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FOR: SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

DepSec Action _____

FROM: General Richard B. Myers, CJCS *1/19/28*

SUBJECT: Stability Operations (SO) Joint Operating Concept (JOC)

- The enclosed SO JOC (TAB A) is forwarded for your approval **in** response to Transformation Planning Guidance requirements
- The concept, authored by USJFCOM and approved by the Joint Chiefs, is the culmination of a lengthy development and refinement effort. USJFCOM collaborated with the Services, the combatant commands, the Joint **Staff** and Defense agencies to produce the inaugural document that will be updated according to the Joint Concept Development **and** Revision Plan. **My staff** provided copies of this paper to the Office for Force Transformation for review. This JOC is key to the continued Joint Force transformation and improvement of joint warfighting capabilities.

RECOMMENDATION: Approve the JOC.

Approve *[Signature]* Disapprove _____ Other _____

JAN 11 2005

COORDINATION: TAB C

Attachments:
As stated

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Stability Operations

Joint Operating Concept



September 2004



As the lead author, US Joint Forces Command matured this concept through the use of joint and Service operational lessons learned and experimentation: numerous co-sponsored joint wargames, seminars, workshops and other concept development venues. Throughout, this process was guided by direct input from the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

During the development of this concept each Service, combatant command, selected members of the Joint and OSD staffs, as well as multinational partners and selected non-DoD agencies made significant contributions. Also included throughout were a host of active and retired flag and junior officers, academics, and professional strategic thinkers.

US Joint Forces Command will continue to use experimentation and lessons learned to refine this concept. Version **2.0** is expected to be staffed in the 3rd quarter 05 timeframe.



E. P. GIAMBASTIANI
Admiral, U. S. Navy



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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

Winning in war consists of securing the desired political aims. To achieve these aims requires both winning in conventional combat operations as well as stability operations: imposing the security required to facilitate the transition to and reconstruction of a “new” normal once major conventional combat operations cease. The joint force will conduct stability operations in all phases of major conventional combat operations: pre-crisis, during major conventional combat operations, and postwar.’ The overall purpose of these operations is to achieve the strategic national, or coalition, goals.

The joint force, as part of a multinational and integrated, multiagency operation, will provide security, initial humanitarian assistance, limited governance, restoration of essential public services, and other reconstruction assistance. These kinds of stability operations will be conducted simultaneously, distributed throughout the theater of war. *All will require a combination of detailed situational understanding; a coercive posture against obstructionists; unified direction from legitimate civil authority; integrated, multiagency unity of purpose and coherency of action; sophisticated media operations; organizational endurance; and sufficient popular support over time in order to facilitate the transition to legitimate local governance and reduce the likelihood of destabilizing elements.*

In the pre-conflict period, the joint force commander’s focus is preventive, seeking resolution of conflict by conducting operations to secure the United States’ (US) objectives and prevent the crisis from crossing the threshold of conflict. During periods of conflict, the joint force commander conducts stability operations for two purposes. The first purpose is to ensure the uninterrupted continuation of combat operations. The second is to create conditions favorable for the long-term success of the US and coalition post-conflict reconstruction program. In the post-conflict period, stability operations include both security operations and civil-military operations in support of civilian agencies and organizations to complete the achievement of wartime political objectives. During conflict the joint force is the “supported” agency. In prevention and



For brevity’s sake, ‘joint’ in the context of this concept refers to a joint, multiagency, and multinational force and includes the integration and appropriate balance of conventional and special operations forces.

reconstruction operations, the joint force is the “supporting” agency. The transitions from supported to supporting and back again are a critical component of both unity of purpose and coherency of action.

Stability operations associated with major combat are among the most complicated missions assigned to the United States military and require a focused approach to ensure that they are successful in obtaining strategic aims. To help provide this required focus, the stability operations concept proposes 10 principles that should guide a joint force commander’s thoughts on the conduct of operations pre, during, and post- conflict.

These principles are:

1. Organize military and civilian agencies to achieve unity of purpose and coherency of action.
2. Incorporate information operations into every action, tactical and operational.
3. Impose security by adopting an assertive posture.
4. Defeat those violently opposed to stability.
5. Neutralize, co-opt, or induce others who threaten stability.
6. Act with precision quickly: Balance restraint and overmatching power.
7. Act from a position of legitimacy.
8. Pursue interim conditions for “next state” in the transition process.
9. Operate within the law.
10. Develop reliable local intelligence.

The military organizes, trains, and equips its forces for conventional combat; it must prepare similarly for stability operations, which will usually involve fighting to establish a secure environment. Military organizations must have the capability to organize, train, equip, and execute long-term stability operations simultaneously with major conventional combat operations. Preventive actions, particularly special operations, information operations, and intelligence activities, properly planned, resourced, and conducted, might even obviate the need for subsequent conventional combat operations by preventing the situation from crossing the threshold of war. If war is thrust upon us, stability operations are essential to the ultimate achievement of strategic aims. Stability operations are a core mission of the military services and civil agencies.



Joint and Service doctrines identify many different types of stability type operations including peace operations, humanitarian assistance, arms control, and shows of force. Version 1.0 of this concept describes a stability operations concept that focuses on operations that precede, occur during, and follow major conventional combat operations in order to achieve a “new normal” environment. The scope of this version of the operational concept is particularly tailored to situations which involve a hostile nation-state acting in ways that are inimical to the vital or important interests of the United States and its allies, or employ a level of coercion against its own population that exceeds accepted norms of international behavior.

This concept is focused on the time horizon just beyond the Future Years Defense Program (FYDP), roughly 2015 and is predicated on the following assumptions:

Assumption 1: The US government will conduct stability operations.

Assumption 2: The US will play a decisive role in stability operations.

Assumption 3: The military and interagency community will achieve synergy in planning and execution.

Assumption 4: The stability operations concept outlines four cases in which the US would intervene to impose security, stabilize the situation, and facilitate the transition to legitimate local governance. In essence, Case 2—major combat operations—is the most dangerous and Case 4—transnational actors—is the most likely to occur. Development in future versions of the concept will be: Cases 4, then 3 and 1. The cases are described in detail in Section 1 (Introduction and Scope) of this concept document.



Section 1 - INTRODUCTION AND SCOPE

1.A Introduction.

This initial version of the Stability Operations Joint Operating Concept articulates how a future joint force commander plans, prepares, deploys, employs, and sustains a joint force conducting stability operations that precede, occur during, and follow conventional combat operations.

This concept describes the challenges the United States and its coalition partners will face and proposes solutions to these challenges while identifying the capabilities required to implement the proposed solutions. Additionally, this concept explicates 10 principles to guide a joint force commander's thought process in developing a coherent strategy for conducting stability operations associated with major conventional combat.

The iterative process of developing the joint operating concept provides a product reflective of historical analysis, operational lessons learned, and past experimental findings as well as forming the foundation for future experimentation. Finally, this concept contributes to further development of subordinate joint functional and enabling concepts that feed Joint and Service transformation plans.

1.B Scope.

The scope of a complete stability operations concept must address at least the following four cases:

Case 1 – An allied or friendly nation-state requests US or multinational assistance in protecting itself from subversion, lawlessness, and insurgency.

Case 2 – US and its allies conduct major combat operations to defeat a hostile nation-state that acts in ways that are inimical to the vital or important interests of the US and its allies or employs a level of coercion against its own population that exceeds accepted norms of international behavior.

Case 3 – US and its allies intervene in a nation, or region that becomes ungovernable, collapses economically and disintegrates into sub national units under the control of warlords and their militias or worse, complete anarchy.



Case 4 – US and its allies conduct operations to defeat a transnational, non-state organization, whose ideology involves significant degradation of human rights that places at risk large segments of a population and acts in ways that destabilize legitimate governments, threatens whole regions, and exceeds the accepted norms of international behavior.

Success in each of these cases requires integrated, multiagency and frequently multinational operations—one of which will be military. Armed military operations are often necessary but rarely, if ever, sufficient to achieve the overall strategic aim. The success of stability operations does not rely solely on killing insurgent combatants or destroying an enemy’s will to fight. Attainment of political objectives requires the application of all elements of government action in a coherent campaign supported by a sophisticated strategic communications campaign. In stability operations, a nation-state can be defeated by militarily weaker state or non-state adversaries if the stronger power is ignorant of the enemy, fails to formulate clear goals, and, perhaps worst of all, pursues military goals that detract from attaining the conflict’s political objective.

Stability can be a misleading word. In the four cases described in this concept, “stability,” understood as “*status quo antebellum*,” will not often be our strategic goal. Rather, the United States (and its coalition partners) will seek a new, better *status quo*—a *status quo* in which citizens are better off than they were before conflict erupted in their country or region. “Better off” can have many connotations. “Better off” may mean more freedom, increased potential for economic prosperity, improved health and safety conditions, or some combination of the aforementioned. Thus, the stability operations described in this concept will rarely, if ever, merely reestablish the kind of order that had existed prior to friendly action. In fact transitioning to a new and better status quo will often involve instability.

The Joint Operations Concepts describes stability operations as “military operations in concert with the other elements of national power and multinational partners, to maintain or re-establish order and promote stability.”² This definition does not capture the essence of the issue at hand. This concept, therefore, describes stability operations as



Joint Staff, “Joint Operations Concepts,” published November 3, 2003, in Washington, D.C., p. 18.

multiagency operations that involve all instruments of national and multinational action, including the international humanitarian and reconstruction community to support major conventional combat operations if necessary; establish security; facilitate reconciliation among local or regional adversaries; establish the political, social, and economic architecture; and facilitate the transition to legitimate local governance.

Stability operations establish a safe and secure environment; provide essential social services, emergency infrastructure reconstruction and humanitarian relief in order to facilitate the transition to legitimate, local civil governance. The objective is clearly to establish governance that enables a country or regime to provide for its own security, rule of law, social services, and economic activity and eliminate as many of the root causes of the crisis as feasible to reduce the likelihood of the reemergence of another crisis.³

Finally, in almost every specific situation covered by the four cases described earlier, operations will entail a long-term commitment of multiple US agencies as well as coalition partners. Often in stability operations, we will be opposed by enemies seeking to employ a strategy of protraction. “Endurance” is required, therefore, to achieve success. Commitment by US civilian political leadership must endure long enough to see strategic objectives materialize. Organizations, military and non-military alike, must have a sufficiently robust structure to conduct sustained operations for lengths of time that may extend several months to several years.

This document is deliberately limited to Case 2, namely the stability operations that precede, are concurrent with, and follow major conventional combat operations.⁴ It addresses the response by the US government and its coalition partners when war is thrust upon us, and under circumstances in which war includes a change in the political arrangement of an opponent’s government. Case 2 involves complex and dangerous stability operations, often including counterinsurgency operations that the joint force will have to conduct against determined adversaries. Later versions of this concept will focus upon the other forms of stability operations.

³ See figure 1, page 9.

⁴ Henry, Ryan, principal deputy undersecretary of Defense (Policy), “Development of Joint Operating Concepts,” undated letter, p. 1, sent from Washington, D.C. This letter describes the necessity to limit the scope of the Stability Operating Concept.



Section 2 - DESCRIPTION OF THE CASE 2 MILITARY PROBLEM

2.A The Strategic Setting.

The next two decades will contain a perplexing and complex array of security challenges for the United States. Many of those challenges will be brought to a state of unavoidable conflict by influences external to the location of the conflict itself. National, transnational, and non-state actors will challenge and redefine the global distribution of power, conventional definitions of sovereignty, and the nature of warfare. Local conflicts and wars are more likely than in the past to escalate into broader conflicts.⁵

Ideological conflicts have not ended. Deeply seated differences in societal, cultural, and religious values remain even in this post-Cold War world. Sometimes these differences will turn violent. Societies, whether nation-state or not, will still confront one another. Major conventional combat operations, with their associated stability operations, will remain a constant potential for the foreseeable future.

Future military operations will be joint campaigns that will include multiagency, multinational, and multilateral partners to achieve mission success. Stability operations are no exception. Truly integrated, multiagency planning, preparation, and execution are hallmarks of future stability operations. The challenges that the United States and our allies and friends face in the future in conducting stability operations involve a complex mix of global dangers, problematic nation-states, and illegal transnational organizations. These challenges threaten the national interests of many nations, not just the United States, and are more complex than any one nation can solve. Solutions require the contributions of multiple nations and agencies —military and non-military, governmental and non-governmental. The requirement is clear: develop the ability to plan, coordinate, and execute multiagency actions at the strategic, operational, and tactical levels.

2.B The Operational Environment.

