

Meeting with the President
11-13-74
Cabinet Room
8:45 to 8:55
Scowcroft and Dave Peterson

Saw a film on Brezhnev



Meeting with the President
11-13-74
8:55 to 9:15
Oval Office
Alone

President asked when Betty was supposed to come over to have that photo taken signing the WIN thing. It's not on the calendar for today and Betty doesn't know when it is and therefore Betty asked the President and the President asked me. Get it on the calendar and have Betty notified promptly this morning so she can plan her day.

President agreed to the ceremony on the South Lawn as opposed to Andrews.

He said, on the Audie Murphy thing, if Tiger Teague keeps bouncing that thing back up, maybe you could do it January 16 when he's in Houston anyway.

We talked about the Cabinet Meeting and the President saw this Ash memo that's attached and I told him that some specifics would be coming forward on Thursday, for him to decide if he wants to in the Cabinet Meeting, give assignments to the Cabinet officers that date beyond the Japan trip... that he has the option of doing it... two big meetings at Camp David on two successive Saturdays or one by one by the departments but the former has the advantage of drama and it has the advantage that other Cabinet officers can participate in the goal setting for the other Departments. He said he would wait to decide until he saw what the proposals from Cole and Ash on Thursday for the Friday Cabinet meeting. DICK, those should be dexed when they come in. I have told Cole and Ash that already.



The President said he has to get a haircut on Friday or Saturday.
GET IT SCHEDULED FOR FRIDAY.

I showed him this memo concerning the spirit of 76. DICK I think we maybe ought to get Hartmann and Nessen and Marsh thinking about whether or not they want to change the name of the plane and get some options up for the President. He and I both think that the name "Spirit of 76" is pretty good. The only problem is it would be nice if he could change it from something else to that, but he can't .. it's already been done.

On the Japan trip, the President agreed to not having that man ride with him.

He also agreed to that American Community reception.


With respect to the reciprocal dinner, he said we should go ahead and sort out who should be invited. This memo was very bad. It didn't show who the American participants were so it's very hard for him to know whether he wants to add those four names and I couldn't explain it. It's also bad because under Tab A, the last page that has the U.S. side says "members of the official suite (8)" but it doesn't say who they are and then it adds Ambassador and Mrs. Hodgson and anyone knows that the Ambassador is part of the official party if that's what official party means..official suite..so it's a bad piece of staff work and not clear. DICK, You just sort it out.

Next, on the same subject. The President says he would like to, after that American Community reception, go back and have a small private dinner probably with Henry, Rumsfeld, Scowcroft, Hodgson and Hartmann... no more than 6 or 8 people...and that I should talk with Brent and decide who ought to be at that dinner and put it together. DICK, You have the action.

Next, the President talked about his breakfast with Hugh Scott saying that Scott had talked about the coal situation

.. commended the President's offer

..business of management, the Cabinet Room and that Bill Usery will have a cot and that they'll do everything possible. The President asked me xx what I thought and I told him I thought that Usery was the guy who could decide that. The timing of any offer of that sort is critical because if one point Labor has the initiative, it looks like its pro-Labor or anti-Labor or pro-Management or anti-Management to make an and that Usery ought to control it. He said okay why don't you let Usery know that there are those kinds of options...that if he has a recommendation



to what the President can do before he leaves to be helpful. Usery should come forward with that recommendation both as to what should be extended and also the timing of it. DICK, See that that's done.

You're right, I understand the problems. Talk to Usery and just get his... just let him know that he has the ability to make recommendations to you on that subject before the President leaves on Sunday... not that they'll be agreed to and certainly he's aware of that too.

Next, he said that Scott had talked to Jim Rhodes and that Rhodes wants to talk to the President or see him. **THAT SHOULD** be arranged for after the Japan trip. You have the action. (of Ohio).

