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CHAIRMAN
of the
Joint Chiefs of Staff

Date: 13 July 2004

MEMO TO: The Honorable Donald Rumsfeld
Secretary of Defense

Subject: Iraqi Force Estimate

Mr. Secretary,

Sir, this package responds to your tasking about force levels in Iraq that resulted from Amb. Bremer's memo.

This is a good product, although slightly out of date given the work we're doing with GEN Casey on the Iraq Strategy. I recommend you review this package with that in mind.

A handwritten signature in black ink, appearing to read "R. B. Myers".

RICHARD B. MYERS
General, USAF

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OSD 76673-04



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CHAIRMAN OF THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF

WASHINGTON, D.C. 20318-9999

INFO MEMO

CM-1925-04
13 July 2004

FOR: SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

FROM: General Richard B. Myers, CJCS *RBMyers 7/9*

SUBJECT: Force Estimate for Iraq (U)

- **Question.** (§) "Questions have been raised about whether US, Coalition and Iraqi force levels in Iraq are adequate. This issue has been raised by some Members of Congress and some retired generals. Most recently, I received a memorandum from Ambassador Bremer asking that the issue be reviewed. This is, of course, an issue that you and I have been reviewing continuously with General Abizaid and the Chiefs as circumstances have evolved.

(§) In light of the new and emerging conditions, it would be useful to develop a current, careful assessment of this question, so that all risks can be properly weighed. If possible, please get back to me ... with an initial military estimate ... of force levels appropriate to accomplish the mission in Iraq," ...to include any other considerations that General Abizaid and/or the Chiefs may feel are appropriate. (TAB A)

- **Answer.** (§) Commander, USCENTCOM (CDRUSCENTCOM), constantly evaluates the number of forces required to be successful in Iraq. CDRUSCENTCOM believes forces in theater are adequate to perform the current tasks and has developed options to request more forces should the current environment change.
- **Analysis.** (§) The current force level in Iraq is 18 US brigades and 5 Coalition brigades. This force level will be reduced to 17 US brigades and 5 Coalition brigades by Aug 04 due to previously scheduled troop rotations. Forces are currently resourced at this level through Mar 06 (the end of Operation IRAQI FREEDOM 3). A recent CDRUSCENTCOM estimate, however, provides a more optimistic forecast that predicts by Jul 04, Multi-National Forces-Iraq will begin the transition to local control and by Jan 05 it may be able to transition to regional control, reducing force requirements to only 7 US brigades. TAB B provides amplifying information.

COORDINATION: (U) TAB C

Attachments:
As stated

Classified By: _____
Reason: 1.5 (a)
Declassify On: 15 June 2014

Lt Gen, USAF; DJ-3

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Date: January 9 2009 12958
ApLAW EO 12958, as amended
Chief, RDD, ESD, WHS

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OSD 76673-04

TAB A


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May 21, 2004

TO: General Myers

CC: Paul Wolfowitz

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld



SUBJECT: Force Estimate for Iraq

Questions have been raised about whether US, Coalition and Iraqi force levels in Iraq are adequate. This issue has been raised by some Members of Congress and some retired generals. Most recently, I received a memorandum from Ambassador Bremer asking that the issue be reviewed. This is, of course, an issue that you and I have been reviewing continuously with General Abizaid and the Chiefs as circumstances have evolved.

In light of the new and emerging conditions, it would be useful to develop a current, careful assessment of this question, so that all risks can be properly weighed.

If possible, please get back to me by May 27 with an initial military estimate, based on work with General Abizaid and the Joint Chiefs, of force levels appropriate to accomplish the mission in Iraq, to include the following considerations:

- Respond effectively to violence at the current level and possible alternative levels;
- Provide protection for lines of communication and critical infrastructure;
- Provide force protection for CPA/Mission and selected UN and Iraqi civil officials, as appropriate; and
- Provide support for accelerated training and equipping of Iraqi security forces, if appropriate.

Issues to consider include:

- Availability of forces estimated;
- Sustainability of level of effort estimated that may be required;



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Tab A

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- Evaluation of any risks in other theaters if the forces estimated were committed;
- Impact on rebalancing the force and the Army transformation; and
- Additional roles Iraqi forces might play if their resources were once again increased.

Please provide your assessment in brigade-level increments.

In addition, please provide a separate assessment of the possible force requirements at the end of this year that might be appropriate to provide security for the planned elections. Include an assessment of:

- Iraqi security forces planned to be available at the end of this year and their capability;
- What capabilities international forces might provide, based on a realistic evaluation of their ROEs and performances to date;
- What role new Coalition partners, including Turkey, Pakistan, and others might play, if that proves possible; and
- What security support Peshmerga, Badr Corps, or other existing Iraqi militia might provide for a temporary period.

