

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

June 26, 2001

2001 JUN 27 AM 8:05

OSD
WHITE HOUSE SECTION

MEMORANDUM FOR THE VICE PRESIDENT
THE SECRETARY OF STATE
THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
THE DEPUTY SECRETARY OF STATE
THE DEPUTY SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
THE ASSISTANT TO THE PRESIDENT, CHIEF OF
STAFF AND NATIONAL SECURITY ADVISOR
TO THE VICE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: Missile Defense Papers

Attached are four papers on missile defense that present:

- principal missile defense policy themes;
- likely questions and answers related to the themes;
- the impact of the ABM Treaty on missile defense development and deployment; and
- responses to the **most** common myths about **missile** defense.

Given the high priority of this matter, especially in light of the impending transmittal of the Amended Budget for FY 2002 to Congress, please review these papers and provide **comments** by noon, Wednesday, June 27.


Condoleezza Rice
Assistant to the President
for National Security Affairs

Attachments

Tab A Principal Themes
Tab B Likely Questions and Answers
Tab C Impact of the **ABM** Treaty on Missile Defense
Tab D Common Myths About Missile Defense



W00858*/01

Principal Themes on Missile Defense

1. The United States intends to move beyond mutual assured destruction and the ABM Treaty. The world has changed fundamentally and the rationale for Cold War arrangements no longer exists. We require a new foundation for our strategic relationship with Russia.
 - The ABM Treaty codified the adversarial relationship between the two superpowers that existed during the Cold War. It was premised on a relationship of distrust and mutual vulnerability.
 - We need to move beyond the concept of mutual assured destruction with Russia. Russia is not the Soviet Union and is not an enemy. Retaining MAD at the center of our relationship with Russia perpetuates suspicions and encourages the retention of artificially large nuclear arsenals. Nuclear weapons should no longer be the principal currency of our relationship.
2. As part of a comprehensive strategy to protect against today's threats, we need a new concept for deterrence. Today's most urgent threat stems not from thousands of Soviet missiles, but from a small number of missiles in the hands of rogue states armed with weapons of mass destruction.
 - The principal threat today is no longer a disarming first strike like we thought about in the Cold War, **but** rather the use of long-range missiles by rogue states for purposes of **terror and** coercion.
 - The leaders of these states have demonstrated a willingness to take large gambles and have stated that they are acquiring WMD and long-range missiles as a means to prevent us from coming to the assistance of our friends and allies in vital regions of interest.
 - We need a new concept of deterrence that includes both offenses and defenses. Missile defense is not a replacement for threats of retaliation, but rather an added dimension of contemporary deterrence and an insurance policy against attack by a handful of missiles. It is also one element of a strategy to dissuade and



deter countries from acquiring or using WMD and ballistic missiles.

3. To meet our deterrence and defense requirements in light of the changed security environment, the United States needs freedom from the constraints of the **ABM** Treaty to pursue the most promising technologies and basing modes to field limited, but effective missile defenses.

- The ABM Treaty explicitly prohibits defense of our territory from missile attack. We are only permitted to defend a missile field in North Dakota.
- The Treaty prohibits the development, testing, and deployment of ABM systems or components which are **sea**-based, air-based, space-based, or mobile land-based.
- The development, testing, and deployment of "theater defenses" with the capability to counter longer-range missiles is also banned by the Treaty. For example, the Treaty would permit the Airborne Laser to shoot-down shorter-range missiles like the North **Korean** No Dong but would prohibit this program if it has the capability to destroy longer-range missiles like the Taepo Dong, which has demonstrated the capability to strike the United States.
- The Treaty also prevents us from sharing and working on defenses with our allies (and even from cooperating with Russia).

4. The Administration will pursue a robust missile defense **RDT&E** program to **acquire** the capabilities to deploy limited, but effective missile defenses as soon as possible to protect the United States, our deployed forces, and our friends and allies.

- The current missile defense testing planned for ~ 2002 is based primarily on the program inherited from the Clinton Administration. That program did not draw on the most promising technologies and basing modes because they are prohibited by the Treaty.



