

MEETING WITH THE PRESIDENT

February 15, 1976

6:00 pm - 8:04 pm

Rumsfeld, Kissinger, Scowcroft, Cheney

Oval Office

I left the meeting with the other three still there at 8:04pm. The Subject was Salt. Brent supplied the President and everyone there with a packet of materials with tabs A through F.

The President started out the meeting, obviously ready to drive to a conclusion since Henry leaves for Latin America Monday afternoon and wants to get the answer to the Soviets prior to their party conference.

The President also started the meeting with a matter that indicated that he had gone with the deferral option but he felt that Defense was being unreasonable. He said, in effect that we have agreed on the 2400 with the Soviets, we've agreed on the 1320 and we agreed on ALCMs at 2500 on heavy bombers and he said the ban on ALCMs over 600 on other aircraft he gave to the Soviets in exchange for the throw-weight/lift-weight. He said those two were tied together and he never had heard DOD or anyone else raise this subsequent to that time. It had always been on the option boards.

I said, well, it depends on how you think of these negotiations. If everytime we offer a package, the Soviets agreed with the pieces of it that appeal to them and we consider that they are then agreed, then I suppose you are right. But that I wasn't aware that we had traded that for throw-weight and lift-weight. The only thing that I was aware of was the linkage between the merve-counting rule and ALCMs. And as Ikle said, we could let that run for a year or two and sort it out after we had better methods of verification. He said that he had never heard anyone raise this question on other aircraft and was amazed and that that was given and that's final. I said, fine, you are the President. He said in Vladivostok I said we wouldn't put ALCMs on other aircraft and that was the quit pro quo for the launch-weight/throw-weight. I said, well, I am amazed. I said that;we then started going through the letter to Brezhnev line by line. Kissinger said he could live with the first sentence of paragraph one as we revised it but that the second sentence should be dropped. I said that my recollection of the Friday meeting was that we would not jam the gray area concept down their throat but we'd have some modest allusion to it and that sentence represents the most modest allusion anyone could come up with. But if they insisted on dropping it, that was their decision. The President said on paragraph 2, number a, that that was settled and I said, well, he said, you agreed to that on Friday. I said, I didn't agree to anything on Friday. I said we went through my paper on Friday and Henry said he agreed with



it except for 2 or 3 problems. One he felt that the merve--that platforms had to count in the merve accounting rule and #3 he, felt that we ought to tone down the gray area and he had trouble on the dates. I said as far as 2a goes, those aren't central systems. The treaty ought to relate to central systems and not non-central systems. We have got to solve the range definition and the cruise missile definition problem and the whole purpose of this is to keep as little of cruise missiles in the treaty as possible. To keep maximum pressure on getting the interim gray areas solved in the interim agreement and therefore the date should be short and the amount of cruise missiles minimal in the treaty. The President said that that was decided in Vladivostok. On A, we agreed to drop the word testing.

On paragraph 2b he dropped the word development any and left it like it was on 2c. I said I didn't think that you needed to count them as merve platforms because that is what we offered to get backfire constrained. The last thing we want to end up with is a deferral where we end up tying ourselves in a knot on cruise missiles and let backfire run free. Kissinger agreed with our changes but would not agree to taking c out.

On paragraph 2d, the President said Brent should rewrite it so that it provides for review of the Verification question at a time to be agreed.

Paragraph three stayed the same.

We had a long discussion about 4 and the question of deployment dates and IOC's on SLCMs and after a lengthy debate and discussion, he agreed to put in January of 1979. Kissinger said it will never stick. They will come back and want to move it to 1980 or 1981. I said, if that happens does that mean that everything we put in this letter we would have given and the Soviets now have--just as with the items up above. The President said no.

On item C, the definition for cruise missile under paragraph 2, the President said we will fight like hell for it but we should not put it in if Henry thinks it will raise a whole new issue.

Under 4a they dropped airbase.

Under 4b and c, Brent apparently is going to rewrite them.

They understand the principal of symmetry but feel that that is for our audience and that this letter is for Brezhnev so they are going to be changed to some extent.

On item D, dropped out air.

On E, it may or may not be in as it relates to the interim agreement. I fought hard for B and C on 4. The President went with Kissinger.

On 4 D--dropped air -- changed could to should.

E is to be rewritten

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I argued every point on the line in and line out paper. He went with January , 1979 but he may yet have to move off that. And he agreed on nuclear arms but to put it into Geneva, which I disagreed with.

I was absolutely amazed at his statement on ALCMs and other bombers was given in exchange for lift/weight and launch-weight at either Helsinki or Vladivostok but there was no way to argue with it and I said, you're the President. However I did say that if we offered this and they agree except for the date, does that mean we've given all the rest of this and he said no. He said, I've always felt that we put a package forward , none of the pieces are agreed to unless the package is agreed to.

I get the feeling the President, when he thinks about Holloway's comments that they don't need to SLCMs and Reed's comments that the ALCMs are not very important and Schlesinger's proposal last September and Kissinger;s contention that you've got to work off what you've previously talked about and Brown's statement that he would support 3 if the President tried 4 first, leaves me in an awfully weak position in discussing these things.

To be continued on the next belt.



Continuation  
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The President seemed upset with DoD and the intranscience and Henry Phrased it in the context of Brown and I said it wasn't so. I said that there are alot of ways to blow SALT. One is by being too tough, and not yielding enough. We all understand that. Another is by being too soft and giving so much that you end up accepting a deal that can't be ratified here in the United States because it lacks simplisity or symmetry or equity. A third way is for us to fail to find a way to address the gray area issues because it makes a mockery of SALT if we don't deal with such systems as backfire, cruise missles SSX20's since they are going to 1250 on 300 launchers and we have already revised the range from 4000 kilometers up to 4600 kilometers and all it needs is another 10%- 15% and it is up to inter-continental range. And the fourth way we can do it is by being so weak on our Defense side here that the Soviets don't even bother to have to negoitate with us.

At the end of the meeting we talked about Ikle's memo and I read parts of it to the President and Scowcroft and the President agreed they should meet with Brown and Ilke sometime on Monday the 16th to make sure they were aboard.

I ended my part of the meeting by saying that my view of this was that we ought to put as little on cruise missles as possible in and we ought to get the date as sure as possible for the interim agreement. I handed my original memo to the President and--he said he'd read it and I said I felt that that's basically where we ought to be.