The operating environment in which stability operations will be conducted is dynamic and uncertain. Uncertainty and complexity will prevail at the strategic level before the crisis and extend to the operational and tactical levels during and after the major combat



United States Joint Forces Command, “The Joint Operational Environment: Into the Future,” published October 2003, p. 62; see also classified sources that are available upon request by appropriate agencies.

operation. Rapid and unexpected changes in the geopolitical landscape will pervade many dimensions—who or what will be the destabilizing factor; who will be our partners; and what will be the military capabilities, intentions, and modes of both our partners and enemies. The “battlefield” of Case 2 on which a major combat operation and its associated stability operation will seek to achieve mission success will likely include some combination of the following operating conditions:

- Disintegration of the hostile regime and collapse of government authority.
- Tribal or clan leaders, warlords, religious groups, and organized crime bosses with various allegiances contending for power and who may be operating transnationally.
- Uncertain disposition of weapons of mass destruction.
- Numerous armed groups including residual military forces; opposing armed, paramilitary groups; insurgent forces; organized criminal gangs; terrorist cells; and networks of common criminals.
- Lack of discipline and control within armed groups.
- Links to global terrorist networks worldwide.
- Easy access to arms, weapons, and explosives.
- Weak, ineffective or tenuous cease-fires.
- Ruthless chaos with no local police or justice institutions to impose law and order.
- Collapse of public services, power distribution, and health services.
- Widespread starvation and disease.
- Massive numbers of refugees and displaced persons.
- Violence and abuses against civilians.
- Intense media coverage of operations.
- No, or shaky, foundation for civil society and democratization.
- Powerful illegal economic incentives for continued conflict.

These challenging factors suggest the need for effective partnerships, both US as well as coalition, with military and civilian leaders in the stability operation and highlight the requirement for adaptability among those military and civilian organizations executing these same operations. These challenges further suggest that successful resolution of



stability operations may require years, not weeks or months, of effort. The environment is further complicated by the transnational nature of some of the opposing forces. The joint force commander must think outside the traditional area of operations. The joint force's battlespace expands beyond the country or region in which they operate and extends through transnational borders and global dimensions. The joint force commander must think locally but be able to act globally.

The joint force will be in a supporting role conducting preventive actions in an attempt to prevent, even up to the last minute, crossing the threshold of war.⁶ Preventive actions, if possible, also set conditions for combat should that threshold be crossed. The joint force will be preparing to conduct stability operations in Case 2, in close partnership with US and coalition civilian officials, intelligence officials, cultural experts, police officials, demilitarization experts, relief experts, weapons of mass destruction investigators, and other national and coalition partners. These preparations are essential to effective stability operations in the initial phases of deployment.

Prior to combat operations, the joint force begins activities to create favorable conditions to support combat operations and create favorable conditions for transition to local governance. Activities include not only efforts to influence adversaries, but also those to influence the physical environment and noncombatants. Actions to influence noncombatants need to extend beyond simply preventing interference with military operations and should include actions aimed at assisting successful realization of long-term goals. These actions are taken to encourage the local population's support for and participation in the post-conflict rebuilding of the country's infrastructure.

During major conventional combat operations, the joint force becomes the supported agency; the main focus will be on achieving military victory. The joint force deploys elements of its forces in close support of the major conventional combat operation and begins to impose security in areas of immediate concern. Stability operations are performed in support of the major combat operation with the main focus on achieving military victory. The emphasis at this point is on imposing security in the wake of conflict so that errant armed groups are brought under control and basic humanitarian relief activities can begin. The imposition of security is one of the first and most



⁶ See Figure 2, page 10.

important steps toward advancing transition and reconstruction. Imposing security will likely involve armed violence and intense enforcement operations against rogue military and paramilitary elements. Hence, the joint force must execute stability operations even while the fighting continues in the major combat operation. In addition, stability operations conducted during combat operations sets conditions for the restoration operations, which follow.

Post-combat, the joint force again assumes a supporting role. This is the most decisive phase of the stability operation because the joint force has to deal with a range of urgent security challenges, often without the assistance of local partners or police forces. At this decisive phase, the joint force expands its imposition of security throughout the countryside to shape favorable conditions so that civilian-led activities can begin creating the “new and better” conditions from which the “new normal” grows and reduces the likelihood of the reemergence of the root causes of the crisis.⁷




Figure 1: Breaking the Cycle of Crisis



See Figure 1, page 9.

Intense media coverage is the environment in which all stability operations take place whether prior to combat, during combat, or post-combat. Throughout each phase, strategic communications are key. Strategic communications require a comprehensive, integrated strategy from the inception of preventive actions through restorative operations and attainment of the desired end-state. Strategic communications must provide command information and assist maintaining the coalition while shaping the battlespace. Additionally strategic communications prevent the adversary from gaining an advantage, by anticipating adversary information operations actions and taking proactive measures to discredit adversary themes.’




Figure 2: Case 2 – Stability Operations

A permissive security environment may exist after a major combat operation in a Case 2 scenario. Much more probable, however, the joint force will conduct stability operations in a hostile or uncertain environment. A permissive environment is one in which military and law enforcement agencies have control as well as the intent and capability to assist the major combat operation. An uncertain environment is one in which host government forces, whether opposed to or receptive to the major combat

⁸ Binnendijk, Hans and Stuart Johnson, ed., “Transforming for stabilization and reconstruction operations,” assessment published by the Center for Technology and National Security Policy, National Defense University, November 12, 2003.




operation, do not have effective control of the territory and populations in the intended operational area. In the most likely scenario of a hostile environment, forces must be prepared to overcome local military, paramilitary, insurgents, terrorists, and crudely-organized armed gangs trying to disrupt the mission of US and allied military forces. A hostile environment is the operational environment in which a number of hostile forces have some control as well as the intent and capability to effectively oppose the operations of the joint force. Efforts to impose security are likely to be met with hostile action. Counterinsurgency operations may be required to secure a semi-protected working environment in order to eventually impose security in the face of these threats.

Military stability operations during and immediately following a major combat operation must be able to shape the local security environment so that urgent **human** needs are met and the critical post-war political process can begin. To shape the local security environment, the commander will have to take local actions; he may even have to create global effects inside and outside his area of operations in collaboration with his peers. None of the efforts to grow a “new normal” in Case 2 can begin in an unsafe and insecure environment.

The joint force must set favorable security conditions to capitalize rapidly on a combat victory. As major conventional combat operations come to completion, the military focus will shift to imposing a secure environment that successfully promotes law and order. The joint force must be prepared to conduct counterinsurgency operations, unconventional warfare, and counter-terrorist activities as well as limited conventional operations in order to impose a level of security that can eventually be enforced by civilian police forces.



Central Idea Actions

Preventive Actions	During Conflict	Restorative
Conduct, when directed, covert and clandestine acts to prevent or prepare combat	•Impose a secure environment to enable the unhindered prosecution of combat and set conditions for restorative operations	•Expand the imposition of a secure environment
•Conduct, when directed, overt acts and flexible deterrent options to support diplomatic efforts	•Organize integrated multi-agency to achieve unity of purpose and coherency of action	•Adopt an assertive posture
•Update already developed situational understanding	•Adapt from the existing stability operations plan	•Defeat those violently opposed; neutralize, co-opt, induce other opposed to stability
Conduct final preparations for combat	•Act with precision, quickly.	•Be present in the community
Refine cultural intelligence	•Exercise restraint with military power	•Support conditions from which long-term stability grows
• Conduct strategic communications	Conduct strategic communications	Conduct strategic communications
•Organize training and preparation for integrated multi-agency stability operations		

All will require a combination of detailed Situational understanding; a coercive posture against obstructionists; unified direction from legitimate civil authority; Integrated, multi-agency unity of purpose and coherency of action; sophisticated media operations; organizational endurance; and sufficient popular support over time in order to facilitate the transition to legitimate governance and reduce the likelihood of the reemergence of the root causes of the conflict.

Figure 3: The Central Idea--Actions

US Armed Forces advance national security by applying military power as directed to help shape the international environment and respond to the full spectrum of crises, while also preparing now for an uncertain future. Our national military objectives are to promote peace and security and, when necessary, to defeat adversaries. Successful stability operations are an essential means of by which we achieve these objectives. Our record of success, however, is mixed. Stability operations must be exercised and rehearsed, among military, interagency, and multinational organizations during wargames and exercises in advance of a major conventional combat operation.



2.C Obstacles to Stability

2.C.1. Deliberate threats to Stability: Spoilers.

Nearly all societies include an element of instability. Many societies have factions and individuals that resist legitimate institutions designed to maintain stability, law and civil order. Furthermore, resistance often comes from external sources who ignore traditional boundaries. While the majority of a population may remain docile even during difficult times, some internal and external elements seek to create or enhance conditions of insecurity and violence for their own ends. These “spoilers” to a peace process or “resistance” to an occupation, whether internal or external, are agents, organizations, or factions that threaten the success of stability efforts. Sometimes working in tandem, sometimes independently, these “spoilers” willfully obstruct US and multinational strategic or operational objectives.’ These agents or groups might seek to fill their own pockets with treasure or power. Criminal gangs and terrorist cells that cannot operate effectively once rule of law is secure, seek to disrupt functional government. There are a myriad of factors that can affect the success of a stability operation; however, deliberate acts of “spoilers” constitute a direct challenge to operational success. The requisite force to deal with “spoilers” is an inherent part of every stability operation.

Dealing with resistance requires a multifaceted approach. Some types can be influenced by political, economic, or informational means without resorting to military action; others must be defeated by military means.

The likelihood of success in stability operations increases significantly when the joint force commander has an anticipatory understanding of who will act contrary to stability efforts. Augmenting classic military intelligence with a cultural understanding of key players and their demands helps the joint force anticipate problems and preempt or respond appropriately.

A joint force commander must understand that there is always internal and external opposition to foreign military presence. Every occupation brings with it dynamics of collaboration and resistance. The joint force will encounter numerous armed groups



Stephen Stedman, “Spoiler Problems in the Peace Process,” *International Security*, Fall 1997 Vol 22 No. 2, pp. 5-53

ranging from residual military forces, opposing paramilitary groups, insurgent forces, organized criminal gangs, to terrorist cells. External spoilers supporting these armed groups can be systemic, regional actors, or third parties acting as guarantors of internal destabilizing elements bent on preventing the creation of security for their own benefit whether political power or economic gain. For example, a major threat to security in the Balkans comes from those who want to impede the movement of the Balkans towards Europe. This opposition caused by small groups of extreme nationalists, often residing outside of national borders, are opposed to European standards of democracy and rule of law.

Resistance strategies often include violence against civilians and conduct attacks on the military and civilian members of the coalition. Resistance to stability operations may be passive or active. Passive measures may include demonstrations, strikes, or boycotts. Active measures could range from blocking delivery of humanitarian aid to terrorist activities such as assassinations, bombings, and suicide attacks or military operations such as raids and ambushes.

Insurgent, transnational terrorists, criminal groups, and others will have access to small arms, grenade launchers and mortars, conventional and improvised explosives, and maybe even weapons of mass destruction. Spoilers will have the capability to organize and conduct their own information operations campaign as well as conduct computer network attacks. The joint force commander must take action to control the various spoilers before they increase the complexity of the task at hand. Success in imposing the security necessary for stability operations is directly related to the ability to identify spoilers. Spoilers generally fit into three categories and will be present in various numbers.

There are three broad categories of spoilers, whether internal or external: Total spoilers, limited spoilers, and greedy spoilers. Spoilers can be individuals, organizations, or governments. Each type of spoiler requires a different strategy to eliminate, contain, or satisfy them. A “one-size fits all” approach is likely to encourage additional spoilers and demands. Regardless of the approach, the joint force commander” must identify and



¹⁰ Reminder: “Joint” in the context of this concept includes multiagency, and multinational force **and** the integration and appropriate balance of conventional and special operations forces.

understand the underlying issues motivating each spoiler. This understanding helps shape the strategy for dealing with spoilers and associated issues.

Total spoilers are those who have no stake in reestablishing civil society; some are professional revolutionaries. Total spoilers are irreconcilably opposed to the US and multinational position. There is little or no ability to negotiate with them; they are unlikely to respond favorably to any inducement or socialization programs. Total spoilers are unrelenting in their quest to thwart the US and the coalition mission. There is no hope of changing total spoilers. The joint force must isolate and defeat them.

