

SECRET

JUN 15 2006

TO: Gen Pete Pace

CC: Eric Edelman
GEN John Abizaid

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld 

SUBJECT: General McCaffrey's Report on Afghanistan

This is an interesting report from Barry McCaffrey. Of note, there is a reference in here to the lack of effective small arms for the Afghan forces. Minister Wardak mentioned that to me as well in Brussels. It seems like a serious problem. What is your assessment? What do we need to do about it?

Also, he questions the size of the Afghan forces, suggesting they should be larger than what we have programmed. Is he right?

Thanks.

Attach: 6/3/06 McCaffrey Report

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Please Respond By July 14, 2006



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IAW EO 12958, as amended
Chief, RDD, ESD, WHS

SECRET



Adjunct Professor of International Affairs

June 3, 2006

**MEMORANDUM FOR: COLONEL MIKE MEESE
DEPARTMENT HEAD, DEPARTMENT OF SOCIAL SCIENCES
UNITED STATES MILITARY ACADEMY**

**COLONEL CINDY JEBB
DEPUTY DEPARTMENT HEAD, DEPARTMENT OF SOCIAL SCIENCES
UNITED STATES MILITARY ACADEMY**

**Subject: Academic Report- Trip to Afghanistan and Pakistan
Friday, 19 May through Friday, 26 May**

1. PURPOSE: This memo provides follow-on feedback reference visit 19-26 May 2006 to Afghanistan and Pakistan. Look forward to doing a faculty seminar with Department of Social Sciences at your convenience in the Fall semester.

2. SOURCES— AFGHANISTAN:

- a. **Afghanistan President Hamid Karzai:** Office visit and discussion. Accompanied by U.S. Ambassador Ron Newman and LTG Karl Eikenberry.
- b. **Afghan Minister of Defense Wardak:** Office visit and discussions.
- c. **Afghan Minister of Interior Mogbil:** Office visit and discussions.
- d. **Afghan Army Chief General Bismullah Kahn:** Office visit and discussions.
- e. **Afghan National Security Officials and Parliamentarians:** MPRI Seminar and Luncheon Informal discussions.
- f. **Afghan 205th Corps Commander and battle staff. - Khandahar Visit:** Briefings and informal discussions.
- g. **Commanding General, Afghan Military Academy:** Briefings, classroom visits, informal discussions.
- h. **U.S. Ambassador Ron Newman:** One-on-one Lunch and discussions.
- i. **LTG Karl Eikenberry, Commander Combined Forces Command Afghanistan:** Briefings and one-on-one discussions.
- j. **LTG David Richards, UK Army, Commander ISAF (NATO):** One-on-one discussions and Briefings.
- k. **MG Ben Freakley, U.S. Army, Commanding general JTF-76:** Battle Staff briefings and one-on-one discussions.
- l. **MG Robert Durbin, U.S. Army, Office of Security Cooperation Afghanistan.** Briefings and discussions status of Afghan National Army and Afghan National Police.
- m. **BG Tim Perryman, U.S. Army, Commander Task Force Phoenix:** Briefings. Formation of the Afghan National Army and Police.



