back.

Rumsfeld -- Has SECSTATE had two meetings with Brezhnev since the cable we saw? If the situation got to the point where quick, urgent decisions were needed, Gen. Brown and I would have little more to add than what our cable said. You might want to meet with Clements and Holloway . . .

Scowcroft -- Second meeting on 21 January, but morning meeting on 22 January was delayed for Politburo meeting. There's no indication of the kind of breakthrough that would be required to get a good decision.

Rumsfeld -- You should break out NSC notes to show the President that Clements and I made those points (i.e. new technology, US lead, protect options) in two or three meetings.

Scowcroft -- SECSTATE may come home with no agreement . . . the President had no problem with your cable.

2. Conversations then turned briefly to NPG, Rumsfeld assessing it as a good meeting. Cited MOD Leber agreement.