Please include any other considerations that you, General Abizaid and/or the Chiefs may feel are appropriate.

Thanks.

DHR:dh
May 04/Force Estimate

Tab A

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April 25, 2007
CH, WHS R & D Div

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TAB B

17 June 2004

IRAQ FORCE ESTIMATE (S)

1. (S) In addition to the military estimate for forces required in Iraq, the SecDef requested several issues be taken into consideration.
Issue #1: (S) "Respond effectively to violence at the current level and possible alternative levels"

(U) Response:

- (S//NF) The current force level in Iraq is 18 x US brigades and 5 x Coalition brigades.
 - (S//NF) This force level will be reduced to 17 x US brigades and 5 x Coalition brigades by Aug 04 due to scheduled troop rotations.
 - (S//NF) In July 04, Commander, USCENTCOM (CDRUSCENTCOM), anticipates beginning transition to local control.
 - (S//NF) By January 05, CDRUSCENTCOM anticipates beginning the transition to regional control, which is estimated to require only 7 US brigades. The transition will take until Jan 06 to complete, if the security environment supports a full transition.
- (S//NF) Current force levels are based on the security situation in Iraq remaining stable or improving.
 - (S//NF) Joint Staff intelligence estimates that the potential exists for sectarian fighting in Baghdad, Karbala, Kirkuk and Mosul, and that an atmosphere of instability remains. Zarqawi will consider the Interim Iraqi Government illegitimate and installed by the United States.
 - (S//NF) Additionally, Islamic extremists and transnational terrorists will continue to target the Coalition, Shi'a population, Iraqi security elements and the new Iraqi government to destabilize the environment.
- (S//NF) To counter an increase in violence in Iraq, CDRUSCENTCOM may need up to 4.0 additional brigades.

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Tab B



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April 25, 2007
CH, WHS R & D Div

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- ~~(S//NF)~~ These additional brigades would be used to:
 - o ~~(S//NF)~~ Help conduct counterinsurgency operations (a 5 brigade commitment would be increased to 7 brigades) (+2.0 brigades)
 - o ~~(S//NF)~~ Protect lines of communication and key infrastructure (a 4 brigade commitment would be increased to 5.5 brigades) (+1.5 brigades)
 - o ~~(S//NF)~~ Bolster support for the UN should SecDef assign such a mission (a 1 brigade commitment would be increased to 1.5 brigades) (+.5 brigades)
- ~~(S//NF)~~ Potential triggers for a request for additional forces are:
 - o ~~(S//NF)~~ Large-scale violent demonstrations
 - o ~~(S//NF)~~ Large-scale rioting or looting
 - o ~~(S//NF)~~ Large-scale multi-ethnic demonstrations
 - o ~~(S//NF)~~ Significant increase in attacks against Coalition forces
 - o ~~(S//NF)~~ A Coalition brigade (+) force withdraws
 - o ~~(S//NF)~~ A general uprising in two major population areas at once
 - o ~~(S//NF)~~ Lines of communications (LOCs) assessments go to RED
 - o ~~(S//NF)~~ Coalition sustainment is degraded by 25 percent due to LOCs instability.
- ~~(S//NF)~~ The total number of US brigades required in Iraq, in a worst case scenario, could grow to as high as 25 US brigades.
 - o ~~(S//NF)~~ 17 x brigades for sustainment
 - o ~~(S//NF)~~ 3.5 x brigades for increased violence
 - o ~~(S//NF)~~ 3 x brigades for elections
 - o ~~(S//NF)~~ 1.5 x brigades for UN security
 - o ~~(S//NF)~~ The number of brigades will be dependent upon the security situation, the need for increased security during the elections, and whether or not Coalition forces will provide UN security.



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Issue #2: (S) "Provide protection for lines of communication and critical infrastructure"

(U) Response:

- ~~(S//NF)~~ Two brigades are dedicated solely to LOC protection and convoy security.
 - ~~(S//NF)~~ Units are also responsible for LOC security within their areas of responsibility.
 - ~~(S//NF)~~ After events in April, a brigade was added in the Babil Province just south of Baghdad to enhance security in an area where LOCs were particularly vulnerable.
 - ~~(S//NF)~~ In the case of increased violence, security for lines of communication will require an additional 0.5 brigades.
- ~~(S//NF)~~ Protection of Key Infrastructure
 - ~~(S//NF)~~ Iraqi ministries are currently responsible for facilities protection with support from coalition forces.
 - ~~(S//NF)~~ Fixed security and quick reaction forces are available to maintain security for critical oil and electrical facilities.
 - ~~(S//NF)~~ Coalition forces will augment Iraqi forces to protect ~45 critical nodes with 2.5 brigades beginning 1 Jul 04.
 - ~~(S//NF)~~ In the case of increased violence the number of protected sites will increase to ~70. This will require an additional 1.0 brigade.
 - ~~(S//NF)~~ Multinational Force—Iraq's (MNF-I's) reserve force has been committed, reconstituted and recommitted to missions in Ad Diwaniyah and Karbala.
 - ~~(S//NF)~~ Moreover, forces have been shifted between division sectors for specific missions and precise periods of time. The flexibility, lethality and agility of these forces permit them to cover more missions than specific numbers might indicate.