Total spoilers are often members of a deposed regime, especially politicians and soldiers, who, for a variety of reasons, cannot be or do not want to be assimilated into the restoration phase society. Other total spoilers may be ideologues that, for political, cultural, religious, or other social reasons, violently oppose assimilation into any society that does not accord primacy to their ideology. Still others are external to the battlespace, and may be individuals, organizations, or countries acting as guarantors of internal destabilizing elements. In developing countries, the joint force may encounter total spoilers who were recruited as children. This last category of total spoilers will continue to fight as long as their masters—usually older, more politically savvy total spoilers—can coerce them into action or provide acceptable rewards for their action.

Limited spoilers are often mid- or low-level members of a deposed regime or defeated military. They may oppose assimilation into society out of fear of their former superiors or out of concern for a loss of prestige and income. Limited spoilers could also be factional or tribal leaders. These leaders seek to preserve advantages their group enjoyed under the previous regime, or to gain advantage over other groups by filling a power vacuum. Finally, an external limited spoiler may be an individual, organization, or government.

Limited spoilers have limited objectives, usually associated with identity, group perceptions of superiority, or endangerment. This group seeks a settlement through the establishment of governance on their terms. While limited spoilers may perceive that their goal is legitimate, the settlement they seek may not be in accord with the peace agreement or mandate that the joint force is working to uphold. Limited spoilers are usually satisfied once their basic goals are met; they can conceivably be included in the



processes of political transformation through appropriate inducements. A limited spoiler may want recognition to gain legitimacy or a role in the restoration phase society, or may demand some sort of remuneration — monetary or material — to advance his personal status or the status of his group. Yielding to seemingly insignificant demands can, counterproductively, elevate the status of individuals obstructing transformation. Regardless of the demand, limited spoilers are normally satisfied once their limited goals are met.

Greedy spoilers act to satisfy selfish, usually economic, interests. They try to manipulate the post conflict instability for personal gain. Greedy spoilers keep pushing the envelope with increasing demands. This spoiler may begin making demands for some type of concession. He may demand payments in cash, fuel, or equipment. The demands will continue to increase. The greedy spoiler may eventually push to control some entity, such as fuel distribution rights, or piece of territory. The joint force commander must understand with whom he is dealing during negotiations. Greedy spoilers can be accommodated in the stability processes, however, only if their usefulness to the process is greater than the cost of their demands. Greedy spoilers seek to take advantage of the chaos associated with political instability to further their interests. Greedy spoilers may surface as criminals or black marketeers seeking a monopoly on scarce goods and services. Sometimes the spoilers are extortionists, selling security for a price to a traumatized population. Greedy spoilers could also be ordinary citizens, or informal leaders of marginalized groups, who are simply trying to gain a material advantage — by what most western observers would consider unfair methods — in a desperate situation. If these spoilers cannot be co-opted, they can be dealt with by standard police methods.

A key consideration is that limited and greedy spoilers often have legitimate interests and that these interests must be addressed before resorting to coercion if the joint force is to avoid losing its legitimacy in the eyes of the people and creates even more spoilers.

Cultural intelligence will assist with identifying leaders and members of each group with the desire and ability to disrupt stability operations. Once the joint force commander identifies the motivations and operating patterns of each group he can devise specific plans to defeat, neutralize, co-opt, or induce as appropriate. In effect, the



stability operation campaign can be understood as a focused set of actions taken simultaneously or sequentially, in and out of theater, to coerce, induce, or socialize spoilers even as security, aid and incentives for cooperation are made available to the population at large. Coercion is the use of force or the threat of force. Coercion defeats total spoilers and contains limited and greedy ones. Since stability operations are not limited to the area of operation, particularly when addressing spoilers, the joint force must coordinate with interagencies — and across national and regional boundaries — to deal with internal spoilers and resolve problems caused by external spoilers.

Inducements, especially those that address legitimate desires, satisfy the needs of limited and greedy spoilers. Inducements may take the form of political recognition, employment opportunities, or other types of material gain. The needs of the population as a whole cannot be sacrificed in order to appease spoilers. Stability operations must remove the mechanisms by which insurgents manipulate and intimidate civilian populations. Civic assistance programs providing security, restoration of infrastructure, or economic opportunities are the best inducements for the general population for whom establishment of good order is in obvious self-interest.

Socialization is designed to prevent the return or development of future spoilers. It influences the local populace and key leaders to cooperate with the joint force in attaining the strategic goals of the operation. Socialization is a long-term process designed to assimilate the spoilers through cooperative programs. This process begins with actions the joint force initiates to legitimize its actions; public information and psychological operations; reestablishment of education, and support to civil administration. Socialization seeks to show that the spoiler has more to gain as part of the solution vice part of the problem.

A stability campaign requires coordinated command presence throughout the community and a public information plan. The public information plan must link security operations, information operations, psychological operations, humanitarian assistance, public affairs, public works, and all other actions of the joint force into a coherent whole—all of which are aimed at eliminating spoilers, increasing security, and enabling restorative operations.



2.C.2. Stability Operations Friction Points

In addition to overcoming obstacles to establishing security, the joint force may encounter unintentional areas of friction due to the diverse participants that are involved in stability operations—international and regional organizations, nongovernmental organizations (NGOs), US government and other foreign government agencies, and private voluntary organizations (PVOs). These diverse organizations have different purposes and mandates, yet collectively they are extremely necessary and important to the achievement of long-term transition to security and reconstruction. The joint force commander must be aware of the mandates and limitations each organization brings to the process in order to leverage their capabilities while reducing the friction associated with coordinating among these diverse organizations. Therefore, one of the joint force commander's objectives is to create an environment that allows coordination with these groups in order to work towards a common goal.

Multinational participation may also be a source of friction due to diversity of guidance from their respective governments. The joint force commander must create a shared vision among coalition partners to build unity of purpose and coherency of action and preventing them from unintentionally working at cross purposes. The ability to share information in this multinational environment enables the joint force commander to identify purposes, capabilities, and limitations of all, and apply that knowledge to achieve the desired security effects while supporting the objectives of these organizations as well.

Yet another source of potential friction in stability operations, one often overlooked, is the population of the affected nation-state. The population itself is adjusting to a “new normal”, and in most instances, there is a civilian leadership vacuum when conventional combat operations end. Furthermore, a nation's population is rarely homogeneous in ethnic composition, political or religious outlook, or desired goals. Thus, the population's transition can be complicated. The post-combat environment may experience radical societal shifts brought on by the forces of ethnic, tribal, and religious discord, all of which require periods of adjustment to bring back to the “new normal”. Assisting the population in this adjustment is part of the joint force commander's tasking during stability operations. Without the joint force commander's intervention, these societal forces—ethnic, tribal or religious discord—converge, and may allow the root



causes of conflict yet another opportunity to reemerge and disrupt ongoing stability operations.

2.D Case 2 Operational Environment

2.D.1. In Case 2, the US and its allies intervene to defeat a hostile nation-state acting in ways that are inimical to the vital or important interests of the US and its allies or employs a level of coercion against its own population that exceeds accepted norms of international behavior. The hostile nation is a non-peer, regional power with a functional government, a standing military force, and special internal police forces that keep control of rival ethnic communities and other oppositionist groups.

The US, as part of an integrated joint, multiagency, and coalition force plans for combat and stability operations in concert with other actions to modify the behavior of this nation-state's government, or remove it from power. The hostile government will not allow access to its territory or population and will actively oppose all diplomatic, informational, military, and economic measures to alter its behavior. The Case 2 hostile power will most likely fight if its leaders perceive that a military intervention by the US and its coalition partners is imminent.

The intelligence needs of the commander conducting stability operations will be more complex than those of a commander conducting conventional combat operations. Effective intelligence support during stability operations builds upon continuous peacetime information collection and intelligence production. Increased reliance on human intelligence sources is, however, necessary to collect detailed information on the motives and methods of any potential adversaries as well as on the root causes of insecurity within the society. Combining both military and non-military means is the most effective method for achieving cultural understanding. Often information from regional coalition partners will form the essence of the joint force's understanding of the environment in which it must succeed.

Early action in the collection effort is necessary. It must begin well before the situation becomes urgent. Intelligence collection assets are limited, and it takes time to refocus resources on an area in crisis. Perhaps more important, the crisis situation may



cause critical sources of information to disappear or “be disappeared” during the course of war. As conflict erupts and the affected nation-state is overcome by turmoil, embassy reporting, bilateral contacts, and private sector assessments tend to erode or *dry up* completely. In extreme cases, most international organizations and embassies withdraw their staff personnel, leaving behind little to gather information on the developing situation.

Among the multiple agencies and coalition partners executing a Case 2 stability operation, there must be a complete and common understanding of each other, the opposition, and the situation. The potential for success increases significantly when all participating agencies develop an effective and reciprocal information sharing process will the joint force be able to effectively address the security and humanitarian needs of the population, streamline field reporting, and integrate real-time information into mission planning. A joint operations intelligence support element, or other specially organized intelligence organization, may be needed to integrate military and non-military intelligence with coalition information gathering and analysis capabilities to create the kind of understanding sufficient for the joint force commander to decide and act.

2.D.2. Preventive actions must achieve one of three cumulative effects. They help prevent the situation from crossing the threshold of war or, if that threshold is crossed, set the conditions for successful combat. Finally, they help set the conditions for restorative stability operations. Military preventive actions support diplomatic, informational, and economic actions. The joint force must present a credible threat in the eyes of the hostile leadership in order to demonstrate the nation’s resolve. This can be achieved by creating the perception of relentless pressure at all levels—strategic, operational, and tactical—in the adversary’s mind.






Figure 4: Case 2—Levels of Force in Stability Operations

Preventive actions operations, conducted by all instruments of government action, including conventional and unconventional military forces, increase the pressure felt by the adversary. Preventive actions can be overt, covert, clandestine, or most probably, some combination of each. Factions whose interests coincide with the US and coalition strategic objectives could be recruited, trained, equipped, and employed to conduct unconventional or guerrilla warfare, as well as subversion and sabotage. The purpose of these kinds of actions is to strip away the regimes legitimacy and control, degrade his military capability, and thwart his military strategies. Preventive diplomatic actions may include the negotiated removal of a subject regime as done prior to the Haiti intervention.

Other actions are indirect—for example, security cooperation activities such as security assistance to regional allies to make them less vulnerable to threats or attacks by the hostile state or its proxies. Show of force and freedom of navigation operations can demonstrate resolve, reassure regional allies, encourage neutral parties to maintain their neutrality, dampen the aggressive impulses of adversaries and pre-position intervention forces should they become necessary. When directed to do so by the appropriate civilian authority, the joint force commander could also assist in identifying and supporting



selected persons or organizations inside the hostile state. Unconventional forces in covert or clandestine operations could directly engage elements of the Case 2 hostile power's unconventional threat, such as transnational terrorists or other total spoilers.

In some cases, preventive actions may involve years of diplomatic, economic, and military activities. In other cases, prevention may take the form of several weeks or months of intense action. In all cases, the need for detailed intelligence comes to the fore.

The principal difference between the intelligence requirement for conventional operations and stability operations is the focus and degree of detail required to support the commander's decision-making process. New information categories emerge that expand the area of interest to include political parties, military and paramilitary forces, as well as governmental and non-governmental organizations that may interact with the joint force.

Intelligence in the pre-crisis phase must provide a thorough understanding of the situation. This understanding will focus on what are usually considered non-military topics, such as politics, economics, criminal activity, and demographics. The joint force commander must consider the political organization and style of the state in which he may operate. The expanded information requirements generate an enormous demand for information that includes demography, topography, land use, food availability, refugees, displaced civilians, and migrations, political boundaries, ethnic conflict, environmental and health condition, transportation networks and conditions. The joint force must develop and update key warning indicators in coordination with all partner agencies involved in the operation. The stability intelligence process must provide the commander with extensive reach into the best data sources available. Analysts must have the connectivity to work closely with all sources of information, identify specific requirements, and then determine which sources—military and government civilian, international organizations, the scientific community, or private industry—can provide it. Analysts must be capable of using the latest in Geographic Information System, geospatial and temporal analysis, and modeling and simulation tools to integrate, verify, and synthesize material from US Government as well as non-US sources. The joint force must be able to disseminate information, such as analytical reports and visualization aids,



to expand the situational awareness. Information sharing among all partners, military and non-military, enhances the common operating picture, and strengthens the crisis response capability of the coalition.

2.D.3. During Combat," US and coalition diplomatic deterrence efforts have failed and the situation has crossed the threshold of conflict. The joint force commander is directed to conduct conventional and unconventional combat operations in order to defeat the hostile power's military forces. The joint force is now the lead instrument of national policy with regard to the crisis, and the joint force commander becomes the supported agent. During the combat phase, the aim of stability operations is twofold: first, to facilitate the forward momentum of combat operations and second, impose security to set the conditions from which long-term stability and reconstruction can grow, and the country can transition to legitimate, civil governance.