- We plan to add additional tests of other technologies and basing modes, such as sea-based capabilities against longer-range missiles. As we have informed our allies and Russia, these tests will come into conflict with the ABM Treaty in months, not years.
- There is no intent to conduct tests solely designed to exceed treaty constraints. There is also no intent to design tests to conform to, or stay within the confines of the Treaty.
- As the President has indicated, the results of our RDT&E program will demonstrate what works and what does not. Those missile defense systems that progress most rapidly and show the most promise will receive greater emphasis and funding.
- We will make proposals regarding a missile defense architecture based on the results of our RDT&E program.
- Criticisms based on cost and effectiveness are premature and unfounded since the Administration has yet to select a missile defense architecture.

5. The Administration intends to construct a new strategic framework with Russia. We seek a framework that reflects the realities of the post-Cold War world and that is founded on common interests and cooperation.

- The new framework will be premised on openness, mutual confidence, and real opportunities for cooperation.
- The new framework will reflect a clean and clear break from the Cold War, and will not be based on the ABM Treaty.
- The new framework will also include substantial reductions in offensive nuclear forces, cooperation on missile defense, enhanced non- and counter-proliferation efforts, and measures to promote confidence and transparency.



The Administration's Principal Themes on Missile Defense:
Questions and Answers

Theme 1: The United States intends to move beyond mutual assured destruction and the ABM Treaty. The world has changed fundamentally and the rationale for Cold War arrangements no longer exists. We require a new foundation for our strategic relationship with Russia.

Q: Will the concept of mutual assured destruction remain a part of the Administration's deterrence **strategy**?

A:

- The concept of mutual assured destruction was an expression of the implacably hostile relationship that existed between the United States and the Soviet Union during the Cold War.
- To address the threats of the 21st Century, we need a new concept of deterrence that includes both offensive and defensive forces. Mutual assured destruction is not a part of this concept of deterrence.
- As the President has said, Russia is not the Soviet Union, and is not our enemy. Mutual assured destruction **no** longer makes sense as the basis of our strategic relationship.

Theme 2: **As** part of a comprehensive **strategy** to protect against today's threats, we need a new concept for deterrence. Today's most urgent threat stems not from thousands **of** Soviet missiles, but from a small **number** of missiles in the hands of rogue states armed with weapons of mass destruction.

Q: Why does the Bush Administration believe that **missile** defense is the only response to dealing **with** the proliferation of weapons of **mass** destruction and their means of delivery?

A:

- The President has made clear that we need a comprehensive strategy to counter this complex and dangerous challenge. This strategy must include strengthening nonproliferation measures (prevention), more robust counterproliferation capabilities (protection), and a new concept for deterring contemporary threats, relying more on defenses and less on offensive nuclear forces.



- Missile defense has received enormous attention and a common misperception is that this is the totality of our agenda in this area.
- Missile defense is a key part of our broader strategy for dealing with proliferation, but is only a part of the overall approach.

Theme 3: To meet our deterrence and defense requirements in light of the changed security environment, the United States needs freedom from the constraints of the ABM Treaty to pursue the most promising technologies and basing modes to field limited, but effective missile defenses.

Q: Why not rely on threats of nuclear retaliation to deter countries like North Korea from launching a missile at the United States?

A:

- As the President has said, "...Cold War deterrence is no longer enough. To maintain peace, to protect our own citizens and our own allies and friends, we must seek security based on more than the grim premise that we can destroy those who seek to destroy us."
- Today, the list of countries with weapons of mass destruction and ballistic missiles includes some of the world's least responsible nations. They seek weapons of mass destruction to intimidate their neighbors and to keep the United States and other responsible nations from helping allies and friends in strategic parts of the world.
- During the Cold War, our goal was to prevent **one** hostile power from using an arsenal of conventional and nuclear weapons against us. In the less predictable world of the 21st Century, our challenge is to deter multiple potential adversaries not only from using weapons of mass destruction, but to dissuade them from acquiring WMD and missiles in the first place.
- One of the factors that make ballistic missiles so attractive to many states is that effective defenses have not been fielded to counter them. Missile defenses



undermine the value of ballistic missiles, thereby reducing the incentive to acquire these weapons in the first place.