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Issue #3: (S) "Provide force protection for the CPA/Mission and selected UN and Iraqi civil officials, as appropriate"

(U) Response:

- ~~(S//NF)~~ MNF-I projects the need for an additional brigade for UN security if tasked.
- ~~(S//NF)~~ With increased violence, this requirement would grow to 1.5 brigades.
- ~~(S//NF)~~ MNF-I will provide security for the Interim Iraqi Government until 1 Aug 04.
- ~~(S//NF)~~ Two battalion HQs with 8 companies and Marine security detachments secure the Baghdad "Green Zone" executing mounted escort duties. This will increase minimally with the stand up of the US Mission in Iraq, but will be sustainable with current forces. Initial work toward US Embassy (USEMB) security agreements began 12-14 May during a DOD and DOS transition conference. Five USEMB Regional Teams will be embedded at Coalition locations and will have fixed and convoy security provided by those forces. Three USEMB Regional Teams will stand alone, using existing CPA governate facilities with contracted security. DOS is requesting US military capability to replace contracted security. The details for security requirements at those locations are being negotiated. Upon agreement, all USEMB security requirements will be solidified with a memorandum of agreement with DOS.

Issue #4: (S) "Provide support for accelerated training and equipping of Iraqi security forces, if appropriate." What additional roles Iraqi forces might play if their resources were once again increased? What Iraqi security forces will be available at the end of this year and their capability?"

(U) Response:

- ~~(S//NF)~~ The Coalition is looking at numerous options to put Iraqis in charge as soon as possible, wherever possible. The current projection is that the Iraqi Security Forces will not be ready to take control of the country until April 05 (at the earliest), but the Coalition may be able to handover control of specific areas or cities based on the security situation and Iraqi Security Force proficiency. USCENTCOM assesses readiness to handover local control to the Iraqis much quicker in the north and south than in other areas.

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- ~~(S//NF)~~ In April 04, Iraqi Security Forces were employed before they were ready and subsequently sustained significant setbacks. In order to prevent additional difficulties like those experienced in April, training for many units has been re-initialized.
 - ~~(S//NF)~~ The Office of Security Transition (OST), has been given the task of training, mentoring and equipping the Iraqi Security Forces. The OST is currently upgrading its plan for training and mentoring requirements and has indicated that additional specific augmentees may be required to support critical training. The Joint Staff is coordinating with Force Providers to source the additional forces now.
 - ~~(S//NF)~~ Additionally, MNF-I has accelerated contracts for equipment, improved its mentoring program and plans to embed Coalition forces with Iraqi Security Forces on joint patrols. MNF-I will continue to train Iraq Security Forces to standard and will employ them only when they are ready.
 - ~~(S//NF)~~ Iraq Security Forces, when trained and ready, will begin patrols in low threat areas. In medium threat areas, Iraq Security Forces will conduct joint patrols with Coalition forces. Coalition forces will continue to patrol high threat areas using intel driven, precision tactics.
- ~~(S//NF)~~ A projection of where Iraqi Security Forces capability will be at the end of the year (Dec 04) is as follows:
 - ~~(S//NF)~~ Iraqi Armed Forces: 9 brigades, 27 battalions, including 3 Iraqi National Task Force brigades, will be trained and equipped.
 - ~~(S//NF)~~ Iraqi Civil Defense Corps: 45 battalions will be trained and equipped.
 - ~~(S//NF)~~ Iraqi Police Forces: Manning will be at or above the 89,000 + required. Transition Integration Program training will be completed for 50 percent and Academy training will be completed for 20 percent. All equipment will be delivered, and infrastructure improvements will be ongoing.
 - ~~(S//NF)~~ Department of Border Enforcement: Manning will be at or above the 21,000+ required. All equipment will be delivered, and infrastructure improvements will continue.
 - ~~(S//NF)~~ Facilities Protection Service: Fully manned at 75,000 and operational under the control and supervision of the Ministry of Interior.

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