Combat operations are the main effort during this phase. The joint force commander is supported by the appropriate elements of interagency and coalition power. The commander must design military effects that not only generate immediate victory in combat but long-term success as well. Achievement of the strategic aims in war also consists of winning the confrontations that always follow even successful combat. The joint force must be organized, trained, and equipped to impose security even while the fighting of major conventional combat operations continues.

The adversary's military forces that sought to match US and coalition strength will have been destroyed in combat, but the fate of the members of that force is an important factor in the future direction of the post conflict transition. Other hostile forces may avoid direct combat and attack asymmetrically by operating in predominantly civilian areas, employing capabilities on the seams between illegal and legal activities, and seeking to hide by blurring the distinction between combatant and noncombatant.

Stability operations facilitate the forward momentum of combat operations by conducting security operations in areas in which conventional fighting has stopped, or have been bypassed by combat troops. The type of forces that stability operations will face and the extent of the opposition those forces exhibit is a direct result of how the joint



See Figure 3, page 11.

force fights during major conventional combat operations. Joint forces conducting stability operations collect information through direct contact with the civilian populace. They also minimize civilian interference with military operations by controlling civilian movement in the battlespace. The joint force coordinates for local resources to support to joint combat force requirements.

The portion of the joint force that is conducting stability operations in support of combat must be composed of task forces or teams with the following elements: a command element, a security element with sufficient combat capability to deal with residual hostile forces, a support element, and a civic assistance element. These elements must have sufficient mobility, survivability, and sustainability to immediately follow and support combat forces. The joint force security element must be organized, trained, and equipped specifically for offensive and defensive operations in an unconventional environment.

The joint force locates total spoilers during the combat phase and begins defeating them. The joint force may employ security elements directly against the spoilers, or use local or other surrogate forces to indirectly engage spoilers beyond the operational reach of conventional forces. Joint special operations forces may conduct other direct, low visibility, covert, or clandestine operations to identify, dislocate, destroy or defeat total spoilers. Joint force civic actions contribute to combat operations in specific ways. For example, they minimize civilian interference with joint force operations by recommending routes, assembly areas, and logistical sites, to avoid densely populated areas. Additionally, the joint force staff plans evacuation routes for displaced civilians and disseminates that information to the populace in order to keep avenues of advance and lines of communication clear. Finally, the joint force staff plans for the management of civilian detainees and prisoners of war.

During the combat phase, limited and greedy spoilers will be difficult to identify and locate within the hostile nation because the lethality of the environment will curtail their activities to a large degree. Limited and greedy spoilers are common among the expatriates of the hostile nation returning home after the war. They may be exiled politicians, religious leaders, soldiers, businessmen, or transnational criminals. All types of spoilers may attempt to misrepresent the situation, their power, or the level of their



influence and legitimacy, in order to manipulate the process for their own benefit, or that of their constituency. The goals of limited, and greedy, spoilers include: eliminating rivals, obtaining a favorable political position, or securing an economic monopoly. The joint force engages potential spoilers through direct or indirect negotiations. The joint force commander must act quickly to limit spoiler demands and induce them to support stability objectives by making reasonable concessions. Coercion, if necessary, could be applied to isolate uncooperative spoilers politically, economically, and socially. The joint force must take legal action against criminal spoilers to enhance the stability process.

Stability operations in the combat phase also set the conditions for follow-on success in the post-combat phase. Such operations are conducted by US and coalition forces, and as soon as it is practical, local security and assistance organizations. Initially, activities focus on winning support by enhancing the positive image of US and coalition combat operations. Joint forces executing stability operations protect cultural landmarks, hospitals, schools, religious sites, and museums. They also protect key assets such as, power facilities, hospitals, water systems, food production and distribution centers, weapons storage areas, and other high interest areas. This helps the joint force commander meet his obligations under international law; it also enhances the legitimacy of the operation in the eyes of international and local observers. Stability operations dislocate total spoilers by isolating them physically and psychologically. The joint force must also cut spoilers off from material support by rationing critical items, limiting the issue of travel and work permits as well as by implementing curfews, checkpoints, and other measures as appropriate.

When it moves into an area during major conventional combat operations, a joint force assigned stability tasks imposes public safety and establishes law and order. Forces engaged in stability operations, especially civil affairs and military police elements, screen the populace to separate potential terrorists or enemy special operations forces from civilians groups. Stability operations contribute to situational awareness by providing information on the political, cultural, and economic situation. This enables the commander to decide when and where to perform government functions that the regime, or local agencies, are unwilling or no longer able to provide. Local leaders and local security forces assist in providing for public safety as soon as it is practicable. Assistance



from neighboring countries resulting from capabilities developed by peacetime security cooperation activities can provide key support.

The intelligence activities during combat are very complex. They must focus primarily on enemy combat forces but begin to expand collection and analysis to include information necessary for post combat stability operations. The capabilities needed are similar to those in the preventive operations. Ongoing human intelligence efforts identify potential cultural, religious, ethnic, racial, political, or economic attitudes that could jeopardize the post hostility stability operation. The intelligence capabilities begin to focus on the unconventional threat posed by total spoilers, to include terrorist threats both inside and outside of the operational area. Human intelligence also focuses on the identity, motivation, and intentions of limited and greedy spoilers. The military intelligence capabilities of the joint force must begin to refocus on information sharing with coalition partners' military and non-military information systems. The intelligence collection and analysis effort will expand to include the status of the infrastructure and its ability to meet the needs of the local population. While combat operations are being conducted, governmental and non-governmental relief agencies will not have access to the battlespace. The intelligence produced by the joint force, however, must be shared with these agencies to enable them to plan and prepare for post-combat relief and development programs. The joint force can facilitate the efforts of its civilian partners by collecting and sharing information on local agencies that could aid relief efforts, identifying and locating key local leaders, assessing humanitarian needs, and restoring essential public works and services.

2.D.4. When major conventional combat operations end,¹² the fighting is not over. Security and a new stability do not emerge naturally, *sui generis*. Some confrontations continue. The number, type, and extent of confrontations will depend upon how the joint force conducted major conventional combat operations. Internal or external factions will vie for control and attempt to take advantage of the situation. Spoilers of peace emerge; some may have been identified previously, others may not have been. The power



¹² See Figure 4, page 22.

vacuum left by combat provides opportunities to limited and greedy spoilers. The same vacuum presents the total spoilers with a favorable environment in which to act.

The degree to which the spoilers can be coerced, or induced, into socialization depends on two notions—their individual situation and finding the right tangible or intangible action and inducement. Total spoilers who severely oppressed the population, especially those total spoilers guilty of crimes against humanity, will not be re-assimilated by society. Individuals, who support the defeated regime because their identity is inextricably intertwined with a deep sense of group superiority, or endangerment, are likely to be irreconcilable after defeat in combat. Young men who were recruited as children, often from the dispossessed underclass tend to be violent and are easy for the older total spoilers to manipulate. If these “child-soldiers” are young enough to reenter the education process and have not become irrevocably habituated to violence, they may be successfully socialized if society can provide appropriate inducements. In any case, total spoilers must be separated from society if they cannot be re-assimilated. Given that most insurgencies begin with the actions of a small fraction of the population, any assembly of spoilers can spark strife and undermine stability¹³.

Somewhat older males, who have had some education and socialization prior to becoming spoilers, may be able to be re-assimilated back into society. Socialization will be more difficult, however, the longer these spoilers have been operating outside of societal norms. Limited spoilers of strong belief in either religious, ethnic, or national superiority or endangerment may be induced into the stability process if their needs concerning group identity are satisfied in political or economic terms.

Greedy spoilers will **try** to obtain more than their fair share of political or material aid from the joint force. They can be useful to the transition effort if they can be influenced to act in a positive manner and their demands are scaled back to reasonable levels. The joint force commander must exercise extreme caution in dealing with greedy spoilers to avoid inadvertently legitimizing them. Any appearance of legitimacy for greedy spoiler may discredit the stability operation in the eyes of the local population.

During reconstruction operations, the primacy of effort shifts back to the civilian authority and the joint force commander resumes the supporting role. The transition from



Peters, Ralph, “The New Warrior Class,” *Parameters*, Volume 24, Number 2, Summer 1994, p. 16.

combat to a “new normal” and subsequent stability is a long process. Security is a *sine qua non*, but it alone cannot produce the transition to a new and stable environment. Self-sustaining stability cannot be imposed: it grows from the right social, economic, and political conditions. These conditions are very complex and reveal why success results only from integrated multiagency stability operations conducted over time and sustained with enduring political will. Military actions contribute to, and are subordinate to, the diplomatic peacemaking process. The presence and activities of US, and coalition forces, help create the conditions for a peaceful resolution of disputes. The situation may require the joint force to assist in sensitive, and potentially volatile, peace building efforts such as conducting elections and demobilizing former belligerents.

The initial focus of those joint forces conducting stability operation is on restoring law and order, protecting noncombatants and key facilities, restoring emergency services, and providing humanitarian relief. Although post conflict activities are primarily diplomatic, military and other civilian involvement is normally required to restore civil authority, rebuild the infrastructure, and reestablish commerce, education, and public utilities. Offensive and defensive operations, conducted by conventional and special operations forces, will likely be necessary to defeat or dislocate the total spoilers who oppose transition to a secure and a “new normal” and cannot be induced or socialized into cooperation.

Intelligence requirements in the post-combat phase will be similar to those of the previous phases. A civilian constabulary force may be embedded in the latter part of the combat phase. A constabulary will allow the initial shift to civilian-run security. The constabulary will also begin the shift in requirements toward forensic or criminal intelligence. A cadre of civil-military experts with considerable experience in law enforcement and forensic intelligence collection and analysis augments the joint force commander’s situational and cultural awareness. Direct, positive, and continuous interaction with the local leaders and population by all elements of the joint force also enhances the commander’s situational and cultural awareness. Such augmentation during the combat phase of stability operations smoothes the movement to civilian control and contributes to long-term success.



The joint force commander's civic-assistance elements will begin to address restoration of essential basic services as law and order is restored. Empowered with a discretionary funds system, the commander employs the local population, directly or through contracts, and begins restoring essential services such as, food and water distribution, waste removal, power production, and basic medical services. The fund enables the commander to employ an idle population, restore services, positively affect the local economy, and foster goodwill and hope among the people.

The civic-assistance element may be required to conduct initial government functions including law enforcement and restoration of public works and services. The civic assistance element may also conduct civil affairs operations, performs economic functions and social services, implements educational programs, provides increased medical care, and satisfies immediate vertical and horizontal construction needs. Social and educational program enables identification and remediation of grievances before the problems become overwhelming. These efforts continue shaping and improving the post-combat landscape. As quickly as possible, the actions of a military civic assistance element must be replaced by long-term, civilian organizations and agencies. These organizations and agencies identified in the planning of any major combat operation and practiced as an integrated multiagency force during routine training and exercises, form the backbone of a long-term, successful stability operation.

2.E Operational Art for Stability Operations.

Operational art, according to Joint Publication 3-0, describes "the employment of military forces to attain strategic or operational objectives through the design, organization, integration, and conduct of strategies, campaigns, major operations, and battles. Operational art translates the joint force commander's strategy into operational design, and ultimately, tactical action, by integrating activities of all levels of war." This definition is insufficient for the purposes of the Stability Operations Joint Operating Concept. Our understanding of operational art must expand to include both military and non-military instruments of government action. Stability operations are inherently integrated, multiagency activities. In stability operations decisions and actions taken at the tactical level can have immediate strategic effects. Likewise, the actions of non-



military participants can also result in strategic effects. These decisions must be guided by operational art and understanding that winning the conflict is only the first step in winning the confrontation.

Operational art begins in the mind and character of the commander. A joint force commander cannot achieve what he cannot conceive. Providing a secure environment can best be accomplished through military means, but the other instruments of government action (diplomatic, information and economic) are required to create the conditions from which “new normal” can grow. The commander must envision a plan that coherently applies all available instruments of government action to ensure that the proper conditions for long-term security are created. He must also adapt as the situation warrants proffering either the “velvet glove” to persuade or the “mailed fist” to compel compliance.

The decentralized nature of stability operations also requires the commander to exercise a high degree of trust and confidence in his subordinates and non-military partners. He must build trust and confidence among the set of peer-leaders, military and non-military, who are responsible for the attainment of US and coalition political aims. The joint force commander’s role will shift as he supports, then is supported, and returns to a support role. His role as a leader, however, remains constant. The joint force commander maintains relationships across cultural lines throughout all of the military and civilian agencies involved in the stability operation.