Theme 4: The Administration will pursue a robust missile defense **RDT&E** program to acquire the capabilities to deploy limited, but effective missile defenses as soon as possible to protect the United States, our deployed forces, and our friends and allies.

Q: Can't the United States do all the missile defense research and testing it needs in the next couple of years without breaking the ABM Treaty, like the Clinton Administration did?

A:

- The Clinton Administration designed its missile defense architecture to be "as Treaty compliant as possible." Therefore, it limited its development and testing programs to ground-based components for defense against longer-range threats. This work is allowed within the Treaty (although deployment outside North Dakota, or in a way that would protect all 50 states would not be allowed).
- In addition to prohibiting us from defending our territory and people, the Treaty bans all development and testing of the most promising technologies and basing modes for missile defense, like sea-, air-, and space-based interceptors.
- As the President has said, we will examine all available technologies and basing modes for missile defense. As we have informed our allies and Russia, we expect our **RDT&E** efforts will conflict with the Treaty limitations in a matter of months, not years.

Q: Why not wait to see if missile defenses will "work" before rushing to deploy them?

A:

- In addition, our determination to field missile defenses as soon as possible is driven by the urgency of the threat.



- Our programs will be structured so that the interim systems initially deployed can be rapidly improved and replaced by more capable systems later.
- Because interim capabilities cannot be expected to perform flawlessly, critics of missile defense may accuse us of deploying systems that do not **"work."** However, an interim capability is warranted in light of existing and emerging near-term threats and the unpredictable nature of those threats.
- Such capabilities, even if not perfect, will provide more protection than we currently have -- which today is no capability at all against longer-range missiles able to strike American cities.

Theme 5: The Administration intends to construct a new strategic framework with Russia. We seek a framework that reflects the **realities** of the post-Cold War world and that is founded on **common** interests and cooperation.

Q: What are the major elements of the new strategic *framework*?

A:

- The President has said that we should seek to complete the work of changing our relationship with Russia **"from** one based on a nuclear balance of terror to one based on common responsibilities and common interests."
- The new strategic framework be premised on openness, mutual confidence and real opportunities for cooperation, including the area of missile defense. It should allow us to share information so that each nation can improve its early warning capability and its capability to defend its people and territory. It should also encompass cooperation to strengthen and enlarge bilateral and multilateral **non-**and counter-proliferation measures.
- The new framework will include substantial reductions in offensive nuclear forces. As the President has said, the United States is committed to achieving a credible deterrent with the lowest possible number of nuclear weapons consistent with our national security needs, including our obligations to our allies.



The Impact of the ABM Treaty on U.S. **Missile** Defense Programs

The President has stated publicly that we must move beyond the constraints of the 1972 ABM Treaty -- "an artifact of the Cold War confrontation" that prevents us from acquiring the capabilities we need to deter and defend against new threats and that perpetuates an adversarial relationship with Russia. The Treaty explicitly prohibits any defense of our territory and bans all development and testing of the most promising missile defense technologies and basing modes.

Specific Treaty Restrictions

- Article I of the Treaty prohibits protection of our territory from missile attack. We are only permitted to defend a **missile field** in North Dakota.
- Article V of the Treaty prohibits the development, testing, or deployment of ABM systems or components which are **sea-based**, air-based, space-based, or mobile land-based.
- Article VI bans the development, testing, and deployment of "theater defenses" with the capability to counter **longer-range** missiles.
- Article IX prevents us from sharing and working on defenses with our allies (and even from cooperating with Russia).

Examples of Restrictions on U.S. Missile Defense **Programs**

Based on these restrictions, the Treaty:

- Prohibits deployment of ground-based interceptors and construction of a tracking radar in Alaska. (Even the Clinton Administration plan could not be deployed under the Treaty.)
- Prohibits the use of sea-based interceptors and radars aboard Aegis ships against long-range missiles.
- Bans the construction of a tracking radar on a ship **or** barge to support **ground-** or sea-based interceptors.
- **Prohibits** space-based sensors for ******* purposes.



- Would permit the Airborne Laser to shoot-down shorter-range **missiles** like the North Korean No Dong but would prohibit this program if it possesses the capability to shoot-down longer-range missiles like the Taepo Dong.

