

July 29, 2003

TO: Larry Di Rita
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
SUBJECT: Gingrich Paper

Please see me on this Newt Gingrich paper on "Seven Strategic Necessities."

Thanks.

Attach.
6/27/03 Gingrich paper: "Seven Strategic Necessities"

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Please respond by 8/8/03



Seven Strategic Necessities
June 27, 2003
Newt Gingrich

12/16

There are seven large areas of strategic necessity that require strategic planning and some significant modifications of current assumptions and efforts.

I. Strategic need 1. Winning the larger argument about terrorism, weapons of mass murder, and American security

It is very important for the Bush administration not to get drawn into a day to day, incident managing, news media and legislator appeasing mindset.

We are going to take casualties.

We are going to be engaged in Iraq, Iran, Palestine and elsewhere for a long time.

We need an elevated debate about the larger zone of American security and the threats to that security. We want to divide the country into three factions.

1. Those who would hide and ignore reality (essentially the McGovern-Dean Democrats).
2. Those who pretend to be responsible but really want to carp and complain without an effective alternative.
3. Those who understand that this will be a hard campaign and may take years and will involve mistakes.

You want to force the carping, criticizing group to join you for the long haul or join the isolationists and reality avoiders.

If there is a clear strategic choice the Bush Administration will win.

If people get three choices the knit picking, daily critics will steadily gain ground.

Do not let yourself be caught up in a daily argument or in trying to predict when you will leave a country or when you will solve everything.

The country needs a little Churchillian promise of 'blood, sweat, toil and tears'.

In 1945-47 the country reluctantly had a great debate about the nature of the Soviet threat. People who had survived a depression and a world war wanted to return to normalcy. Gradually they concluded that that was impossible and with the help of young Republicans like Nixon and Ford, Harry Truman and George Marshall forged a Consensus that lasted for over 40 years.



A large debate requires large strategies and speeches about the larger realities.

II. Strategic Need 2. Creating a world with minimum terror and minimum risk of weapons of mass murder requires both the negative goal of defeating bad people and bad regimes and the positive goal of creating systems of safety, health, prosperity, and freedom (the four words which best express the world we want our neighbors to live in).

We are very good at creating a first campaign to defeat the bad guys or the bad regime. We are stunningly less effective at creating a campaign to build systems of safety, health, prosperity and freedom.

We need a doctrine for second campaigns. This will inherently be a doctrine for integrated operations. Joint operations involve all the services. Combined operations include foreign countries. Integrated operations involves all the elements of governmental and non-governmental power being orchestrated and brought to bear to help build a country or society after we have defeated the bad forces which have been oppressing them and threatening us.

The current challenges in Iraq and Afghanistan are symptoms of this lack of an integrated doctrine and the lack of an effective interagency system for implementing such a doctrine. We can continue muddling through at increased cost and risk to ourselves or we can take winning the peace as seriously as we take winning the war.

Compare the quality of people and level of resources spent thinking through and creating the units and people which won in Iraq in three weeks with the stunningly smaller effort to think through how we rebuild a country and the disparity becomes unchallengeable.

There is still some wishful thinking in Washington that somehow these things will go away or can be fixed on the cheap.

The countries we liberate will not go away. In the absence of a successful and powerful American doctrine and system for a second campaign using integrated and combined assets we run a real risk of losing in the peace what we have gained in the war.

Those trying to deal with Iraq, Afghanistan and Palestine should simply build lists and brief reports on every impediment to effectiveness and every tool and system they wished they had. We will only get better by being consciously self aware.

III, Strategic Need 3..Palestine may present us the challenge of trying to win a total war against an enemy hiding among civilians. Hamas' leaders state publicly that 'not a single Jew' will be left in Israel and that 'not a single meter of territory' will be left in Jewish hands. There is sound reason to believe they mean it. This is a declaration of total war.



America has a sound doctrine for total war against an entire nation. Dresden, Hamburg, Tokyo and Nagasaki are among the memories of how decisive Americans can be when faced with a threat of total war.

However America does not have a doctrine for total war against an enemy who is hiding behind a civilian population. Furthermore that civilian population is likely to be terrorized by the forces of total war and so simply appealing to their better interests is useless. ✓

We learned in Iraq that the Baathist forces would kill villagers and threaten wives and children in order to get people to attack the Americans.

It is clear that Palestinians who favor real democracy or would be willing to live peacefully with Israel risk their lives if they speak out.

When faced with a terrorist opponent willing to use violence against their own people the only solution is to develop overmatching systems of intelligence and force which can help people defeat them. ✓

British General Thompson in Malaya developed a system like this and decisively defeated the communists. In one of the most successful aspects of the Viet Nam war (described in Bing West's The Village) very small units of Marines worked with villagers to develop self defense forces in communities of 6,000 Vietnamese with about 20 Marines.

If the President is to be able to confront and defeat Hamas the United States will have to develop a doctrine and system of helping those Palestinians who want their families to have safety, health prosperity, and freedom and are prepared to fight the terrorists if necessary to achieve that future.

The only hope for peace between Israel and the Palestinian people is for the United States to overtly ally with those Palestinians who will accept Israel if they have safety, health, prosperity and freedom and in this alliance defeat and ultimately eliminate the threat of the terrorists.

