



COALITION PROVISIONAL AUTHORITY
BAGHDAD

MEMO FOR: Secretary Rumsfeld
FROM: Paul Bremer *6/2/23*
SUBJECT: Status of ICDC as of July 1, 2004

Your guidance is to keep coalition and Iraqi options open in regard to the future of the ICDC. As you note, it could become the reserve component of the Iraqi Armed Forces (which will need reserves because of the small size of the regular army), a gendarmerie-like force, or split into different forces, perhaps with some of it dissolved or at least deactivated. Meanwhile, it will be operating under the control of the US-led Iraq MNF. As security conditions evolve, the Iraqis and we will have a clearer idea of how to use this capability in the future.

As of July 1, the ICDC will have to be assigned to one or another Iraqi ministry: Defense or Interior. No Iraqi security force can exist unless clearly positioned within the state structure we are creating. A sovereign state must have clear institutional ownership of its armed personnel—without such ownership, both sovereignty itself and the assignment of these forces to the multinational force lacks credibility. Moreover, there will be a variety of administrative functions that must be fulfilled by the Iraqis (e.g., logistics, administration and pay). Finally, if the ICDC were not clearly assigned, it would become the prize of competition among Iraqi politicians trying to strengthen their positions through the control of armed power.

We believe the best ministry by far in which to place the ICDC is the MoD. In the short term, placing it in Interior would create an excessive concentration of power, with 80,000 police, 40,000 ICDC, and tens of thousands of other MoI-controlled security forces. In contrast, the MoD will have only about 10,000 soldiers in activated units by July 1. Also, of necessity, MoI will have much closer ties than MoD to the Iraqi National Intelligence Service. The MoD will have greater and more relevant institutional capacity to “organize, train, and equip” the ICDC than will the MoI, the focus of which is on development of police, not armed forces. Finally, insofar as we want to keep both the reserve and the gendarmerie options open, the MoD is the appropriate institutional structure for either approach.

Placing the ICDC within the MoD will therefore not prejudice its ultimate mission and character. Whatever its fate, the ICDC’s roles and structures argue strongly for its placement in the MoD for as long as it exists and it is this understanding that we have developed collectively in the SIGS over the past few months. Unless I hear otherwise from you, we will include the ICDC in the forthcoming CPA order creating the MoD, while keeping open the options as you indicate.



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OSD 02676-04