Missile Defense Development and Testing in FY 2002

- The Clinton Administration designed **its missile** defense architecture to be as "Treaty compliant as possible." Therefore, it limited its development and testing programs to ground-based components for defense against longer-range threats. These tests are allowed within the Treaty. (As noted, deployment in Alaska would not be allowed.)
- The current missile defense testing planned for FY 2002 is based primarily on the program that was inherited from the Clinton Administration. The test program will be modified and built on to reflect the goals and guidance of the new Administration. We will pursue all promising technologies and basing modes, including those prohibited **under the** Treaty.
- We need a robust development and testing program to determine what works. The **ABM** Treaty explicitly prevents such a program. Only once we have conducted such a program will we know what to deploy and at what cost. To criticize the **Administration's** approach on effectiveness or cost grounds now, before we have been able to pursue our development and testing program, is premature at best, and disingenuous at worst.
- The objective of the test program is to field effective defenses against limited threats as soon as possible. There is no intent **to conduct** a test solely to exceed Treaty constraints. There is also no intent to design tests to conform to, or remain within the confines of the Treaty.
- As we have informed our allies and the Russians, we will seek capabilities not allowed under the Treaty, including sea-based and other mobile capabilities designed to intercept longer-range missiles.



- Moreover, and again as we have told both allies and the Russians, while we do not know precisely when our programs will come into conflict with the ABM Treaty in the future, the timing is likely to be measured in months not years.

New Philosophy on Missile Defense Development and Deployment

- DoD is adopting a flexible, evolutionary approach to missile defense RDT&E and deployment.
- The FY 2002 Amended Budget will include new funds to reinvigorate research on technologies with missile defense applications, to speed development of established technologies, and to allow for robust testing and evaluation of systems that are more mature.
- Under our new approach, test assets could be upgraded and fielded as soon as possible to provide an interim capability against near-term threats.
- For example, the prototype of the Airborne Laser is scheduled to attempt its first shoot-down of a missile in 2003. If this test demonstrates the capability to intercept, the Airborne Laser prototype could be available to provide an emergency missile defense capability.
- In addition, deployment of an interim ground-based system could be completed in Alaska as early as 2004 by upgrading existing radar capabilities and emplacing interceptors drawn from test assets.
- The flexibility and evolutionary nature of the missile defense RDT&E program will be different from the standard weapons development process. The process will be iterative and ongoing. Those systems that progress most rapidly and show the most promise will receive greater emphasis and funding.
- The interim systems that could be deployed on an emergency basis will not be perfect but, especially in combination, will make an important contribution to the defense our cities, our forces and friends and allies.
- Our missile defense programs are structured so that these interim systems can be rapidly improved and replaced by



more capable systems to provide effective, layered defenses against a limited missile attack.

- Because interim capabilities cannot-be expected to perform flawlessly, critics of missile defense may accuse us of deploying systems that do not 'work." However, an interim capability is warranted in light of existing and emerging ~~near-term~~ threats and the unpredictable nature of those threats.' Such capabilities, even if not fully mature, will provide more protection than we currently have -- which today is no capability at all against longer-range missile able to strike American cities.
- These capabilities are not an alternative or substitute for traditional deterrence, but rather an essential means to enhance deterrence against the new threats of today, not those of the past.



Missile Defense Myths

1. States like North Korea and Iran would not dare to attack the United States, knowing that they would pay a terrible price in response. Nuclear deterrence prevented the Soviet Union from attacking the United States and our allies in the Cold War. We can continue to rely on offensive deterrence instead of missile defenses.