- n. **BG William Chambers, U.S. Air Force, Deputy Commander Combined Forces Command—Afghanistan:** Discussions.
- o. **BG James Terry, U.S. Army, ADC-Ops -- 10th Mountain Division:** Discussions and Briefings.
- p. **BG Christopher Miller, U.S. Air Force, Commander of Air Combat Command for CJTF-76**
- q. **BG (P) Stephen Layfield, U.S. Army, J3 ISAF:** One-on-one discussions and briefings.
- r. **BG David Fraser, Canadian Army, Commander Coalition Task Force Aegis, Khandahar (NATO):** Discussion and briefings.
- s. **BG (Ret) Herb Lloyd, DYNCORP Afghanistan:** Lunch. One-on-one discussions and update. Drug Situation.
- t. **Colonel John Nicholson, U.S. Army, 10th Mountain Division Brigade Combat Team:** Field Visit and Briefings - Battalion Commanders and Brigade Battle Staff.
- u. **CMDR Ryan Shoal, U.S. Navy, Provincial Reconstruction Team. (PRT), Kunar Province:** Secure Telephone Briefing and Discussions.
- v. **Colonel Chris Toomey, U.S. Army, Afghanistan Corps District Engineer:** Briefings and discussions.
- w. **Colonel Mo Morrison, U.S. Army, JTF76 J2 Intelligence Officer:** One-on-one briefing and discussions.
- x. **Mr. Tom Koenigs, United Nations Representative Afghanistan: UNAMA.** One-on-one discussions and briefings.
- y. **Mr. Doug Wankel, U.S. Embassy Drug Policy:** Briefings and one-on-one discussions.
- z. **Mr. Michael Metrinko, U.S. Embassy:** Briefing - Oversight of the new Afghan Parliament.
- aa. **Combined Forces Command-Afghanistan (CFC-A) Battle Staff. Campaign Brief.**
- bb. **Dinner Seminar NATO ISAF Staff: (LTC's and Colonels.)**
- cc. **Dinner Seminar US JTF 76: (Army and Air Force General Officers-- and Full Colonel Commanders).**
- dd. **Special Operations Headquarters—Afghanistan: Visit and Briefings.**
- ee. **JTF-76 Joint Operations Intelligence Center: Briefings and discussion.**

3. SOURCES—PAKISTAN:

- a. **U.S. Ambassador Ryan Crocker:** Embassy residence - dinner discussions; Office call - one-on-one visit.
- b. **BG Sandy Davidson, U.S. Army, U.S. Defense Representative Pakistan:** Briefings and one-on-one discussions.
- c. **ODRP Briefing by Colonel Allen and Colonel Shapiro:** Discussions Support to the Pakistani Military.
- d. **Mr. Bob Cahill FBI — DOJ Legal Attaché Team:** Briefings - War on Terrorism.
- e. **U.S. Defense Attaché Round Table with Colonel Tom Wahlert and team.**



- f. **Mr. Tom Nuse, DEA SAC:** Discussions and briefing.
- g. **U.S. Embassy Political Officer Ms. Theresa Grenik:** Briefing and discussion.
- h. **U.S. Embassy Economic Officer Mr. Drew Quinn:** Briefing and discussion.
- i. **Office Call Pakistan Vice Chief of Army Staff, Gen Ahsan:** Briefing and discussions.
- j. **Vice Chief of General Staff MG Yusuf:** Pakistan Army Operations Brief.
- k. **LTC Kalik Dar, Pakistan Army:** Current Operations Briefing.
- l. **LTG Raza, Commandant Pakistan National Defense College:** One-on-one office call and discussions.
- m. **Luncheon Seminar Pakistan National Defense College with LTG Raza and Senior Staff:** Open discussion the strategic situation of Pakistan.
- n. **MG Shahid Iqbal, Chief Instructor, War Wing at the Pakistan National Defense College. Discussions.**
- o. **MG Muhammad Tariq Masood, Director General of the Institute of Strategic Studies, Research and Analysis at the Pakistan National defense College.**
- p. **Vice Air Marshall Faaiz Amir, Chief Instructor ND Wing at the Pakistan National Defense College**
- q. **Dr. Mazari, Institute of Strategic Studies:** (Rant by Ms Mazari for an hour about the danger of Afghanistan and the refugees, the evil of the Indians, the ignorance of the Americans, etc. Suggested Afghan refugees should be driven out of Pakistan and get killed in their own country. Nice lady...PHD from Columbia University)

4. TWO EQUALLY VALID VIEWS OF AFGHANISTAN:

1st – OBSERVATIONS ON THE GROUND:

- Afghanistan has in the short space of five years moved from a situation of mindless violence, cruelty, poverty, massive production of drugs, the absence of government, and isolation - to a nation with a struggling democratic government; an exploding economy; a rapidly growing, disciplined Army; a vibrant free press, and active diplomatic and economic ties with its neighbors and the world. The 30 million people have showed almost unbelievable gratitude for the actions of the international community and have welcomed a significant foreign presence with great hospitality and trust.
- Opium production has been dramatically slashed by 48% just in the past year. In less than three years, 4.4 million refugees have flooded back into the nation. 95% of the refugee camps in Pakistan have been closed. A Constitution has been adopted.
- A President has been elected who is a Statesman of enormous integrity, vision, and courage. A Parliament has been elected with representation from every walk of political life - and a greater percentage of women than any other democracy in the world. The road network and transportation infrastructure have gone from absolutely non-functional to a rapidly growing network that is beginning re-vitalize the economy and trade with its neighbors.
- Massive amounts of international and private foreign aid are pouring into the country. The totally destroyed educational system is beginning to function. The agricultural and livestock system has grown enormously. The irrigation system destroyed by the Soviets is coming back.
- The security situation is so dramatically changed for the better that no platoon-sized unit has ever been defeated in battle. U.S. Forces routinely operate in squad sized units.



- As one US Army Aviation Brigade Commander told me - "I have been flying over this country for three combat tours since 2001- the change for the better is almost unbelievable - I can see it with my own eyes from 500 feet."

2nd - DESCRIPTION FROM UNCLASSIFIED OFFICIAL US GOVERNMENT PUBLICATIONS:

- Afghanistan is also described in official unclassified US Government documents as a nation where: security forces act independently of government authority; terrorist attacks, armed insurgency, and violence continue; security and factional forces commit extrajudicial killings and torture; local police routinely torture and abuse detainees; and corruption and official impunity remain pervasive problems.
- The judiciary was inefficient and subject to influence and corruption; and local Shuras sentence people to death by stoning or flogging.
- The country remains devastated by the peril of 450,000 landmines which kill and maim hundreds of people a year; foreign missionaries are harassed; there is widespread public perception of government corruption, including ministerial involvement in illegal narcotics; intimidation and violence directed at NGO workers increased during the past year.
- Violence against women persisted, including beatings, rapes, forced marriages, kidnappings, and honor killings; violence impeded access to education; child abuse was endemic throughout the country; and violence and instability hampered relief and reconstruction efforts in different parts of the country.
- Afghanistan also produces more than 90% of the world's opium poppy (4,475 metric tons 2005) and is also the world's largest heroin producing and trafficking country. Illicit opium production is one-third of the entire GNP and valued at \$2.8 billion. The GOA has not been able to enforce its decree banning opium production. They have conducted limited opium eradication. Drug addiction is growing rapidly with 920,000 drug users (to include 7000 injecting heroin addicts). The drug problem has grown out of control (all but two of Afghanistan's 34 Provinces). Evidence has mounted that the drug proceeds are supporting the Taliban and terrorist groups.

SUMMARY—THE THREAT:

- In my view, there is little question that the level of fighting has intensified rapidly in the past year. Three years ago the Taliban operated in squad sized units. Last year they operated in company sized units (100+ men). This year the Taliban are operating in battalion sized units (400+ men).
- They now have excellent weapons, new IED technology, commercial communications gear and new field equipment. They are employing suicide bombers who are clearly not just foreigners. In many cases, they appear to have received excellent tactical, camouflage, and marksmanship training. They are very aggressive and smart in their tactics. Their base areas in Pakistan are secure. Drug money and international financial support have energized their operations. Their IO campaign is excellent.
- In three years, the Taliban has reconstituted the movement. They are brutalizing the population, in particular in the Pashtun areas. They are now conducting a summer-fall campaign to knock NATO out of the war, capture the Provincial capital of Khandahar, isolate the Americans, stop the developing Afghan educational system, stop the liberation of women, and penetrate the Police and the ANA.
- The Taliban will be slaughtered in the coming six months of their attempt to confront NATO in large unit operations. They will be forced back into a more cautious insurgency role. We obviously must fight them politically, economically, as well as militarily. In my view, they will soon adopt a strategy of "waiting us out."



