

May 10, 1973  
Meeting with de Staercke

*No Cable -  
Ink only -  
File -*

*Gene*

*Fdr*

After the NAC meeting today I had a meeting with de Staercke, and the discussion was essentially as follows:

1. I told him on an exceedingly personal basis, and that I was uninstructed on this, that there was at least the following possibility: <sup>some</sup> people in various Capitals reading the report of that meeting might ~~well~~ ask themselves or muse to themselves <sup>a</sup> the following:

- (a) Apparently, <sup>most of</sup> the Ambassadors to the NAC didn't get instructions
- (b) Does this mean that they are not going to be involved in this problem? Is the NAC out of ~~it~~ <sup>the line of action?</sup>
- (c) Does it mean that <sup>capitals</sup> they are handling the response to the Kissinger speech in a different way?
- (d) Does it mean that they prefer to work through someone other than their Ambassadors to the NAC?
- (e) What does all this mean to the future of the North Atlantic Council?

As Dean, I was sure he was asking himself those questions. He agreed that he was and in fact that that posed a ~~serious~~ danger to the Council.

2. I asked him, did he not agree with me, and again, on an exceedingly personal basis, totally uninstructed, that this Kissinger speech offered Joseph Luns <sup>a</sup> ~~the~~ wonderful opportunity for leadership -- that he <sup>might</sup> could visit with people from the EC,



and from Japan and <sup>at</sup> ~~within~~ national Capitals, and show some momentum and leadership in this. De Staercke fully agreed, saying that he was sick that Luns was going to the Bilden~~m~~bergers where he is going to be one of a hundred instead of "the one", that it is a waste of time, that he should be doing this, and his problem is "working", ~~and~~ an energy quotient problem. I asked him what kind of staff he had, and he said Kastle could be helping him with this, he is not a terribly broad man, but he is competent and able; and I said well I was just asking the question because it struck me that it might be an opportunity for Joseph to do something in this regard.

3. De Staercke said he fully agreed that there was time to ~~do~~ <sup>respond</sup> ~~this~~, <sup>to HAK and deady principles</sup> and he said he was convinced they were capable of sorting themselves out to do it. The problem was France. I said, well, you then/looks at the two ends of the rubber band. At one end is France and at the other end is your individual and collective assessment of the degree of urgency, the necessity, ~~is~~ <sup>I</sup> the need for this type of broader framework sufficient that you and your colleagues are willing to exert the kinds of pressures on ~~France~~ <sup>those recalcitrants</sup> that will get the rubber band to give in the direction you want? That's the question that people have to ask themselves. Can the <sup>Council</sup> one delay and frustrate and prevent something from happening. The answer is yes, unless what needs to happen is of sufficient weight and importance and significance to the future of the broader alliance, that it takes precedence.



4. He said that he disagreed with Catalano saying, and those in the meeting, who said there wasn't time, <sup>for another reason, namely that</sup> ~~for another reason~~ he <sup>now</sup> ~~said because~~ these problems are being addressed, and I said that was <sup>one of</sup> my point. The problems are being solved; they may be being solved poorly; they may be being solved independently; but <sup>outside of a broader context understanding</sup> solutions will <sup>come</sup> result, and if ~~they're solutions~~ time marches on; and if <sup>of</sup> those are solutions that are not considered in a broader framework -- as Everett Dirksen used to tell a story about a Senator, and he made a speech on the Senator one time, and he said the Senator is remaking America and you are not going to like it -- and I ~~said~~ I have that feeling ~~that~~ these individual, separate, compartmentalized solutions are remaking the future of the Alliance and ~~I don't think we are going to like it.~~ <sup>we may not</sup> We need to <sup>address</sup> ~~do~~ them in a <sup>broader</sup> different framework.

5. Finally, I said to him there is another problem. That is the problem that these matters will be dealt with <sup>some way</sup> This is related to the previous point <sup>but different</sup> ~~and~~ they will be dealt with. They may end up being dealt with bilaterally, <sup>or</sup> only with the big powers, but they are going to be dealt with. <sup>1</sup> The ~~sense of urgency and the need~~ is clear enough on our side that my impression is that they are going to be dealt with, and the effect of an inability to sort out yourselves/to deal with them, or the effect of a dramatically different assessment as to the need to deal with them, will <sup>not</sup> result <sup>in</sup> their not being dealt with, but rather they will result in their being dealt with in different <sup>separate</sup> fora. He fully agreed with me. He was very aware and sensitive to that.