- The world has changed greatly since the Cold War. We no longer have the Berlin Wall and the Soviet Union, but, as the President said, this is still a dangerous world, a less certain, and a less predictable one.
- We need to update our concept of deterrence to reflect the realities of the current security environment, which includes weapons of mass destruction in the hands of some of the world's least responsible states. These leaders place great value in possessing even **a small** number of long-range **missiles**.
- The leaders of these states have demonstrated a willingness to take large gambles and have stated that they are acquiring weapons of mass destruction and long-range missiles as their means to deter us from coming to the assistance of our friends'and allies in vital regions of interest.
- These leaders may well believe that they can blackmail us
 - prevent us from helping the **victims** of their aggression
 - if they can hold even a small number of our cities hostage to attack.
- This is not Cold War deterrence. States like North Korea and Iran are not seeking massive arsenals for a first strike. We are not talking about a second strike capability on our part. We are seeking the ability to defeat **a small** number of **missiles** to deny these countries an instrument of coercion.
- Missile defense is not a replacement for threats of retaliation, but rather an added dimension of contemporary deterrence. It is one element of a strategy to dissuade countries from acquiring weapons of mass destruction and the means of delivery and to deter their use.



- Missile defense also avoids the grim prospect of being forced to order a retaliatory strike that might kill many innocent civilians for the reckless act of an irresponsible dictator.
2. The technology for missile defense simply does not work.
- The **United States** has formidable engineering and scientific capabilities that are up to the task.
 - In fact, we have already had several notable successes in our development programs.
 - The PAC-3 system has successfully intercepted target missiles in all eight intercept tests conducted thus far.
 - The last two intercept tests of the **THAAD** system were successful.
 - Israel's Arrow missile defense system, which was developed jointly with the U.S., has had numerous successful tests and is now being deployed,
 - The first intercept test of the ground-based system for defense of the U.S. against long-range missiles was also successful.
 - In this test, a warhead on a target missile launched from California was successfully destroyed by a kill vehicle launched from an atoll in the South Pacific.
 - This was not a "**lucky shot**," or an event that occurred "by accident" as some have described it, **When** a target warhead and a kill vehicle that are each about the size of a chair, collide in the vastness of space about 140 miles above the earth, at closing speeds of ~~15,000~~ miles per hour after being launched over **4,300** miles apart, that is not an accident.
 - Although we have had many successful tests of our missile defense systems, we have also had some failures.



- . This is not unusual for development programs. Test programs are designed to uncover engineering flaws and we expect that some tests will inevitably not succeed.
 - . There were several notable failures in early tests of rockets for the U.S. space program. Yet we persevered, and eventually landed a man on the moon. In fact, manned space flight is almost routine today.
 - . As the President has said, we will evaluate what works and what does not in our missile defense programs. We know that there will be failures and that some approaches won't work. But we will build on our successes.
3. Even if it could work, missile defense costs too much money.
- . Missile defense is an imperative given the growing threats we face from rogue states armed with weapons of mass destruction and seeking long-range missiles.
 - . Like other major defense programs, such as those to develop new fighter aircraft or ships, missile defense will require significant funding.
 - . In addition, there is a cost to inaction that cannot be measured in dollars, namely that we will remain vulnerable to blackmail or attack from rogue states armed with **WMD** and **missiles**.
4. Diplomacy and arms **control** are more effective ways to stop proliferation.
- . Diplomacy is an essential tool in countering **WMD** and missile proliferation. Prevention is the first line of defense.
 - . We will work with friends and allies on nonproliferation and counter-proliferation efforts to prevent and protect against the spread of weapons of mass destruction and missiles.
 - . The United States will continue to support arms control treaties like the Nonproliferation Treaty (**NPT**), but we understand that such agreements have limits. Some rogue



states cheat on such agreements, as Iraq did with its crash 'program to develop a nuclear weapon prior to the Gulf War. Other rogue nations simply do not join such international agreements.

- we know that despite our best efforts, **WMD** and missile proliferation has already occurred and that determined nations will ultimately acquire greater capabilities in the future.

5. The 1972 ABM Treaty is the "cornerstone of strategic stability." There would be profound problems if the United States were to withdraw from the Treaty.