5. FRIENDLY FORCES:

a. U.S. Joint Task Force 76:

- We have fielded an aggressive, beautifully equipped air-ground team that operates freely throughout the country. Tactics are sound. Operational security (OPSEC) is impressive. US information operations (IO) and non-kinetic operations are tightly aligned with fire and maneuver. The discipline, morale, and competence of the troops are simply awesome.
- The chain-of-command is extremely experienced. The tactical commander (MG Ben Freakley JTF-76) and his battalion and brigade commanders are in many cases on their third or fourth combat tour. They absolutely know what they are doing. LTG Karl Eikenberry the strategic and operational Commander (CFC-A) has great experience and a very sophisticated grasp of the political and military situation. He is respected by the Afghans as the "Father of the Afghan Army".
- The US Army National Guard units embedded as trainers of the new Afghan Army (ETT's) have done a superb job. Afghan progress has been so dramatic that CENTCOM should consider using an Active Duty Light Infantry Brigade Combat Team for the next set of US Afghan unit trainers and partnership units. We will need to push these developing Afghan units to a higher training and operational level.
- We have a very, very small US military presence (17,000 troops) in a giant and dangerous land which is one third larger than Iraq. (The size of Texas). US Forces face thousands of heavily armed Taliban as well as pervasive criminal and Warlord forces. Pakistan is an active sanctuary for the Taliban and is struggling against the "Talibanization" of their side of the frontier. Afghanistan is awash with weapons. Taliban suicide bombings and IED's are now constant and rapidly growing in intensity and effectiveness (although they are very primitive and ineffective compared to Iraq). Pakistani Madrassas continue to get the very bright sons of the Afghan rural areas because of poverty and a lack of an Afghan educational system.
- The Taliban have not been defeated. NATO Forces will face a great challenge during the coming 24 months as ISAF assumes total responsibility for the security situation. The training and partnership of the Afghan Forces will require at least five years of continued robust US Military presence.
- In my view, the deteriorating situation in Afghanistan requires a continuing division-sized US military force with at least six ground combat battalions supported by significant: US Army aviation, engineers, USAF CAS and C130/ AC130, civil affairs, military police, reconnaissance, intelligence, logistics, and 155mm and MLRS artillery support.
- Suggest we must have a continued robust presence of Special Operations Forces for counter-terrorist unilateral action. (These SOCOM Forces are inspiring for their incredible professionalism in stealthy air-ground actions supported by superb intelligence. They are very judicious in their employment of force. They are in my judgment, the most dangerous people on the face of the earth.)
- We will encounter some very unpleasant surprises in the coming 24 months that will require US fighting forces which can respond rapidly throughout this huge and chaotic country to preserve and nurture the enormous successes of the past five years. The Afghan national leadership are collectively terrified that we will tip-toe out of Afghanistan in the coming few years—leaving NATO holding the bag-- and the whole thing will again collapse into mayhem. They do not believe the United States has made a strategic commitment to stay with them for the fifteen years required to create an independent, functional nation-state which can survive in this dangerous part of the world.

b. NATO Forces – ISAF:

- The new commander of ISAF LTG David Richards (UK Army) is very, very capable. He has an excellent grasp of the situation on the ground and an equally clear view of the NATO realities that limit his capabilities. ISAF is fenced by parameters that will politically and militarily constrain their possible future actions. The good news is



that the current ISAF HQS is a standing NATO capability of enormous competence. They have extensively trained together and rehearsed for this operation. They can without question coordinate and synchronize all NATO military forces under their control. There is also a sizable and talented US military team resident in the ISAF NATO Headquarters.

