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THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE  
1000 DEFENSE PENTAGON  
WASHINGTON, DC 20301-1000



JUL 01 2002

MEMORANDUM FOR THE VICE PRESIDENT  
THE SECRETARY OF STATE  
DIRECTOR, CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE  
THE ASSISTANT TO THE PRESIDENT FOR  
NATIONAL SECURITY AFFAIRS

SUBJECT: Supporting the Iraqi Opposition (U)

Organizing the Iraqi Opposition to assist with regime change is needed for two reasons: to ensure legitimacy, particularly in the eyes of other regional players, and to make sure the wrong people don't fill the vacuum created by the end of the Saddam regime.

Regional leaders have argued that it is important for Iraqis to be seen participating in the liberation of their country. Regime change in Iraq should not be simply the result of an American "invasion." This could be an important factor in obtaining regional support.

Even more important, however, is the need to ensure that the post-Saddam vacuum is filled quickly by the right people. An attempt to run Iraqi affairs by ourselves *without* a pre-cooked umbrella group of Iraqi Opposition leaders could backfire seriously. A historical example may be instructive:

- (U) In 1943-44, FDR and Churchill had plans for an Allied Military Government for postwar France (i.e., an occupation government for France as well as Germany). They considered deGaulle a phony. Only when deGaulle was greeted by millions of cheering Frenchmen in June 1944 did they conclude that he indeed represented free France.
- (U) Had FDR and Churchill actually imposed an occupation government, the Communist-dominated resistance would have been the only significant political force on the ground in the country. The Gaullists would have been neutered, and the Communists would have ruled the countryside.

~~Classified by~~ ~~DA SD William J. Luti~~  
Reason: 1.5(a)(d)  
~~Declassify on: 17 June 2012~~

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Chief, Records & Declass Div, WHS  
Date: OCT 12 2010



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
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- (U) DeGaulle, in power from 1944-46, was able to expand his own political movement and effectively neutralize the Communists.

(S) In Iraq, there are many undesirable opposition elements—a Communist faction, Sunni fundamentalists, and radical Sh'ia—all with presumably some support around the country and in some institutions. Organizing the democratic opposition groups that we favor into a real political-military force is essential to preempt these groups, avoid a political vacuum, and avoid a chaotic post-Saddam free-for-all.

(S) An international presence, or interim international "commission", would not be an adequate substitute for helping friendly indigenous forces establish their political and military authority quickly on the ground.



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Declassify on: 17 June 2012



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EF/650

May 17, 2002 7:40 AM

TO: Doug Feith  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld  
SUBJECT: Iraqi Opposition

SECDEF HAS STR

JUL 8 7 00

*(Handwritten signature/initials in a circle)*

*copy entry in R...  
Held*

I think an info memo to the senior people in the NSC on the subject of Rodman's memo here might be useful. Why don't we get one fashioned. 6/25

Thanks.

*Response attached. Feith has approved*

Attach.  
05/09/02 ASD(ISA) memo to SecDef re: Support for Iraqi Opposition

*(Handwritten signature)*  
Larry Di Rita  
4/24

DHR:dh  
051702-5

.....  
Please respond by 5/21/02

*USDP  
ISA must*

*5/27/02  
5/18/02*

*This shd go out  
on Monday 5/20.  
Glad that SD  
liked your memo.  
Do it as a memo  
from SD to himself  
(VP, Powell, Rice, Tenet) DJF*

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05-17-02 16:07 LN



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# TAB B

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BCH  
5/9



ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF DEFENSE  
2400 DEFENSE PENTAGON  
WASHINGTON, DC 20301-2400

EF 1536

INFO MEMO

INTERNATIONAL  
SECURITY  
AFFAIRS

OSD  
5 U.S.C. § 552 (b)(Z)

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Chief, Records & Declass Div, WHS  
Date: OCT 12 2010

I-02/007190

FOR: SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

FROM: Assistant Secretary of Defense, International Security Affairs  
(Peter W. Rodman, [REDACTED])

09 MAY 2002

SUBJECT: Support for Iraqi Opposition (U)

(U) Organizing the Iraqi Opposition to assist with regime change is needed for two basic reasons:

- legitimacy, particularly in the region, and
- making sure the wrong people don't fill the vacuum.

Legitimacy

OSD 1.4 (d)

(S) Regional leaders seem to be of the view that Iraqis need to be seen as participating in the liberation of their country. It should not be seen as just an "American invasion." [REDACTED]

- This is likely to be an important factor in obtaining regional support.

Filling the Vacuum

(S) Even more important may be the need to ensure that the post-Saddam vacuum is filled quickly by the right people.

A historical analogy is instructive:

- In 1943-44, FDR and Churchill had plans for an Allied Military Government for postwar France (i.e., an occupation government for France as well as Germany). They considered deGaulle a phoney. Only when deGaulle was greeted by millions of cheering Frenchmen in June 1944 did they conclude that he indeed represented free France.



~~CLASSIFIED BY ASD/ISA PETER W. RODMAN  
Reason(s) 1.5(d)  
DECLASSIFY ON 9 May 2012~~

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- Had FDR and Churchill stuck to their plan, the Communists would have been the only significant political force in the country. The Gaullists would have been neutered, and the Communist-dominated resistance would have ruled the countryside.
- DeGaulle, in power from 1944-47, was able to build up his own political movement and effectively neutralize the Communists.

(S) In Iraq, there are many undesirable opposition elements – a Communist faction, Sunni fundamentalists, and radical Shia – all with presumably some support around the country and in some institutions. Organizing the groups we favor is essential to preempt these groups, avoid a vacuum, and avoid a chaotic post-Saddam free-for-all.

(U) An international presence or interim international “commission” would not be an adequate substitute for helping friendly indigenous forces establish their political authority quickly on the ground.

COORDINATION: TAB A

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COORDINATION

Under Secretary of Defense for Policy

Mr. Douglas J. Feith

L. J. Feith

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IAW EO 13526, Section 3.5  
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EF/LSO

May 17, 2002 7:40 AM

TO: Doug Feith  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*  
SUBJECT: Iraqi Opposition

*NESSA  
for SK*

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DHR:dh  
051702-5

.....  
Please respond by 5/21/02

*USDP*

*5/17/02*

*ISA has l*

*5/19/02*

*→ PWR*

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Coordination Page

Under Secretary of Defense (Policy)

Mr. Douglas J. Feith

AD 6/24/02

Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary (ISA)

Mr. Peter C. W. Flory

CS

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