While integrated, multiagency unity of purpose and coherency of action begin in the mind of the joint force commander, they are executed by the US military and non-military, and coalition organizations simultaneously across complex physical, informational, and cognitive domains. Defeating spoilers who may be insurgents, militant extremist or terrorists requires the conduct of counterinsurgency operations throughout the area of responsibility all while under the ever-watchful eye of the international media, the people back home, and the local population. Supporting strategic communication actions are required in all dimensions of the information domain—broadcast and print media and person-to-person discussion—to establish the legitimacy of coalition actions and preempt spoiler attempts to enlist the general populace in their cause.



In stability operations, the battlespace extends beyond that normally associated with purely military operations. Interagency, coalition government, and non-governmental agencies will require access to the battlespace if they are to act coherently with the joint force. These agencies will require not only terrain but also access to air and seaport facilities, transportation networks, the local work force, and portions of the electromagnetic spectrum — particularly bandwidth — in which to operate. The commander must consider these requirements not only in space but also in time; priority of allocation will shift with operational phases as the lead shifts from civilian primacy to military primacy and back.

The battlespace in the cognitive domain concerns the “minds” of those who oppose transition. The domain also includes the cultural, social, and religious, as well as the political and economic perceptions of everyone concerned with the operation. Spoilers must be convinced of not only of the futility of their actions but also the failure of their attempts to garner popular support. Noncombatants must be convinced of the legitimacy of coalition actions and the benefit to remaining neutral. Likewise, external actors, both nation-states and transnational actors, must be convinced it is not in their interest to intervene.

Operational art in stability operations requires a coherent civil-military organizational construct. The organization and the process it adapts must result in both horizontal and vertical synergy. This synergy will help to achieve and sustain unity of purpose and coherency in action across organizational and cultural lines. Spoilers will attack using multiple asymmetric means, which the joint force must oppose by coordinated action. The joint force commander must apply all available military and non-military power coherently to destroy, disrupt, or defeat spoilers. The joint force commander must be ready to implement innovative partnerships with the interagency, international organizations, non-governmental organizations as well as with academic groups and the international business community.

Perhaps the most important aspect of operational art is the ability to “fit” these elements together — in harmony. Any plan that a joint force commander constructs must satisfy political leadership, attain the political aims assigned, and be constructed collaboratively with his peer-leaders who are co-responsible for attaining those aims.



Further, the joint force commander’s plan must be executable by the forces he has available in the physical and information domains, and within the organization he has on hand or creates. If one of these elements is out of balance, the joint force commander must adjust the others—and continually rebalance as his operations unfold. In stability operations, the joint force commander must balance resource allocations among offensive and defensive operations, as well as, civic assistance and non-military applications of power. How and when are matters of his judgment, a matter of his art.



Section 3 – Case 2 STABILITY OPERATIONS – THE CONCEPT

3.A. Synopsis of the Central Idea.

Successful Case 2 stability operations are inextricably linked to planning and executing war. If combat is required, stability operations will form an essential part of pre-combat activities, combat Operations, and post-combat actions. The joint force, as part of a multinational and integrated, multiagency operation, still provides security as well as initial humanitarian assistance, limited governance, restoration of essential public services, and other reconstruction assistance—until the security environment permits civilian agencies to perform these functions. These kinds of stability operations will be conducted simultaneously, distributed throughout the theater of war. *All will require a combination of detailed situational understanding; a coercive posture against obstructionists; unified direction from legitimate civil authority; integrated, multiagency unity of purpose and coherency of action; sophisticated media operations; organizational endurance; and sufficient popular support over time in order to facilitate the transition to legitimate local governance and reduce the likelihood of the reemergence of destabilizing elements.*

Pervasive knowledge in stability operations requires thorough familiarity with the all of the dynamics at work within the joint area of operations: political, economic, social, cultural, religious. The joint force commander must have an understanding of who will oppose transition efforts and what motivates them to do so.¹⁴ He must understand the nature of the conflict, the enemy, the battlefield, and the nature of local population and culture. Augmenting traditional military intelligence with what is commonly understood as “criminal intelligence,” “economic intelligence,” and “political intelligence,” and “fiscal or financial intelligence” in the civilian sector and with cultural understanding enables the joint force commander to anticipate developments and take appropriate preventive or reactive measures. All forms of intelligence, to include human, must be collated into common accessible databases. This collation of types of intelligence—when coupled with consistent, positive interaction with local leaders and citizens—provides the



Reminder: “Joint” in the context of this concept refers to a joint, interagency, and multinational force.

joint force commander and civilian leadership the basis for the detailed situational understanding required to be successful.

A coercive posture against obstructionists is achieved by the aggressive pursuit of all who oppose security and the creation of conditions from which a long-term new “normal” grows. Military commanders should seek to defeat or bring violent spoilers to justice using the executive law enforcement powers of the mission’s civilian authorities. Joint force commanders conducting Case 2 stability operations must mount counterinsurgency style operations, in close collaboration with civilian police and other security forces that develop local intelligence to locate spoiler threats, limit their freedom of action and, when directed, defeat them before these threats can do harm or slow the stability process. The explicit elements of these coercive operations, drawn from the counterinsurgency paradigm, include:

- Find by developing, and employing, the necessary local intelligence to support offensive operations.
- Fix by denying violent spoilers freedom of action or movement while at the same time protecting essential friendly groups and facilities.
- Strike militant spoilers with the intent to bring them under arrest, disrupt their activities, or defeat them in battle through a combination of military, police, psychological, and legal actions.

The way to deal with spoilers in the long term is to establish the legitimacy of the operation in the minds of the local people. The people, once they have an effective government, will then eliminate most of the spoilers leaving the military to focus on those that are most difficult and dangerous. Dealing with spoilers requires a multifaceted approach. Some types of spoilers can be influenced by political, economic, or informational means without resorting to military action; others must be defeated by military means.

One of the conditions required for long-term results form several aspects of legitimacy. Legitimacy is a product of fact and perception. By acting under the direction of legitimate civil authority the joint force ensures legal and moral legitimacy for both the



force and the operation. In stability operations, only an appropriately mandated civil authority can direct coercive operations against spoilers. Authorized under proper authority, the civilian leader of the mission is normally vested with executive powers to enforce compliance with the law. The perception of legitimacy is sustained with the international community, regional, and domestic populace, when operations are conducted with scrupulous regard for international norms on the use of force and regard for humanitarian principles.

Legitimacy is essential to create long-term success. Stability operations are usually characterized by an effort to seek a broader legal legitimacy through a mandate from the international community and to establish “new” legitimacy locally. In many cases, restorative stability operations can be characterized as a fight over legitimacy—old versus new.

Integrated, multiagency unity purpose, though very difficult achieve, begins with a shared, common end-state. This common understanding of the strategic objectives and operational end-state is articulated through the mutual intent of the joint force commander and the lead civilian leader. This intent must be stated in unambiguous terms so that civil and military subordinate organizations and peers understand what is expected from them. In stability operations, actions taken at the tactical level can have immediate strategic implications. For this reason, the strategic context of the operation must be articulated and understood by all participants — military and civilian — at all levels: strategic, operational, and tactical. Integrated and collaborative planning with **US** government agencies and multinational partners is a prerequisite to achieving unity of purpose. The civil-military plans for stability operations must be nested in all operational planning then refined and rehearsed in pre-operational wargames and exercises. Planning and rehearsal — with all elements expected to execute the operations, military as well **as** multiagency — form the foundation of success in execution.

Integrated, multiagency coherency of action results when all available civil and military means work toward achieving the common purpose. Just as the joint force commander and the lead civilian leader ensure unity of purpose by clearly nesting intent within that set by their military and political leaders, coherency of action is achieved at the strategic, operational, and tactical levels by integrated, multiagency actions. When he



is the lead agent, the joint force commander must be able to set the pace and direction of the stability operation. As the supporting agent, the joint force commander must be able to respond to changes of pace and direction in the operation in sync with civilian agencies. Integrated, multiagency actions are not limited to military operations that are kinetic and lethal; they may also be military or civilian operations that are non-kinetic and non-lethal. Coherent economic actions, computer network attacks, and actions in public diplomacy represent non-kinetic, non-lethal operations that, when coupled with kinetic and lethal military strikes optimize the commander's ability to generate coherent effects in the battlespace.

A civil-military "Joint Planning Structure," established by the military and leading civilian agency, is the joint force's nexus for civil-military preparation, organization, and action. Furthermore, it is the structure that maintains both unity of purpose and coherency of action. The Joint Planning Structure ensures a common understanding of near term "next state" composite civil-military objectives for the mission and facilitates integrated planning and coherency of action on specific matters that require intense and close civil-military collaboration and management over time. Coherency of action is enhanced when all components of the mission operate in a network-centric environment with extensive collaborative planning and execution. Such an environment enables simultaneous, distributed operations with other stability activities or combat operations without loss of coherency.

A sophisticated media operation is required to achieve strategic, operational, and tactical objectives. Media operations must address the local populace, regional neighbors, coalition partners, domestic audiences, our own forces, our opponents, and others.

National-level policy guidance provides the framework for information operations planning and execution across all activities. Operational and tactical information operations are traditionally identified as: psychological operations, electronic warfare, computer network operations, operational security, deception, and other information operations. Other information operations are defined by some as: information needed by the joint force commander to make decisions and take actions. Others define it as computer network attack and computer network defense, and actions taken to degrade an



opponent's decision making capability. This concept does not discuss these definitions, but rather focuses on media operations associated with public affairs and public diplomacy.

Stability operations focus on public affairs and public diplomacy—not as an element of strategic communications, but as informational instruments of national strategy. Each is a separate function with a unique mission. Public diplomacy is an interagency governmental effort to communicate prepared messages and themes to an international audience.¹⁵ In contrast, public affairs operations focus is on public actions. They provide a timely flow of accurate information to internal and external publics.¹⁶ While public affairs and public diplomacy reinforce each other, and involve close cooperation and coordination they must be separate and distinct. Each function requires distinct efforts to plan, resource, and execute as part of the joint force commander's larger stability operations plan. It is critically important that public affairs and public diplomacy efforts are mutually supportive in order to maintain credibility with their respective audiences.

The organizational construct for stability operations must support operations of long duration. Organizational endurance will be paramount to overcoming the duration and complexity of stability operations. While the end-state may be well defined, the nature of the operations is complicated by the time required to solve problems at multiple levels and create the conditions from which long-term success can develop. Stability operations are psychologically intense. Leadership must be able to continually balance restraint with overmatching power. The individual must be psychologically prepared to engage in the operations over an undetermined amount of time. The individual must be able to have an offensive mindset and peacemaker heart. Civilian and military organizations must have the capability to organize, train, equip, and execute long-term stability operations simultaneously with conventional combat operations.

Long endurance operations also require patience. The same tactical patience that applies on the battlefield applies in stability operations. It takes time to create long-term success. Opposing forces will utilize time as their ally for they will seek to employ a strategy of protraction, which only reinforces the need for patience. The joint force



¹⁵ Joint Publication 3-61, *Doctrine for Public Affairs in Joint Operations*, Joint Staff, 14 May 1997, p 111-18
¹⁶ Ibid, section II

commander and the lead civilian must view stability operations as a marathon. The successful transition marathon requires intensive planning, training, and purposeful execution. Stability operations are a test of will, nerves, and endurance.

Joint force logisticians must be able to know what type and amount of support is needed throughout the battlespace, near real-time. The logistics organization must also be able to rapidly obtain and distribute the necessary materiel and services to the organizations that need them in time to support both military and civilian stability operations. The integrated civil-military logistics organization must integrate deployment, employment, and sustainment of the joint force in order to eliminate redundancies, stimulate synergy, and synchronize the movement and sustainability of forces conducting stability operations over a long duration. The in-country or regional footprint should be reduced to the minimum possible. The organization must seamlessly transition through deployment, employment, and sustainment and from supporting preventive stability operations to major conventional combat operations, and then post-combat support for stability operations.

Maintaining popular support over time, internationally, domestically, and locally, is key to mission success. Maintaining popular support requires managing expectations and perceptions of all who are involved in a transition operation—especially those of the population that the joint force is attempting to stabilize. The population at large must perceive consistency in the policies, actions, and processes of the joint force throughout the operation in all times and places. This is especially critical in the movement from combat to post-combat operations or when rotating forces during the long-duration restorative phase of stability operations. The actions and processes must not change radically when commanders and units change unless there is a clearly articulated reason for making such a change. Consistency is also crucial as the joint force transfers authority for the operation from military to civilian control. Civilian authorities must know which policies the military put in place and understand the ramifications of altering them. Equally important, the joint force commander should, if at all possible, coordinate policy decisions with civilian authorities before he makes them. Integrated, multiagency operations—from start to finish—are an essential hallmark of stability operations.