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

Next, by 9:15, when I had finished, and Kissinger still had not arrived for the third day in a row, the President said "Maybe we ought to change Kissinger's time." I said maybe we ought to. I said you've got two problems...if it's not possible for Henry to get over here on time, maybe we ought to change the time as follows: that in the ~~morning~~ morning I would see the President at 8:30 a.m....Hartmann would see him at 9:00....and at 9:15 Kissinger would see him.... and then at 9:45 Rumsfeld, Nessen, Hartmann and Timmons would see him and he'd still be free at 10:00. That gives Kissinger an extra 15 minutes which might be helpful. The President said okay, talk to Scowcroft about that and see if that's helpful. **DICK YOU DO THAT TODAY** and if so, we'll change the schedule for the rest of the week. and thereafter.

Next, I said to the President, there's a second problem. I said, frankly, certainly we want to get the schedule set but the fact of the matter is you're the President of the United States and he is one of your Cabinet officers and it is a very bad signal in the White House and in the Department of State and elsewhere in this town for him to be 15 and 20 minutes and 30 minutes late for meetings with you three days in a row. It positions you in the wrong place. I said I can just see what's taking place over at the Department of State. All of Kissinger's



aides are running around to him in the meeting saying
Mr. Secretary you've got to get over to your 9:00 meeting with the
President...you're late 10 minutes, you're late 15 minutes....and
Kissinger is saying "yeah, I know, I'll be along, I'll be along in good time".
Now that gets around and it's wrong and you ought to do something about
it. He said I see the problem.



Meeting with the President

11-13-74

9:15 to 9:35

Nessen said the President had agreed to see Pepi Granheimer and Sheika. The President said to have them come over to the Oval Office about 1:45. That should go on the calendar.

DICK, You and I have got to talk to Nessen and tell him to stop bringing up calendar items in there. The purpose of that meeting is not for Nessen to work off all his things outside the system. If he's got a calendar item like Pepi Grandheimer, he can damned well put it through Rustand like everyone else in the building. If he's got press questions....that's what that meeting is for. It's not for him to go in and talk about books to be written by somebody or photographs to be taken by Woodward and Bernstein and all of these things he's been bringing up....he doesn't understand that and it's really got to stop....it's wrong... I mean it's just shortcircuiting the system. He ought to go in there and be prepared to talk substantive questions.

Next, the subject of George Brown came up. The President said that he wanted to strongly emphasize that he did not agree with or approve of the statements by Brown. And I said that you might want to do one other thing and that's let Schlesinger know that before Nessen says anything in his press briefing so that at Schlesinger's press conference today he can reflect that he has heard from the White House. I'VE GOT THE ACTION TO TELL BRENT TO CALL SCHLESINGER.

Next, the subject of Butz came up. Timmons brought it

The other problem, DICK, is that Nessen keeps bringing up problems that have not been staffed out. He brought up this food question for example, not having talked to Brent....he brings it up to the President. There's got to be a procedure for him and it's got to include checking first with the guy who's got the substantive responsibility then with me and then with the President.

Next, the subject of the Butz cable came up. Timmons brought it up. The President said well we sent something to Butz telling him no because Nessen wanted to know the answer to the question on what



was our answer to Butz' wire. What do we send Don? I said I really don't know. And I said you must be handling this with Brent. And the President looked puzzled and he said well wasn't I handling it with you or Dick Cheney. I said I didn't know. .DICK, YOU SHOULD GET TO NESSEN AND TELL HIM TO GET TO BRENT as he should have in the first damned place and get the answer to that.

[REDACTED]

Next, they talked about recession announcements. And Timmons brought up the milk subject and said that Nessen should check with Seidman and Agriculture. I said if it's an Agriculture decision, we should dump the questions on Agriculture. And Timmons said well it isn't because Agriculture disagrees with the decision. I said well who made the decision and he said the Economic Policy Board made the decision. The President said well if Agriculture has one position and the Economic Policy Board has another position why wasn't I ever given a piece of paper showing the differences so I could make a decision.

I had no idea there was a conflict between the Economic Policy Board and the Department of Agriculture and the EPB had the obligation of coming forward to somebody and letting him have a chance to get into it if he wanted to... which they never did... in fact, they disagreed with Agriculture.... So we should go to the Economic Policy Board and trace back on this..... this is worth tracing back on to get at the system right... but they should not be making Presidential decisions if they are in disagreement with the Department. Those things should go up. And you should talk to Seidman about it and get a memo from him to me explaining what happened on that milk thing.