- ISAF is now taking OPCON of some very powerful NATO battalion combat teams--- in particular the Brit's, the Canadians, and the Dutch (1300 troops with their own lift, attack helicopters, and F16 ground attack aircraft). However, ISAF flexibility will be severely limited by the realities of the political-military ROE's (both known and unknown) that will constrain each of these national contingents. In addition, ISAF is severely lacking adequate enabler forces (attack and lift helicopters, smart munitions, intelligence, engineers, medical, logistics, digital command and control, etc) to fully leverage and sustain their ground combat power.
- The rapidly expanding NATO ISAF Forces are doing very well on the ground. The Canadians have done some fierce fighting and have responded very well to their first exposure to real combat since WWII. They should be very proud of their leadership and the courage of their soldiers. However, the Taliban campaign envisions knocking NATO out of the war by massing on perceived weak points in the Alliance. The Dutch are widely believed to be a significant target since the Dutch Parliament has signaled their weak political support of this deployment. Other Allied units (e.g. the Rumanians) are weak formations wrapped up in ad hoc allied organizations. Some small NATO units have deployed badly equipped and poorly structured. US Joint Forces will have to remain very cognizant of these ISAF vulnerabilities during their transition. ISAF success will have huge importance to our US national security objective to internationalize the political and economic development of Afghanistan. If NATO fails---we fail.
- NATO-ISAF has another daunting problem. By this coming February 2007 (seven months), NATO will assume total responsibility for the entire battle space of Afghanistan. The next ISAF Commander (three star) and the Headquarters (Corps level requirement for operational and tactical control of 25,000 NATO troops (including US) and 50,000 + Afghan security forces) has not yet been identified. This ISAF command element for next February should already be fully assembled in one physical location (such as Grafenwoer Training center) and undergoing a six month training workup to assume control in Afghanistan. This as yet unidentified NATO Hqs will need to actually start movement into Afghanistan NLT Nov-Dec 2006. In sum, we are already in danger of not fielding an adequate NATO command and control capability suitable for this crucial requirement.

c. Afghan National Army (ANA) and Afghan National Police Formations (ANP):

THE AFGHAN NATIONAL ARMY:

- The creation by US CFC-A of 44 battalions of ANA Forces (30,000 troops) in 36 months is an enormous success story. They are the most disciplined, and effective military force in Afghanistan's history. In general, these troops are very courageous, and aggressive in field operations. They operate like armed mountain goats in the severe terrain of Afghanistan. Their relations with the embedded US trainers have been appreciative and trusting. In general, the US Embedded Training Teams (ETT's) admire and work effectively with their counter-part units. Our courageous US Army National Guard and Reserve Army and Marine training units operate in great isolation and under very demanding conditions from other US JTF76 forces.
- The Afghan Army is miserably under-resourced. This is now a major morale factor for their soldiers. They have shoddy small arms ---described by Minister of Defense Wardak as much worse than he had as a Mujadeen fighting the Soviets 20 years ago. Afghan field commanders told me that they try to seize weapons from the Taliban who they believe are much better armed. The ANA report AK47's in such poor maintenance condition that rounds spin into the ground at 100 meters. Many soldiers and police have little ammunition and few magazines.
- These ANA units do not have mortars, few machine guns, no MK19 grenade machine guns, and no artillery. They have almost no helicopter or fixed wing transport or attack aviation now or planned. They have no body armor or blast glasses. They have no Kevlar helmets. They have no up-armored Humvee's or light armor tracked



vehicles (like the M113A3 with machine gun cupolas and with slat armor). They need light armored wheeled vehicles.

- There seem to be neither US resources nor political will to equip these ANA battalions to rapidly replace us as the first line counterinsurgency force. Strongly suggest that this Army and Police Force should be 70,000 to 100,000 troops within 18 months—not an anemic force of 50,000 soldiers. We should fund this effort at \$1.2 billion annually and sustain it for ten years. The force should be expanded to include fifteen or more armed engineer battalions and medical battalions to work on the road, water, micro-power (6% of the country has electricity), medical and security infrastructure requirements. This situation cries out for remedy. A well equipped, disciplined, multi-ethnic, literate, and trained Afghan National Army is our ticket to be fully out of country in the year 2020.