3.B The Principles of Case 2 Stability Operations.

Commanders from the operational to the tactical level draw from their own wealth of knowledge and experience. The depth of knowledge and experience varies with each commander. Case 2 stability operations will occur in various locations, at different times, over a long duration, and as a result of varying circumstances. Each commander charged with conducting a specific stability operation will face a unique set of conditions affecting their conduct of the operation. The following principles offer commanders a set of tools to help shape their thoughts, decision process, and actions. The principles are meant to guide commanders as they plan, prepare, execute, and sustain the operation that matches their specific circumstances. **As** a set, these principles represent the duality inherent in all stability operations—the “velvet glove” and “mailed fist”.

3.B.1. Organize the efforts of military and civilian agencies to achieve integrated, multiagency unity of purpose and coherency of action.

- Begin with a practiced plan; adjust from it.
- Reinforce the need for a joint civil-military structure for operational planning and execution.
- Publish a political-military plan that establishes tasking authorities.
- Integrate military, special police, and civilian police operations from beginning to end.
- Bring to bear all instruments of government action.
- Ensure that activities of each element link to the common strategic end-state.
- Establish a pervasive knowledge environment and technical architecture.

A political-military plan is essential to provide the strategic guidance required to develop an effects-based plan. Integrated, multiagency operations begin well before any crisis emerges. Civilian counterparts must participate in developing stability operation plans prior to crises, as well as in exercises and wargames that rehearse those plans. A political-military plan facilitates unity of purpose and coherency of action, for it is this plan that constitutes the foundation for the interagency strategy in stability operations.

Nongovernmental actors are normally very knowledgeable of an area of operation and its



people. They can assist the joint force commander to refine approaches requiring military attention. Understanding the interests of all actors involved in the conduct of conflict and post-conflict operations is the truest validation of objectives that define what a nation or coalition of nations is attempting to do.¹⁷ Integrated, multiagency operations begin well before any crisis emerges. Civilian counterparts must participate in developing stability operation plans prior to crises and be involved in the exercises and wargames of these plans.

The political-military plan establishes shared understanding of the mission and is a common point of departure for the joint force. However, nothing goes according to plan. A key for success in stability operations is the joint force commander's ability to gain understanding, recognize needed changes, adapt and convey the intent of these changes to the joint force, multinational forces, the interagency, and others. The ability to convey the required changes to the plan allows the joint force commander to seize the initiative and adapt to an ever-changing operational environment. This adaptability requires augmenting and staffing both military and civil command structures with the expertise and capabilities required to develop pervasive knowledge and share that knowledge.

Exercises and wargames provide venues to practice making coordinated civil-military decisions and taking coherent action. These venues also help create organizational agility and synergy by teaching the civil-military team to adapt to changing situations and organizational demands. Commanders and civilian leaders can be trained and empowered to conduct flexible and responsive operations without a loss of unity of purpose that focuses on common strategic aims. Military commanders and civilian leaders, if they plan and prepare together and operate in proper organizational construct, can conduct integrated, multiagency operations that use the full range of government and coalition partner actions.

Transition to legitimate civil authority, not actions on the military objective, should be the point from which to initiate backward planning. Before the initiation of combat, the consequences of military action on post-hostility recovery must be considered. Backward planning looks beyond combat operations to encompass consolidation and transition considerations. Combat operations are subordinate to, and are a subset of, a



¹⁷ Binnendijk, ed., Ibid.

strategic shaping campaign that addresses the nation's, or coalition's, ultimate strategic objectives.

3.B.2. Incorporate strategic communications into every action, tactical and operational.

- Do the right thing, in the right way, at the right time, then ensure it is seen and understood by those you must influence.
- Consider strategic communications and include information operations with war planning efforts.
- Create a civilian-military media operations center.
- Attack adversary's information networks and limit his ability to affect coalition information operations.

Civilian-military media operations must convey the US and multinational objectives of the stability operation to the local, regional, and international populations. Media operations must tie theater operations to national strategic themes. Media actions and other supporting activities must be an inherent part of every operation and war-gamed to ensure its ability to support operations. Every actor—from private to general on the military side and from individual to senior civilian leader among the multiple agencies involved—has two basic responsibilities. First, each must execute his or her actions efficiently and effectively consistent with achieving common strategic aims. Second, each is an “information warrior” responsible to promulgate command information themes.

Sophisticated media operations require a comprehensive and integrated strategy from the inception of planning for combat operations through stability and nation-building to the desired end-state. Strategic communications supported by Public Affairs and other capabilities can help to establish legitimacy for the operation, win the hearts and minds of the local population, gain regional and international support, and influence an adversary's decisions. Communication with the local population is key for managing expectations, allaying fears and suspicions, explaining legitimacy, and generating support for the operation, thus minimizing public unrest and possible interference with the operation.



One of the crucial themes of stability operations is transparency. Transparency means that the joint force, consistent with the requirements of operational security, communicates its intentions and capabilities to all audiences inside and outside of the area of operations. The joint force must make all segments of the population aware of its operational mandate, mission intentions, and techniques used to ensure security and transition to a “new normal.” Failure to communicate effectively will foster suspicion and may erode the development of the trust and confidence on which the long-term success of the operations depends. Integrated and synchronized information operations, with protocols to maximize information sharing among multiagency partners and the local population, are necessary to facilitate transparency.

Information operations additionally enhance stability operations by providing reliable communications support facilitating decision superiority, enhancing theater ballistic missile early warning, enabling red and blue force tracking, and providing spectral imagery products. Other core capabilities include: electronic warfare, operations security, military deception, computer network operations, and psychological operations.

3.B.3. Impose security by adopting both an assertive and engaging posture.

- Maintain a visible presence—execute combat, reconnaissance, and other patrols.
- Extend security to non-military agencies and individuals as the situation dictates.
- Know the local people and leaders; engage them daily.
- Ensure the actions of all parties support policies and programs.
- Implement an effective strategic communications campaign to formulate the message and broadcast it to the population.
- Collect, document, and destroy unauthorized weapons when directed.

The commander achieves an assertive posture by anticipating potential trouble as well as disrupting the spoilers’ overall cohesion and capacity to obstruct stability. The commander must adopt a proactive approach that turns chaos and disorder into an advantage by taking the initiative and placing violent spoilers at risk throughout the battlespace. The joint force will rapidly employ tactical forces capable of surviving while traversing complex terrain, especially urban areas, and employing precise firepower.



Proper force protection when engaging and working with the local population mitigates risk, so does an expansive involvement with local leaders and citizens. In stability operations, force protection is more than physical security. The perceived legitimacy and impartiality of the joint force, the mutual respect between the force and the population, and the force's military credibility enhance force protection. Security and force protection must extend beyond the military elements to international and local government agencies as well as to non-governmental organizations. The joint force will require the ability to track blue forces, red forces, and civilian partners in order to respond to, or avoid confrontations. The mission may require that the joint force extend security to the local population when local security and police forces do not exist or are ineffective.

The joint force must be able to rapidly sense, detect, identify from standoff range, defend against, and recover the force from chemical, biological, radiological, and enhanced-explosives attack. It must also implement a system to account for, contain, distribute or destroy military spoils: weapons, ammunition, and equipment including enhanced explosive ordnance, as well as chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear materials. Improvements in improvised explosive device or mine detection and neutralization are essential to maintain freedom of action.

3.B.4. Defeat those who violently oppose security and the creation of a “new normal.”

- Take the initiative in dealing with the root causes of spoiler-driven violence; spoilers act strategically, the joint force cannot afford to react just tactically.
- Isolate total spoilers from sources of power and popular support: find, fix, and strike.
- Apply overmatching military power in a precise and timely manner to eliminate violent opposition

Spoilers operate at the strategic level. Even minor tactical actions are aimed at achieving their political aims. By responding tactically to spoiler attacks, the joint force only addresses part of the security problem. The key metric for the joint force

Commander is not how many spoilers he is able to kill or capture. The true measure of



success is the number of adversaries the joint force converts into allies. The military instrument is only one element of national power. All elements of national power must be engaged in the transition of society to a “new normal.”

Stability operations are not limited to kinetic, lethal attacks; non-kinetic, non-lethal methods of engagement are often both appropriate and preferred. Such methods include not only information and psychological operations, but also could take the form of political and economic initiatives by civilian authorities. Even when kinetic, lethal means are necessary, these actions should be accompanied by actions taken by other instruments of government or coalition action.

Some violent opposition factions won’t emerge until their leaders judge the conditions for success are ripe. The commander mounts counterinsurgency operations, in close collaboration with civilian police forces that locate spoilers, limit their freedom of action and, when directed, defeat spoilers before they can do harm or slow the transition process. If spoilers can “wait out” the intervening force or sense that conditions favorable for their faction’s success are likely to emerge, they will appear to comply only to rise later. “Playing possum” is a tactic as well as a strategy.

3.B.5. Neutralize, co-opt, or induce others who threaten security and the creation of a “new normal”.

- Socialize limited spoilers through cooperative arrangements.
- Induce cooperation of greedy spoilers.

Some of the demands made by limited as well as greedy spoilers reflect legitimate needs. When meeting these needs supports the overall aim of the operation, the commander and the civilian leader may decide to do so within their capability. The commander and the civil leader must take care to avoid inadvertently legitimizing individuals, factions, or organizations inappropriately. Limited spoilers need time to see that their objectives will actually be met. Greedy spoilers adapt, so commanders and leaders must constantly re-evaluate their decisions and actions relative to greedy spoilers.



3.B.6. Act with precision quickly. Balance restraint and overmatching power.

- Move quickly and decisively to neutralize threats to stability once threats are identified; preclude or preempt when possible.
- Apply appropriate levels of power to meet strategic aims.
- Minimize collateral damage to civilians or the infrastructure.

Freedom of movement is necessary to maintain the initiative and is necessary for the stability operation to progress. The fundamental right of the joint force's freedom of movement must be stated and enforced. The joint force must have the capability to maneuver rapidly and safely throughout the battlespace, quickly negotiate obstacles to include minefields, improvised explosive devices, and contaminated areas, particularly in complex terrain and urban areas.

Commanders must carefully apply force in stability operations. A misuse of force could negatively affect the perception of legitimacy of the operation and reduce the level of consent on the part of the local population and international community. On the other hand, the appropriate use of force to prevent spoilers from disrupting the transition to a better future could increase the level of consent. The joint force commander must base the decision on how and when to use force on his situational understanding, using force to achieve the overall political objective and not as an end in itself.

Future operational level headquarters will need to maintain network connectivity to plan and act on the move. This connectivity must include the civilian leadership structure, even before it deploys into theater. Commanders will require the flexibility to deploy into the operational area and conduct stability activities at considerable distances from static bases. Mission-type orders will be critical to maintaining flexibility and initiative, especially in highly dynamic and fluid joint deployments to conduct decentralized stability operations.

Commanders must execute flexible responses rapidly, precisely, and independently at every level. Efficient application of resources enhances ability to operate over a longer period of time. By avoiding unnecessary harm to the adversary, civilians, civilian property, and the environment, the commander retains the moral high ground and sustains the legitimacy of the operations. The joint force controls the situation by applying



overmatching power. Control allows the joint force commander to frame the environment.

To maintain the initiative, the joint force will have to re-supply on the move often at a considerable distance from logistical centers. The joint force commander will need to know exactly what his force needs to sustain operations and be able to provide the right mix of supplies and services rapidly using an austere logistical architecture.

3.B.7. Act from a position of legitimacy.

- Develop a legal and policy framework to provide a position of legitimacy if no legitimate civil authority is established.
- Build support among the population for the policies and programs of the legitimate authority.
- Ensure that all activities are consistent with the political mandate under which the force operates.

The joint force commander focuses his civil-military operations on supporting civilian agencies and organizations to assume full authority for implementing the civil portion of the stability operation. Legitimacy is a social, psychological, and political phenomenon not given to swiftness, as is the case in military operations. The military often achieves its objectives quickly, but the completion of the mission depends on progress in the civil arena. As the operation progresses, civilian agencies will assume increased responsibility for civil functions and require less military assistance. The relationships established in the initial stages of the operation, coupled with accurate assessments of the progress of civil-military implementation are crucial to the transfer of authority and ultimate extraction of the joint force. The joint force commander must use his assets sparingly when civilian assets are more appropriate in promoting the overall objective of the mission. The joint force must be prepared for the measured, sustained application of military capability in support of strategic aims. Commanders must assess their actions against their contribution to long-term strategic stability objectives.