[REDACTED]




Meeting with the President - Oval Office 11/13/74 with Simon
10:15 - 10:25

1. I told the President that he and I agreed that there will be times when he would want to use a procedure that does not include his having the full advice of all his advisers on important matters but when that occurred he wanted to make the decision. And that I had briefed the Senior Staff to that effect that such an instance was immediately before us and that I wanted him to be aware of it. Simon then filled him in that he and Kissinger had been working on a speech for Kissinger to make Wednesday and Simon would follow up with the foreign Relations Council in New York on Thursday or Friday--very important speech concerning oil involving billions of dollars. The President said he was aware of it. Simon said that I, OMB, CEA, CIEP and Interior--legislative liaison, no one else has been consulted except Treasury, State and the FED and the FED did not agree. The President said ok I am willing to go with it the way you two have decided and take the heat. The important of this decision for from it that you can do it either way. If you do it by bypassing the others you risk several things #1 the anger of the other people in government who are dealing with that problem that you didn't consult. #2 the impression of disorder in the WH and in the government that we don't know what they are doing because those guys will be out badmouthing it. #3 the danger that you are going to make a bad mistake because you haven't consulted fully and you will be blindsighted. The advance of doing it this way is that you can do it faster and more secretly. and you take your pick--the President choose.

advantage

Simon said he disagreed with Kissinger on the pricing policy of oil--Kissinger wanted to make everyone happy and he, Simon wanted to get the price down but that is something they could talk about after he got back from Japan #3 Simon said, Butz had called and asked him to reclimb on the the one million tons of grain and the President said I've decided that it's over--we are not going to let a bunch of Senators demagogue us into changing our position
The meeting ended at 10:25am

reclimb



Meeting with the President

11-13-74

1636 to 1652

Oval Office

Alone

[REDACTED]

I told him confidentially that Eberle would be going but that he and I both felt it should be held very tightly and the President said okay... hold it between the three of us. I said Eberle is going to come up with some names and that later we'll decide when to announce it.

The President took a phone call from the President of the Ohio Farm Bureau. [REDACTED]

I told the President the new schedule would be

8:15 a. m. Brent

8:30 a. m. Rumsfeld

9:00 a. m. Hartmann


9:15 a. m. Kissinger

9:45 a. m. Nessen and Rumsfeld


He agreed

I gave him the report that Dave Packard would be seeing him in Vegas or Phoenix and if not there then here Saturday. I told him that Packard felt he had problems on conflict of interest and they would be difficult to resolve. But I told the President that I thought they could be resolved and he should press it.

[REDACTED]



Next I went through the list of candidates for jobs -- former Members of Congress. The President had the following comments on Norris Cotton for the Cancer Advisory Board, okay -- Dominick for small ambassadorship, okay -- Marlo Cook for judgeship, okay -- Bennett for an advisory committee, okay -- Shoop for ICC, he said we just sent forward Corbett but if a vacancy occurs Shoop would be okay -- Kuykendall, he said was seeing Brinegar for some job at DOT -- Lamar Baker, he said someone should check his qualifications and that he recalls they sent over a recommendation for Rog for somebody else for the Park Service




I told him that Max Fisher had called on the Brown matter. And said that Paul Miltich had come to me with an idea that possibly the President to put this to bed ought to have a letter to Brown, the point being the President has not done anything except to have Nessen speak and it may be that if the story is going to keep rolling that it would be helpful to put it to bed by some action. . . . such as a letter to Brown. But I said that I really did not have a view on it and the other options of course were to do nothing and hope it kills the story or to fire him or to praise him or to call him in and talk to him and be able to say to Sigma Delta Ki that you have expressed yourself to General Brown and that's all you have to say on it. But the problem is that Brown put out a statement which cleans his skirts and the President has not done anything other than issue a statement. I said he ought to just be aware of those options. He said to talk to Bob about it. So I went in and I handed Hartmann the letter and the Brown statement and said "you've got the action" and walked out and Hartmann went in to see the President.