THE AFGHAN NATIONAL POLICE:

- The Afghan National Police are vital to establishing order in the urban and rural areas. (33,000 Afghan National Police ANP nominally exist and 5,200 Afghan Border Police) They are in a disastrous condition: badly equipped, corrupt, incompetent, poorly led and trained, riddled by drug use and lacking any semblance of a national police infrastructure. There is very little oversight at Province or District level.
- CFC-A in close and effective partnership with Department of State (INL) is now working diligently to correct the situation—principally using contractors as the training and management mechanism. This must be a crucial US national security objective in the coming ten years. We are starting from ground zero. The Germans who have lead nation responsibility have not been much help. In my judgment, the ANP training program must primarily be executed in-country with the very capable and courageous embedded US contractor police mentors/advisors.
- The Afghan police lack uniforms, armored vehicles, weapons, ammunition, police stations, police jails, national command and control, and investigative training. The police situation is perilous and vital to Afghanistan regaining control of the country from the rampant criminality, the Taliban, the tribal and factional fighting, and the constant multi-year vendettas that persist among tribes and families over resources (water, gems, drugs, timber smuggling, grass grazing rights, etc).
- The Afghan National Police cannot function unless there is a corresponding significant, funded coherent strategy to create a system of justice. We should do this with primarily an international contractor force. They need a thousand jails, a hundred courts, and a dozen prisons. The international community must build an educational and vocational training system tied to District level leadership to provide a re-entry system. The US cannot continue to be the only option of incarceration --in lieu of Afghan authorities either killing criminals/Taliban or letting them go.
- Without a reliable framework of National Police and a Justice System to create internal security—the political and economic development of Afghanistan will not be possible. Afghanistan will rapidly become in the coming years a narco-state. Afghanistan is already clearly a narco-economy.

6. DRUGS, ROADS, KIDS, AND AGRICULTURE:

The only thing that works well in Afghanistan is the giant, sophisticated opium-heroin-hashish drug industry. It will consume the country. It can only be countered by the simultaneous application of three major strategic lines of operation.

- First, we must eradicate the opium crops without fail each growing season with increasing power and effectiveness --primarily using contractor operated manual eradication employing masses of Afghan rural workers. A kilogram of injectible heroin in Afghanistan can be bought for \$2,500.00. The same kilogram can be sold on the US East Coast for \$95,000.00. These desperately poor people are not stupid. They only get a fraction of this profit—but opium cultivation is a guaranteed way to make huge money now.



- Second, we must provide an alternative economic option. In the short run, this is easy. We must provide direct help to farmers so they do not starve. This does not cost much money. (It now costs us a billion dollars a month to fight the Taliban)

In the longer run, it means building a road network for \$450 million over the coming seven years. It means connecting the Province and District capitols to a unified electricity national grid. This would be a \$1.2 billion project which could be completed by 2016. (Now four disconnected grids) It means forging an educational system to teach kids and young adults: agronomy, basic health and preventive medicine, literacy, animal management, well-digging and irrigation management, road construction and management, the management of micro-power energy cooperatives, management of tourism, basic structures construction, simple accounting, Islamic values of honesty and service, etc.

The international community will support us on this objective. It also requires foreign investment. This would be a fifteen year program which should primarily be carried out with Afghan labor, small Afghan companies, and foreign oversight and management which mentors and develops Afghan talent.

- Third, the Afghan national political leadership must study the example of China, Thailand, Pakistan, Bolivia, Peru and other nations where drug cultivation has been severely constrained by a national campaign to convince the population that drug production will: weaken the nation, be in conflict with national cultural and religious values, addict the labor force and children, and destroy the possibility of peace and a moral family life. This is actually an easy message to craft and a joy to disseminate.

7. PAKISTAN:

The central question seems to be ---are the Pakistanis playing a giant double-cross in which they absorb one billion dollars a year from the US while pretending to support US objectives to create a stable Afghanistan---while in fact actively supporting cross-border operations of the Taliban (that they created) --- in order to give them themselves a weak rear area threat for their central struggle with the Indians?