- The world has changed greatly since 1972.
 - Unlike the Cold War, today's most urgent threat stems not from thousands of ballistic missiles in Soviet hands, but from a small number of missiles in the hands of rogues.
 - The President has said we must **move** beyond the constraints of the ABM Treaty to deter and defend against the threats of today's world.
 - The ABM Treaty codified the adversarial relationship between the superpowers that existed during the Cold War. It was premised on a relationship of distrust and mutually assured destruction. We need a new foundation for our strategic relationship with Russia. Russia is not the Soviet Union. Russia is not an enemy.
 - We have begun real consultations with friends, allies, and, importantly, with Russia about a new cooperative framework that addresses the realities of the post-Cold War world.
 - This new framework should **allow** for defenses, substantial reductions in strategic offensive forces, as well as **counter-** and nonproliferation efforts,
6. Deployment of missile defenses will lead to a new arms race.
- We have said all along that **we seek missile** defenses to deal with the threat of blackmail and terror by rogue **states.**



- The limited missile **defenses** we intend to deploy would only be capable of defending against handfuls of incoming missiles, not hundreds or thousands.
- The limited missile defense that we will deploy would not in any way undercut the Russian nuclear deterrent, even at levels far below the **lowest** levels reportedly being contemplated by Russia.
- Furthermore, Russia has maintained a missile defense system around **Moscow** for decades and understands that missile defenses are not provocative.
- China is already engaged in a substantial **effort** to modernize its strategic nuclear forces, some of which are currently targeted on the United States. We do not believe our deployment of limited missile defenses should lead Beijing to further accelerate its buildup of strategic nuclear forces.
- Defense procurement is a very transparent process in the United States. A U.S. effort to build large-scale, rather than limited defenses against long-range missiles would be readily visible well in advance of potential deployment.
- Furthermore, one of the factors that make ballistic missiles so attractive to many states is that effective defenses have not been fielded to counter them. Missile defenses devalue these weapons, thereby reducing incentives for proliferation.

7. Deployment **of** missile defenses will harm relations with Russia and China.

- We believe it is important for Russia and the United States to work **together to** develop a new foundation for our relationship in the **21st** Century.
- This relationship should no longer be based on the 1972 ABM Treaty, which was premised on an adversarial relationship of distrust and mutually assured destruction.
- The ABM Treaty was created at the height of the Cold War, and prohibits us from defending our territory and that of



our friends and allies against the growing threat posed by the proliferation of weapons of **mass** destruction and ballistic missiles.

- The new framework of our relationship with Russia should reflect a clean and clear break from the Cold War, and should be premised on openness, mutual confidence, and real opportunities for cooperation.
- Over the coming months, we hope to complete the work of changing the U.S.--Russia relationship from one based on a mutual balance of terror to one based on common responsibilities and common interests.
- With regard to China, we do not view China as an enemy and **our missile** defenses are not directed at it. Our defenses are designed to protect against those states that would threaten or blackmail us.
- We do not believe the deployment of missile defenses should compel China to increase the pace and scale of its already ambitious effort to modernize its strategic nuclear forces, and to deploy hundreds of shorter-range missiles opposite Taiwan.
- Furthermore, missile defenses are not provocative. These purely defensive weapons can only be used to defeat an incoming missile launched by an aggressor or **a missile** launched by accident.

8. Deployment of missile defenses will split the U.S. from our allies who are opposed to this **idea**.

- There is a growing recognition among allies that the threat from **WMD** and **missiles** is growing **and** represents a major security challenge for the future. This is reflected in recent official statements of the NATO alliance and in statements by **many** national leaders in Europe and Asia.
- There is agreement among allies on the need for a comprehensive strategy, including strengthened non- and counterproliferation measures, as called for by President Bush.



- There is also a growing recognition that missile defenses are an essential element of the response to today's threats. This is clearly seen in the remarks by a number of allied leaders.
 - The list of countries with weapons of mass destruction and ballistic missile programs includes some of the world's least responsible states. This poses a growing threat to the United States, **as well** as to our friends and allies.
 - These rogue states seek weapons of mass destruction to intimidate their neighbors and to keep the U.S. and other nations from helping allies and friends who may be victims of aggression.
 - When Saddam Hussein invaded Kuwait in 1990, the world joined forces to turn him back. But the international community would have faced a very different situation had Hussein been able to blackmail us and our allies with nuclear-tipped missiles.
 - Far from splitting the United States from our allies, missile defenses allow us to **meet** our international commitments to **come** to their aid in a crisis.
 - The President recently sent several high-level U.S. delegations around the world to consult with friends and allies on this important topic.
 - We intend to continue working with friends and allies to create a new framework **for** security and **stability that** reflects the new strategic environment.
9. **Missile** defense does not **defend** against other means of delivering a **WMD** payload to the U.S., such as a terrorist **using** a suitcase **or** car bomb.