Then, as I was leaving the room, the President said he got a call from Henry Schlesinger and he wants a meeting of the NSC before we go to Russia and I said does he want a meeting of the NSC or does he want a private meeting? He said well he mentioned a meeting of the NSC. And I said oh. He said you know the problem there is that General Brown has privately given Henry a memo indicating that he is not unfavorable to what



Henry has talked to Brezhnev about. And I said Mr. President you have got a very tough procedural question here. No matter what you decide, eventually you're going to need the support of the Department of Defense to sell it in this country and of the Congress. People who are not in on the takeoff don't like to be in on the landing. I said secondly at least two Administrations have gotten themselves a little bit of trouble by dealing out of the White House with the JCS directly -- Johnson on bombing, and Nixon and Moore on other matters that bypassed Laird. I said at some point those kinds of things can blow the roof off. People don't like to be made the fool. I said of course that's what you have to weigh against the danger of a leak if you have an NSC meeting. A private meeting -- you know where the leak came from... if you're the only one in the room with Schlesinger. I said quite honestly, in my opinion, this is a very very tough question. It's a bitch. He said Don talk to Brent and Henry about it and see what they think. I went to see Brent and told him essentially that the President had returned Schlesinger's phone call. Schlesinger had asked for an NSC meeting. The President was concerned about having one for fear of a leak. Brent says that's right. I said to Brent that the President is aware of the arguments on the other side -- that is to say that at some point you will need the support of the Defense Department and secondly people don't like to be cut out of the action. The President wants your view as to what he should do in terms of whether or not he should meet with Schlesinger privately or should he call the NSC meeting. Brent said to me "I agree with you. The minimum he ought to meet with him privately." I said Brent I didn't say I had an opinion, I am just transmitting what the President said. I said you've got the action and get back to me with what you and Henry recommend.



Meeting with the President

7:12 to 7:23

11-13-74

The President made the ~~decision~~ decision ~~now~~ not to send George Brown a letter but to call him in person and tell him that everyone is entitled to some mistakes and he just made a beauty.... that he's a good officer and he should go back and do his job.... but he wanted him to know face to face that it was a bad mistake

I told the President about the Coal Agreement and that it should be held very confidentially. He agreed to do so... said he had heard about it from Rog

I talked to him about how to handle Dave Packard and urged him to urge Packard to come in

He said he wanted to see General ~~Strom~~ Brown at 7:15 and he's arranged for it

He said that Strom Thurmond, at the dinner last night, had asked if he was going to accept an ROA award in February. Someone should check the mail.... correspondence or the schedule office to find out about that

Finally, the President gave me a note saying that the husband of an old girlfriend of his from Nevada, named Dean Phillips, had told him that he sent him a letter urging him to see a friend of his when he goes to Japan. The President said see if you can dig out the letter. It's from Dean Phillips to the President concerning a friend of Dean Phillips' in Japan that he wants the President to see. If it makes any sense the way it could be handled is to have the friend invited to the reception that Hodgson is hosting for the American Community which, I believe, the President signed off on today.



Meeting with the President

11:13:74

10:45 p. m.

I called the President from my house and told him the more I thought about the Brown matter the more I was concerned the approach that he had outlined was inadequate. That in 2-4-6-8-10-12 months, he might feel that he had not handled it properly and I suggested that he...when he meets with Brown...that he makes sure that Brown leaves having a full understanding of the depth of the President's feelings about the Jewish people about the problems of persecution about their right to free expression and about the danger of the themes that Garbles put forward in World War II and have been put forward for centuries. As we talked, he agreed and indicated that he would like to also do that in response to a question~~s~~ at Sigma Delta Ki on Thursday evening. He asked me to get some ideas prepared. I finished the conversation about 10:55 and called Goldwin and asked him to get some remarks prepared and then call Cheney. I told the President that Goldwin would be dexting those remarks to him. ^{the} Along in the short of it is...the harm is that Brown...not that Brown said them but that he thinks them.

Goeller