- The web of paranoia and innuendo on both sides of the border is difficult to assess. However, I do not believe that President Musharaff is playing a deliberate double game. Pakistan is four nations in one weak and violent state. The Pakistan Army is the only load-bearing institution holding the nation together. The Army provides the only corps of high-integrity societal leadership (in general---and certainly when compared to civilian political elites). There is absolutely no way that the Army is serving as a dupe while fielding 15 battalions in severe combat in the FATA --battalions which have suffered hundreds of casualties (while presenting a picture of both courage and embarrassing ineffectiveness). The ISI is the Army. The Frontier Police are the Army. The senior state and national police leadership and much economic business is the Army.
- In my view, the real problem is that the Duran Line marking the border does not exist. The Pashtuns and others are not primarily Afghans or Pakistanis---they are ferociously conservative, ignorant, hostile, black turban, black baggy pants guys ---with AK47's and an aversion to infidels and national government. They move back and forth from Quetta to Khandahar to fight and live--and have for decades. The Pakistanis barely control 5% of Baluchistan. They do not control most of the FATA. They fear the increasing radicalization of their frontier. Afghanistan does not control anything except parts of Kabul most of the time. Both nations are consumed by nationalistic hatred of the other state. (Pakistan far, far less than Afghanistan) Pakistan conversely reserves nationalistic hatred for the Indians ---which is of course reciprocated equally.)
- Cross-border coordination military- to- military is superb between JTF-76 and the Pak's. Intelligence cooperation is superb. The US should consider actively supporting a concept of fencing and putting barriers along selected areas of the Afghan-Pakistan border to constrain movement of the many, many armed groups moving back and forth across the frontier. The US can also will serve a useful role in promoting cross-border dialog and cooperation in every way possible - while scrupulously respecting the sovereignty of both nations.



8. CONCLUSIONS:

There is much to be encouraged about in Afghanistan. Karzai is a giant. The Parliament is talking and negotiating. The ANA is beginning to be a serious security force. The poor, desperate Afghans have crawled out of their caves and bunkers and are putting together a survival economy. (The 4th poorest nation on the face of the earth). The Taliban are being gunned down day and night when they mass. The international community--- both NATO and the UN are engaged and making a difference. We are not alone.

- The Afghans are very impressive people. Traditionally they were pragmatic, not extremist. They are sick of fighting and they know we brought peace. They are genuinely a remarkable, hospitable people.
- CENTCOM brilliantly flipped our strategy from counter-terror to counter-insurgency at the end of the first year. Our US military forces have acted with enormous discipline and skill. We must be careful to rapidly tone down our aggressive operations in any urban area or when dealing with the civil population in the coming months. Our current detainee operations at Bagram Air Base and in the brigades are now extremely professional, firm and humane. We must continue to ensure absolutely zero toleration for abuse or undignified treatment of any Afghan under our control. The protection of Human Rights is a military objective.
- Our goal must be zero innocent civilian casualties ---even where this means Taliban units escape destruction by hiding among the people. We have to stay out of the cities and push the ANA with our backup into civil population control operations. We need to defer on the roads to the civil population while actively countering IED's and suicide bombers. (Move convoys at night, build by-pass roads, get US military and AID infrastructure out of built-up areas, use ANP units to accompany our small unit convoy movements.) Suggest we need to concentrate on the ANA and the ANP...not on large unit US operations.
- Active participation by the US inter-agency team and adequate international economic reconstruction aid are the future keys to winning the struggle for a peaceful and stable Afghanistan. We also must publicly commit to a joint, long-term strategy of cooperation with the Afghan government. (Fifteen years)
- We must re-think the relative importance we place on Afghanistan. This was the source country of international terrorism. If we fail and it slips back into anarchy ---it will again be a sanctuary for international terror. Iraq now receives five times the funding of our nation-building programs in Afghanistan. We support Iraqi forces that are 2.5 times larger and growing--- than those of Afghanistan. Desperately poor Afghanistan can now fund only 13% of their Security Forces budget. Conversely, oil rich Iraq currently can fund 59% of their security forces.
- The bottom line is that there is the potential for a twenty year miracle in Afghanistan on the order of magnitude of the birth of modern Japan following WWII. Afghanistan will never have any significant economic heft in the world arena. But it can become an island of stability and an example of a modern Islamic state ---with a people who can dry up the sanctuary that murdered 3000 Americans on "911."
- It was an honor to see the men and women of the US Armed Forces and the CIA---as well as NATO---who are creating a new Afghanistan by their collective courage and dedication. We are without question moving inexorably in the right direction to achieve our goal of a stable, peaceful Afghanistan in the coming years.

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