- The United States must also defend against these other threats.
- The United States spent about \$11 billion last year on counter-terrorism efforts, about twice as much as we did on missile defense. We also work closely with friends, allies, and the broader international community on **counter-**terrorism initiatives.



- . The President recognizes the need to do more to protect America's homeland and citizens against the possibility that a terrorist group could use weapons of mass destruction against targets in the United States.
 - . In May, the President launched a major initiative, appointing Vice President Cheney to oversee the development of a coordinated national effort that will expand and integrate the myriad federal, state, and local government efforts in the **WMD** preparedness area.
 - . The President has asked the Director of the Federal Emergency Management Agency to create an Office of National Preparedness. This Office will be responsible for implementing the results of those parts of the national effort overseen by Vice President Cheney that deal with consequence management. Specifically, it will coordinate all Federal programs dealing with weapons of mass destruction consequence management within the Departments of Defense, Health and **Human Services**, Justice, and Energy, **the Environmental** Protection Agency, and other federal agencies.
 - . But, in addition to **defending** against the potential terrorist use of weapons of mass destruction in the United States, we also need missile defense because countries like Iran and North Korea are making enormous efforts to acquire and develop long-range **ballistic missiles** -- **suggesting** that ballistic missiles are the "delivery means of choice" for these nations.
10. The **United States** has **exaggerated** the **WMD** and missile threat. We should wait until we **see** whether the long-range missile threat actually **materializes** before we deploy defenses.
- . The threat from ballistic **missiles** is already present and will continue to grow.
 - . For example, in 1998 North Korea launched a three-stage Taepo Dong 1 missile that overflowed Japan. The Intelligence Community assesses that this launch demonstrated the ability **of** North Korea to deliver a small payload to the United States. The Taepo Dong 2 missile currently under



development in North Korea will have an even greater range and payload capability.

- Ballistic missiles, first used over 50 years ago when Germany launched hundreds of V-2 rockets against Great Britain, have become an increasingly common feature of modern conflict. For example, hundreds of ballistic missiles were used during the Iran-Iraq war in the 1980s.
- In the Persian Gulf War in 1991, 28 American soldiers were killed and 99 were wounded during an Iraqi Scud missile attack on a barracks in Saudi Arabia. This is a high percentage of the total casualties the United States suffered in that conflict, in which 148 troops were killed and 470 were wounded in **combat**.
- Only now, more than 10 years after that attack, are we about to field an effective capability designed to counter the short-range threat. We **do not** wish to ever be put in such a position again.
- This is the reason we cannot wait until an even greater threat is upon us to begin development and testing of systems to counter this threat.
- The number of ballistic missiles on the face of the earth, and the number of countries possessing them is growing. The technology for ballistic missiles is ubiquitous. The existence of this **threat is not** debatable -- it is real.
- Sweeping political changes have occurred over the last 15 years and many more will occur over the next 15 years. The world of **2015** will almost **certainly be little** like **today**, and will without a doubt be **notably** different from what today's experts are confidently forecasting,
- While it is difficult to know precisely who will threaten **us**, or where, or when, we **know** that the technology **for** ballistic missiles will not disappear. Which is why we need to develop the means to defend against these weapons in the hands of any future adversary.



11. The U.S. can proceed with all the missile defense development and testing it needs in the next few years without withdrawing from the ABM Treaty.

- Article V of the ABM Treaty states that "Each Party undertakes not to develop, test, or deploy ABM systems or components which are sea-based, air-based, space-based, or mobile land-based."
- Development and testing of ground-based ABM capabilities are permitted under the Treaty. While the Bush Administration will examine ground-based options, we will also explore other avenues. We will pursue all of the most promising technologies and basing modes to provide for a limited but effective defense against rogue state missile threats. This will include sea-based and airborne capabilities prohibited by the Treaty. Given the threat, the President has made deployment as soon as possible a top priority.