3.B.8. Pursue interim conditions for “next state” in the stability process.

- Set practical, common near-term priorities for civil-military efforts.



- Foster hope. Ensure that some progress is made each day in both security and the wider set of conditions that are necessary to grow long-term success, and that everyone from the local to the international level is aware.
- Restore and sustain services as quickly as the security environment allows.
- Involve the local population and leadership in both planning and execution as soon as such involvement is practical.

As daily lives improve, so too will the perception of the course of stability operations. Restoration of basic services indicates the creation of a “new normalcy.” The “new” refers to improved and different conditions from those that described the “normal” before the intervention. Local leaders and population will need both time and help understanding and adapting to a “new normal” state of civic life. The “new normalcy” enhances the perception of the stability operation in the eyes of the affected population. This in turn will increase cooperation with stability programs and policies, enhance the security of the joint force, and relieve human suffering. It will help to dislocate those spoilers who oppose stability by reducing public support for their anti-security activities

3.B.9. Operate within the law.

- Establish legitimacy for stability operations and maintain it.
- Act within the political mandate and ensure that all activities are consistent with that mandate.
- Set an example to the rising local political-military leaders.
- Retain the moral high ground: act in accordance with democratic values and respect for life and property.
- Conduct an active strategic communications campaign to maintain legitimacy at home and abroad.

Establishing and maintaining the legitimacy of the stability operation is one of the essential goals of the joint force in enabling the attainment of the political end-state. The perception of legitimacy promotes consensus with operational goals and objective in the minds of the local population, the American public, and the international community.

Although legitimacy is initially derived from the mandate of the political body authorizing the operation, it can only be sustained if the joint force conducts the operation



with scrupulous regard for national and international norms on the use of force as well as regard for humanitarian principles. Commanders must ensure that all members of the organization understand the implications of their actions on legitimacy and operate accordingly.

3.B.10. Develop reliable local intelligence.

- Achieve and retain detailed and sophisticated understanding of the situation.
- Know and understand the underlying causes of the conflict.
- Understand the political, social, cultural, and economic factors at work as well as key actors and working relationships.
- Anticipate effects of actions to avoid unintended consequences.

The joint force commander must recognize an absolute requirement to develop local intelligence in order to prosecute security operations successfully. Gathering intelligence amongst local citizens, military, and police enables the commander to anticipate danger. Other sources of information may seem “non-traditional,” for they include open sources such as travel agencies, commercial ventures, international and non-governmental organizations that are likely to have been engaged in the area prior to the arrival of the joint force. Ideally, the US government would have fostered local intelligence sources well before the situation reached a crisis and the joint force could exploit them through multi-agency channels. The ability to exploit these sources will be enhanced if there is mutual trust among US and coalition military and multi agency intelligence organizations, especially those operating at the regional and local level. Using intelligence-led operations, the joint force commander increases the likelihood of finding potential spoilers and preventing them from disrupting security and interrupting the creation of conditions that lead to long-term success. The joint force must be able to evaluate data and information using expertise and technology to determine significant entities, trends and relationships in the area of operation. Intelligence cells must develop a method to collect then synthesize political, criminal, economic, demographic, psychological, and other relevant information regarding the conditions and forces that influence the society. The joint force must have the means to expeditiously disseminate



relevant and coherent information to all levels of the organization, and its civilian and multinational partners, from national level policy makers to operational commanders to tactical leaders in the field.



Section 4 – CAPABILITIES

Transforming the way joint stability operations will be conducted requires changes in joint force capabilities. The sections below are essential stability operations capabilities, categorized by functional area: Command and Control, Battlespace Awareness, Force Application, Focused Logistics, and Protection. To execute future stability operations as described in this concept, the joint force commander and his force require these capabilities.

4.A Command and Control Capabilities

4.A.1. The ability to create integrated, multiagency unity of purpose vertically and horizontally throughout civil-military organizations by clearly articulating desired a shared vision of effects.

4.A.2. The ability to ensure that stability planning is nested with war planning.

4.A.3. The ability to conduct collaborative, planning, execution, and information sharing among US civil-military agencies and coalition partners from the operational to tactical levels.

4.A.4. The ability to achieve multiagency coherency of action during planning, coordination, and execution by creating a joint, and combined when necessary, multiagency planning and execution organization empowered to facilitate integrated civil-military operations.

4.A.4.a. The ability to enhance rapid information sharing with coalition members, multiagency players, and non-governmental organizations through information sharing technologies and policies.

4.A.4.b. The ability to field a command and control system with reach back capability and connectivity to facilitate other agency participation.

4.A.5. The ability to augment a standing joint force headquarters with a cadre element that is trained organized, and equipped to plan and conduct stability operations. Must possess the capability to command and control, as well as, plan operations on the move. Must be capable of producing mission-type orders that allow subordinate commanders to exercise initiative in the decentralized execution of stability operations.



4.A.6. The ability to integrate stability operations training with combat training.

4.A.7. The ability to develop and execute a political-military plan to achieve desired effects, to include civil-military media operations.

4.B Battlespace Awareness Capabilities

4.B.1. The ability to achieve a persistent situational awareness and shared understanding in a joint, multiagency, and multinational context in order to know the operational environment and the interrelationship among ourselves, our adversaries, and the local population.

4.B.2. The ability to use an operational net assessment to support stability operations and to reflect that information in the integrated civil-military common relevant operating picture.

4.B.3. The ability to provide persistent intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance that integrates all intelligence capabilities, including human intelligence assets, into the overall intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance architecture.

4.B.4. The ability to identify and exploit key sources of information and expertise best suited to meet the knowledge requirements of the joint force.

4.B.5. The ability to evaluate data and information using domain expertise and proven technologies to determine significant entities, trends and relationships, then disseminate relevant and coherent analysis to all levels of the integrated civil-military organization, from national level policy makers to operational commanders to tactical leaders in the field.

4.C Force Application Capabilities

4.C.1. The ability to impose security throughout the battlespace to ensure unhindered combat operations and set the stage for long-term success.

4.C.1.a. The ability to train operational headquarters to execute stability and major conventional combat operations simultaneously and integrate those operations with a civilian multiagency organization.



4.C.1.b. The ability to disintegrate, disorient, dislocate, or destroy direct threats to stability with a combination of kinetic and non-kinetic weapons as well as military and non-military means in urban and other complex terrain.

4.C.2. The ability to rapidly organize, train, and equip forces to conduct integrated, multiagency stability operations as task forces or teams consisting of command, security, support, and civic assistance elements.

4.C.2.a. Command element must be able to plan, organize, and execute integrated, multiagency stability operations in a distributed environment in conjunction with combat forces or independently and implement a stand-alone public information campaign.

4.C.2.b. The security element must be able to specifically conduct offensive and defensive stability operations in an unconventional environment that imposes and maintains full security in objective areas.

4.C.2.c. The support element must be able to provide materiel and services to support civic assistance as well as to sustain the force. Includes enhanced, multifunctional engineer assets with self-protection capabilities to conduct construction, power generation, debris removal, and other required engineer functions.

4.C.2.d. The civic assistance element must be able to support civil administration, coordinate humanitarian relief, restore basic services, maintain law and order, begin reconstruction efforts, and implement the public information campaign. The civic assistance elements must be capable of conducting its actions completely integrated with those of the multiple agencies that will have responsibility for creating the long-term conditions necessary for stability to grow.

4.C.2.e. Non-combat elements (e.g., Combat Support, Combat Service Support, and when applicable selected civilian organizations) must have sufficient mobility, survivability, connectivity, and sustainability to immediately follow and support the combat task forces or teams.

4.C.3. The ability to integrate deployment, employment, and sustainment of the force, thus eliminating redundancies, stimulating synergy, and coordinating the movement and sustainment of forces conducting stability operations, and reducing in-country and regional footprint.



4.C.4. The ability to seamlessly transition joint deployment, employment, and sustainment from supporting preventive transition actions, to being supported during major conventional combat operations, and then supporting post-combat operations.

4.C.5. The ability for commanders to use fund actions to employ local personnel and affect local economies early by supporting reconstruction and development. Sustain this funding through transition to post-combat stability operations and turnover to full civil control.

4.C.6. The ability to plan and execute nested and coherent strategic communications at every level within the integrated, multiagency organization.

4.D Focused Logistics Capabilities

4.D.1. The ability to maintain persistent deployment, employment, and sustainment situational awareness throughout the integrated, multiagency organization. Support restoration of basic services by identifying those needs during planning and throughout the execution phase.

4.D.2. The ability to develop a coherently joint logistics common relevant operational picture, a reliable, dedicated information and communications network, and automated decision tools in order to anticipate, predict, plan collaboratively, synchronize, and satisfy integrated, multiagency stability operations requirements for deployment, employment, as well as sustainment of these forces.

4.D.3. The ability to account for, contain, distribute or destroy military spoils: weapons, ammunition, and equipment and to conduct sensitive weapon site preservation.

4.D.4. The ability to rapidly provide essential civil assistance, humanitarian, and reconstruction materiel in a combat or other hostile environment.

4.E Protection Capabilities

4.E.1. The ability to track selected Blue forces to the individual level, near real time, in the battlespace to provide a properly filtered common operating picture, minimize fratricide, and enhance agility and synchronization. Must also be able to employ enhanced Red and Civilian Partner Force tracker capabilities, a real-time threat warnings



broadcast system, chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear, and explosive protection, and automated diagnostic medical capabilities.

4.E.2. The ability to operate in a weapons of mass effect environment. Must be able to rapidly sense, detect, identify from standoff range, defend against, and recover the force from chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear, and enhanced-explosives attack.

4.E.3. Improve personnel protection.

4.E.3.a. The ability to rapidly employ tactical forces capable of surviving while traversing complex terrain and employing precise firepower.

4.E.3.b. The ability to issue improved body armor to all deployed personnel, military and civilian.

4.E.3.c. The ability to employ improved counter-mine protection through remote detection and elimination, to include jamming and pre-emptive command detonation.



4.F Stability Operations Mapping to Joint Operations Concepts

		Joint Operations Concepts Attributes							
		Common Understanding	Decision Superiority	Adaptive	Rapid Employment	Continuous Pressure	Disrupt the Adversary	Distributed DES	Coordinated MN and IA
Para	Stability Operations Required Capability								
Command and Control	4.A.1	Unity of purpose--shared vision	X	X					X
	4.A.2	Nested SO planning	X	X		X			
	4.A.3	Collaborative plan and execute	X	X	X				
	4.A.4	Coherency of action	X	X		X	X	X	X
	4.A.5	SO planning element	X	X					
	4.A.6	Integrated training			X	X			X
	4.A.7	Political-Military planning	X	X	X	X	X		X
Battlespace Awareness	4.B.1	Persistent awareness	X					X	X
	4.B.2	Operational Net Assessment	X	X					
	4.B.3	Robust Intelligence	X	X			X		
	4.B.4	Information exploitation	X	X	X		X	X	X
	4.B.5	Intelligence dissemination	X	X		X			
Force Application	4.C.1	Impose security				X	X	X	X
	4.C.2	Organize, train for stab ops			X	X			X
	4.C.3	Integrate DES						X	
	4.C.4	Operational transitions				X		X	
	4.C.5	JFC special funds			X	X		X	
	4.C.6	Information operations			X		X	X	X
Focused Logistics	4.D.1	Persistent DES awareness	X	X				X	
	4.D.2	Logistics CROP	X	X	X			X	
	4.D.4	Spoils containment			X			X	X
	4.D.5	Civil Assistance and Materiel			X	X			
	Protection	4.E.1	Red/Blue/CivilianPartner Tracking	X					X
4.E.2		WME protection			X	X		X	
4.E.3		Improve personnel protection			X	X	X	X	

Legend
X = Correlation of capability to function



CONCLUSION

The next two decades will contain a perplexing, complex array of security challenges for the United States. Expanding webs of the economic and information architectures will afford opportunity for some regional powers to compete on a broader scale and emerge on the global landscape with considerable influence. In addition, regional power structures are likely to alter as regional conflicts, civil wars, and transnational actors reshape existing norms.

Nations, transnational actors, and non-state entities, operating internally and externally, will challenge and redefine the global distribution of power, the concept of sovereignty, and the nature of warfare. Local conflicts and wars are quite likely and will carry the **risk** of escalation into broader conflicts. Major conventional combat operations, with its associated stability operations, will remain a constant potential for the foreseeable future.