Victory in the Israel-Palestinian conflict thus inherently means victory both in a campaign against terrorists and in a campaign to build a safe, healthy, prosperous, free Palestinian society.

In this case victory in a total war surrounded by civilians requires waging the first and second campaigns concurrently.

The specialists at Quantico, Fort Benning and Fort Bragg should be assigned the job of developing in detail a doctrine, strategy and structure for winning this total war on behalf of the Palestinian people against the terrorists. The intelligence community should be ✓



involved for its knowledge but the doctrine for war winning should come from specialists in policing, urban warfare, and guerrilla operations in the military.

The goal is to give the President the instruments he needs to be able to win if the forces of Hamas, Islamic Jihad, Al Fatah, etc insist on total war.

IV. Strategic Need 4. Future threats and complex realities rather than lessons learned from Iraq should define the core of American intelligence, military and integrated needs for the next generation.

Iraq and Iran are useful campaigns to study but they have limited application to force size and structure for the future. The real challenges are in heavier opponents (North Korea, a rogue Pakistan, Iran) and more dispersed problems (Palestine, the ungoverned areas, the dictatorships of Syria, Libya etc.)

Planning should begin with the decisiveness of President Bush's description of the global war on terror on the USS Lincoln and the wide ranging assertions of the National Strategy released September 20,2002.

The forces today are stretched much further than people in Washington believe.

The number of places we could be involved is far larger than anyone in Washington wants to contemplate.

The number of people who live in ungoverned areas is far greater and more dangerous than anyone currently wants to report.

The amount of money and scale of activity underway in the gray areas (people smuggling, illegal arms deals, illegal international transportation, traditional international crime, and international narcotics) creates a system within which terrorism can operate which is far larger, more robust and more agile than anyone contemplates. This dark underside of globalization is better funded than the police, more agile than public bureaucracies and often better equipped technologically.

In 1975 Secretary of Defense Rumsfeld used the facts to convince the post-Viet Nam, post-Watergate Democratic Congress that the world was dangerous and defense spending had to be increased.

Today a similarly comprehensive, realistic and starkly candid assessment needs to be developed by the Administration and shared with the Congress and with the American people so they will understand the scale of the threat, the complexity and speed of the modern world, and the amount we will have to invest to develop truly effective systems of national security.



This may be the most difficult challenge we face and it may take more political and bureaucratic courage to confront than any other strategic necessity.

V. The fifth strategic necessity is to transform the Army into an institution which is at the center of jointness. This is a much bigger challenge than simply bringing the Army into jointness. The Army's instinct that complex warfare requires land forces is exactly right. The Army's instinct that in the end all the other services may end up supporting ground forces is almost certainly right.

However this is an argument for jointness at the heart of the Army and not at its periphery.

This requires the development of joint tactics and effective fires so the entire process from day one is seamlessly joint.

This also requires profoundly reshaping the Army's personnel system to get rid of the 1917 individual replacement system and move to a unit preparedness system more like the Navy and the Marine Corps.

If the new Army team is instructed to begin with jointness and then think through the redesign of the Army a drastically different outcome will result than if the team is told to rethink the Army with jointness as one of the goals.

First comes immersion in jointness and then comes design of the new 21st century Army.

This is the only way to get to an effective joint force in the next decade.

VI. The sixth strategic necessity is a briefing on the first two years of the war and where the United States must go from here.

The first step is to combine the lessons learned from 9/11, Afghanistan, and Iraq with the emerging threats and realities around the world into a single briefing for the congress, the news media and the country.

Beginning in mid-September the Congress should be thoroughly briefed on the first two years of the war with terrorism and weapons of mass murder. The briefing should go on to outline the current threats to security and to outline the President's strategies for defeating these threats. Finally, the briefing should outline a positive vision of a future of safety, health, prosperity and freedom for all people in a world in which terrorism and weapons of mass murder are opposed and defeated by virtually everyone in a strategic coalition of the willing.

The entire information campaign of the future (which has to be an integral part of developing the Integrated doctrine and system mentioned in strategic necessity two above (second campaigns) depends on the development of this presentation.



Members of Congress, reporters, and citizens all need a coherent single explanation of what has happened, what we have learned from it, what threatens us and what we are going to do about it and the metrics appropriate to measure success in the future.

In September there will still be great interest in the lessons learned and they are the logical hook as a two years after review of phase one of the global war. By January the lessons will be in the past and the Congress will be focused on politics and elections.

There is a window of about three months in which this can be achieved.

This is potentially an enormous mobilizer of understanding, support and resources. Without it people will develop their own models and their own metrics for success and the situation will be dramatically more muddled.

VII. The seventh strategic necessity is to establish a system of DoD detailees throughout the federal government and where possible as overseas detached personnel for foreign governments to both maximize DoD's influence on debates and to maximize the flow of information to DoD.

It has been a significant mistake to yield the territory at NSC and elsewhere to the State Department and other interests. The result has been a much more limited reach by the Defense system into the policy making apparatus.

What is really needed is the opposite approach.

There should be a conscious systematic strategy for sending good people to every point in the federal government and to as many contacts with foreign governments as possible.

This requires carrying extra officers and senior ncos on the rolls but in the long run it will pay a tremendous dividend in communicating the defense system's views, values, and practices.

