

February 21, 1974

MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATIONS WITH
AMBASSADOR DE ROSE, HIS DCM, MR. CARRAUD
AND SPECIAL ADVISOR, MR. GOLDWIN
THURSDAY, FEBRUARY 21, WEDNESDAY, FEBRUARY 20

On each day I held about a two-hour meeting with Ambassador de Rose, his DCM Carraud and my Special Advisor, Robert Goldwin. We met in my office.

The meetings resulted from a conversation de Rose and I had after the meeting of the Thought Group earlier this week on Tuesday. In that meeting de Staercke again indicated his strong conviction that we should try to clear out a lot of the issues that are still unresolved before going back into the Council. He again suggested to me that I meet with de Rose privately to attempt to do that.

Because of my instructions from Washington from the Secretary urging me to work closely with de Rose, number two because of the constant suggestion of de Staercke that I do so, and because of de Rose's willingness to do it; I was also a bit concerned that some of the proposals we were putting forward to amend the Declaration read after the Washington Energy Conference seemed to have a harsher connotation than they would have when they were drafted, namely before the Washington Energy Conference. Therefore, it struck me that



it would at least be useful for me to sit down with de Rose and make sure that there was no misunderstanding on that score and also see that I fulfilled my instructions and at least attempted to do what the Dean and the Secretary General wanted me to do.

In both meetings at the beginning and the end, I indicated what the ground rules were. My statement was essentially as follows: ~~A number~~ of the members had offered a wide variety of suggestions, that the Dean and the Secretary General were all a bit concerned that we not turn this into a Christmas tree with a whole lot of pieces added on by every country, and that some control be kept on the development of these drafts so that it continues to be, and ends up being a coherent whole. Recognizing that it struck me that possibly if Francois and I talked a bit and further explored with each other what the rationale was for the proposals each of us were making, with respect to the areas that still remained unresolved, that possibly Bob Goldwin and Carraud could come up with some language that de Rose and I could fiddle with the thought in those instances where it was possible, we might find something that de Rose personally and guessing his government's



requirements, and Rumsfeld personally with some sense of his governments requirements might be able to agree to personally. Then go back to our governments recommending that they accept to the extent we were successful in doing that and eliminate some of the remaining unresolved issues, fine. To the extent that we were unsuccessful, as we undoubtedly would be, with respect to such things as the date of the June 22nd meeting, we could leave those things to the Ministers and the Heads of Government to sort out. The thought then was that after we had gone as far as we thought we could go in two meetings we would take a look at the areas of common agreement between the two of us personally, come back to our governments on an ad ref basis and see what they think about them. If both of our governments agree to some of them, so much the better. We will have removed some of the underbrush and closed some of the unresolved issues. If they don't, or if there are some areas that Francois and I couldn't agree on, we just go back into the Thought Group on Monday and continue the way we were going.