Future military operations will be joint campaigns that will include multiagency, multinational, and multilateral partners to achieve mission success. Stability operations are no exception. A political-military plan supported by truly integrated, multiagency planning, preparation, and execution are a hallmark of stability operations. The challenges that the United States and its allies and friends face in the future while conducting stability operations involve a complex mix of global dangers, problematic nation-states, and illegal transnational organizations. These challenges threaten the national interests of many nations, not just the United States, and are more complex than any one nation can solve. Successful solutions to stability operations require the contributions of multiple nations and agencies — military and non-military, governmental and non-governmental.

Successful stability operations must be inextricably linked to planning, preparing and executing war. Security is the common thread that binds the joint force's operating environment before, during, and after combat operations. If combat is required, stability operations will form an essential part of combat operations and post-combat actions. The joint force, as part of a multinational and integrated, multiagency operation, will still provide security as well as initial humanitarian assistance, limited governance, restoration



of essential public services, and other reconstruction assistance—until the security environment permits civilian agencies to perform these functions. These kinds of stability operations will be conducted simultaneously, distributed throughout the theater of war. Successful stability operations require a combination of detailed situational understanding; a coercive posture against obstructionists; unified direction from legitimate civil authority; and integrated, multiagency unity of purpose and coherency of action; sophisticated media operations; organizational endurance; and sufficient popular support over time in order to facilitate transition to local governance and reduce the likelihood of the reemergence of the crisis.

Just as military organizations organize, train, and equip their forces for combat; so must they prepare similarly for stability operations, which often involve combat activities. Military organizations must have the capability to organize, train, and equip for the execution of long-term operations simultaneously with major conventional combat operations. Preventive actions, properly planned, resourced, and conducted, might even obviate the need for subsequent combat operations by preventing the situation from crossing the threshold of war. If war is thrust upon us, stability operations are essential to the ultimate achievement of strategic aims. Stability operations must be a core mission of the military services and civil agencies.



APPENDIX A – TIMEFRAME, ASSUMPTIONS, AND RISKS

Timeframe

This concept addresses the time period around 2015.

Assumptions

General assumptions for the stability operations joint operating concept are:

1. The US government will conduct stability operations.
2. The US will play a decisive role in stability operations.
3. The military and interagency community will achieve synergy in planning and execution.
4. The concept outlines four cases in which the US would intervene to impose security, stabilize the situation, and facilitate the transition to legitimate local governance. Case 2 is the most dangerous and case 4 is the most likely to occur.¹⁸

Risks

1. Civil-military collaboration, coordination, and information sharing remains problematic and lacking common goals and objectives.
2. Stability operations not embraced as a core civil-military mission. Forces normally designed and dedicated for combat roles will increasingly provide “non-traditional” roles and subsequently not prepared for stability operations.
3. Rules of engagement may be confusing and conflicting when conducting stability operations in conjunction with combat.
4. Combat operations do not coordinate plans or account for concurrent stability operations.



¹⁸ Order of concept development will be **Case 2**, then 4, 3, and 1.

APPENDIX B – GLOSSARY OF OPERATIONAL TERMS

Arms Control: (DOD) A concept that connotes: a. any plan, arrangement, or process, resting upon explicit or implicit international agreement, governing any aspect of the following: the numbers, types, and performance characteristics of weapon systems (including the command and control, logistics support arrangements, and any related intelligence-gathering mechanism); and the numerical strength, organization, equipment, deployment, or employment of the Armed Forces retained by the parties (it encompasses disarmament); and b. on some occasions, those measures taken for the purpose of reducing instability in the military environment.

Arms Control Activities: Actions conducted in compliance with or in support of arms control treaties, agreements, obligations, or ongoing negotiations. (New definition derived from CJCSM 3113.01A, page A-14, GL-2)

Counterinsurgency (COIN): Military, paramilitary, political, economic, psychological, and civic actions taken by a government to defeat insurgency. (*JP* 1-02)

Foreign Humanitarian Assistance: Programs conducted to relieve or reduce the results of natural or manmade disasters or other endemic conditions such as human pain; disease, hunger, or privation that might present a serious threat to life or that can result in great damage to or loss of property. Foreign humanitarian assistance provided by US forces is limited in scope and duration. The foreign assistance provided designed to supplement or complement the efforts of the host nation civil authorities or agencies that may have the primary responsibility for providing foreign humanitarian assistance. Foreign humanitarian assistance operations are those conducted outside the United States, its territories, and possessions. Also called FHA. See also foreign assistance. (*JP* 1-02)

Foreign Internal Defense (Figure 3): Participation by civilian and military agencies of a government in any of the action programs taken by another government to free and



protect its society from subversion, lawlessness, and insurgency. Also called FID. (JP 1-02)




Figure 3.

Freedom of Navigation Operations: Operations conducted to demonstrate US or international rights to navigate air and sea routes, or in space. (Modified version of existing JP 1-02).

Humanitarian and Civic Assistance: Assistance to the local populace provided by predominantly US forces in conjunction with military operations and exercises. This assistance is specifically authorized by title 10, United States Code, section 401, and funded under separate authorities. Assistance provided under these provisions is limited to (1) medical, dental, and veterinary care provided in rural areas of a country; (2) construction of rudimentary surface transportation systems; (3) well drilling and construction of basic sanitation facilities; and (4) rudimentary construction and repair of public facilities. Assistance must fulfill unit-training requirements that incidentally create humanitarian benefit to the local populace. See also Humanitarian Assistance. (JP 1-02)



Line Of Communications: A route, either land, water, and/or air, that connects an operating military force with a base of operations and along which supplies and military forces move. Also called LOC. See also base of operations; route. (DOD)

Military Contacts: Visits by military and defense personnel, delegations, and units to foreign countries for the purpose of security cooperation. Military contacts include senior defense official and senior officer visits, counterpart visits, ship port visits, participation in defense shows and demonstrations, bilateral and multilateral staff talks, defense cooperation working groups, regional conferences, State Partnership for Peace Program activities, attaché activities and personnel and unit exchange programs. (new definition derived from CJCSM 3113.01A, page GL-6)

Noncombatant Evacuation Operations: Operations directed by the Department of State, the Department of Defense, or other appropriate authority whereby noncombatants are evacuated from foreign countries when their lives are endangered by war, civil unrest, or natural disaster to safe havens or to the United States. Also called NEOs. (JP 1-02)

Peace Enforcement (Figure 4): Application of military force or the threat of its use, normally pursuant to international authorization, to compel compliance with resolutions or sanctions designed to maintain or restore peace and order. (JP 1-02)



All graphs portray
a positive result

Peace Enforcement Operations




Figure 4.

Peacekeeping Operations (Figure 5): Military operations undertaken with the consent of all major parties to a dispute, designed to monitor and facilitate implementation of an agreement (cease fire, truce, or other such agreement) and support diplomatic efforts to reach a long-term political settlement. (existing JP 1-02 definition)






Figure 5.

Security Assistance: (DOD) Group of programs authorized by the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961, as amended, and the Arms Export Control Act of 1976, as amended, or other related statutes by which the United States provides defense articles, military training, and other defense-related services by grant, loan, credit, or cash sales in furtherance of national policies and objectives. Also called SA.

Show of Force: An operation designed to demonstrate US resolve that involves increased visibility of US deployed forces in an attempt to defuse a specific situation that, if allowed to continue, may be detrimental to US interests or national objectives. (JP 1-02)

Support to Counterinsurgency (Figure 6): Support provided to a government in the military, paramilitary, political, economic, psychological, and civic actions it undertakes to defeat insurgency. (JP 1-02)



All graphs portray a positive result

Counterinsurgency Operations




Figure 6.

Insurgency: (DOD, NATO) An organized movement aimed at the overthrow of a constituted government through use of subversion and armed conflict.

Sanction Enforcement And Maritime Intercept Operations: (DOD) Operations that employ coercive measures to interdict the movement of certain types of designated items into or out of a nation or specified area.

Unconventional Warfare: (DOD) A broad spectrum of military and paramilitary operations, normally of long duration, predominantly conducted by local or surrogate forces who are organized, trained, equipped, supported, and directed in varying degrees by an external source. It includes guerrilla warfare and other direct offensive, low visibility, covert, or clandestine operations, as well as the indirect activities of subversion, sabotage, intelligence activities, and evasion and escape. Also called UW.



APPENDIX C – COERCION, INDUCEMENTS, AND SOCIALIZATION

Countering direct threats to long-term security and success caused by a spoiler may be in itself a full-time mission. But until the spoilers¹⁹ are managed, as evidenced in Iraq, less than effective progress may be made in other areas. In order to control the spoilers the joint force may use a mix of capabilities for coercion, inducements, and socialization of the population and leadership in the target area. The focus concentrates efforts on formal as well as informal leadership, their followers, or both.

Each type of spoiler requires a different strategy that the joint force must use in order to dislocate, contain, or satisfy them. A singular approach is likely to encourage additional spoilers and demands. The joint force must identify the type spoilers and underlying causes in order to manage spoilers through a focused system of coercion, inducements, and socialization.

Coercion: Coercion attempts to eliminate total spoilers and to contain or intimidate greedy spoilers. Coercion will generally be negative reinforcement; it will be application of force, or denial of desired goods and services. Coercion ranges from total isolation of the spoiler, freezing or eliminating sources of economic or other aid to counter-terrorism type operations.

Total spoilers are restrained by dominance of force. It is through force or the threat of force the joint force commander seeks to compel compliance. Coercion is used to physically and psychologically isolate spoilers from the population. Spoilers are physically isolated by offensive and defensive military operations to defeat them or restrict their movement and limit their access to designated areas. Offensive operations include overt, covert, or clandestine operations. Defensive operations protect key personnel, facilities, and equipment from attack by spoilers. Psychological operations seek to eliminate popular support.

Inducements: Inducements take the form of political, financial, or other concessions or payments to mollify and convert the limited spoilers (those who have political aims

¹⁹ Total spoilers: those who are totally apposed to the stability mission Greedy spoilers: those who seek to gain power or money, or both, in the uncertain situation of the moment. Limited: those that seek limited objectives for personal gain or group advantage.



different from ours but who can be accommodated). Unlike coercion, inducements can be characterized as positive reinforcement of the actions of the targeted group.

Inducements satisfy the needs of limited spoilers and the population as a whole in basic needs and security. Inducements are political, financial, or other concessions or payments made to mollify and convert limited—or in some cases greedy—spoilers. Inducements can be characterized as positive reinforcement for the actions of the targeted group when such actions are consistent with joint stability objectives.

Socialization: Socialization is a long-term process designed to prevent the development of new spoilers through education, psychological operations, and any other means. The aim of the process is to develop the mindset among the leaders and population that they will progress to a peaceful and prosperous condition by following the suggestions of the US and coalition partners.

Socialization is designed to prevent the return or development of future spoilers through engagement with the local populace and key leaders. This requires a coordinated command presence and information plan with links to information operations, psychological operations, public affairs, and the interagency community. Socialization is the change in attitude throughout all levels of a society that makes its members amenable to the objectives of the joint stability operation. This means the willing acceptance of capitalism and democracy, as well as religious, racial, and ethnic tolerance. Socialization also requires society to allow equal opportunity, freedom of speech and the press; protection of human rights; access to markets; and peaceful coexistence with the world community.

All societies and regions require some level of coercion to maintain stability. The level of coercion required is dependent on crime and the presence of criminal organizations, basic needs being met, outside influences and support to insurgency and violence, and the peoples' consent to being governed. Indigenous government and law enforcement are sufficient to maintain stability through low levels of coercion in normally stable societies and regions. Where crime, the effects of war, and insurgency overwhelm local and national governments, higher levels of coercion are required to maintain stability. This higher level of coercion consists of introduced (usually military) coercion alongside indigenous coercion.



Where all or most societal functions have collapsed, the introduced military coercion will provide all or most of the required coercion in an environment where basic needs are in jeopardy and the potential for insurgency is high. While establishing an initial period of security through the use or threat of use of military coercion is vital, lowering the overall level of coercion required is more critical and requires a three-part approach.

First, efforts must be made to replace the introduced coercion with indigenous coercion on a one-for-one basis, such as military and law enforcement. Second, inducements to meet basic needs and enhance the function of civil government must be efficiently applied to restore an initial semblance of normal society. Initially, the military force provides inducements. This is because the initial security environment usually will not permit or encourage non-government organizations or contractors to provide these type services. Third, a process of socialization that runs concurrently with inducements is conducted through effective information operations against spoilers, public information programs with the aim of building consent to government, and education programs designed at bettering the society's self-sufficiency. Socialization must work towards long-term stability in the region and the society concerned. With all of these approaches, patience and commitment to a long-term view is required. In most cases, instability was years in the making and it will be years in the rebuilding.





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